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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON POLITICAL AND FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
By 
Riatu Mariatul Qibthiyyah 
August 2008 
Committee Chair: Dr. Sally Wallace 
Major Department: Economics 
We address the questions on what determines local government proliferation, 
specifically on the impact of intergovernmental transfers on proliferation. On exploring 
the determinants of proliferation, we provide a more elaborate empirical technique than 
exists in the literature by employing panel binary outcome, survival regression, as well as 
count analysis to capture the time varying effect from intergovernmental transfers. We 
also examine the impact of proliferation on service delivery outcomes and construct 
channels by which the policy may affect the outcomes in the education and health 
sectors. We apply panel difference-in-difference estimation and we uniquely identify the 
different treatment group and thus control for the plausible differential impact on 
outcomes in regards to changes in intergovernmental transfers. 
On the determinants of local government formation, there are likely competing 
effects across transfers on the decision to proliferate as well as on the extent of 
fragmentation given that we find (1) the lump-sum conditional grants positively influence 
the probability of proliferation, (2) a province with higher median share of equalization 
grants associates with higher number of local governments, (3) higher equalization grants 
implies a longer duration to the proliferation event, and (4) higher tax sharing in the 
   
xvii 
 
proliferated local governments reflects higher stability where stability refers to the longer 
duration to the sequential proliferation event. The findings suggest the tactical central-
local behavior may be present, however, the support of rent-seeking hypothesis on 
proliferation should not be generalized to overall system of transfers.   
On the impact from the proliferation policy, the education and health outcomes 
estimations provide mixed results within the treatment group. The findings shed light on 
the current practice of administrative or political decentralization, specifically on the 
competing local-central preferences within each sector on measured service delivery 
outcomes. The results from difference-in-difference (DID) estimations show support on 
attainment of education outcome in new local governments represented by a reduction in 
the dropout rate but not on the quality of education in terms of higher students’ tests 
scores even though there is a relatively higher conditional grants allocated to the 
proliferated local governments. Meanwhile, in terms of infant mortality rate, we only find 
evidence of improvement in infant mortality on the originating local government but not 
on the new local governments. Controlling for selectivity and production function 
covariates have not changed the pattern of the impact. 
1 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Indonesia as a developing country in transition is a unique case study on how 
government might response to institutional change. The 1999 decentralization policy in 
Indonesia has introduced a more flexible procedure to create new jurisdictions.
1
 At the 
same time, major changes have occurred in the central-local fiscal system, specifically in 
the intergovernmental transfer system. Implemented in 2001, Indonesian decentralization 
policies have been characterized by rapid formation of new jurisdictions across the 
various levels of sub-national governments.  
Table 1 shows the number of local governments in Indonesia from year 1998-
2005. There are changes (formations and eliminations) to provinces that lead to a total of 
33 provinces in year 2005—up from 26 provinces. The formation of new jurisdictions 
occurs at the provincial level as well as at the municipality/city level. The number of new 
municipalities/cities has increased over the years with an average growth rate of 15 
percent per year. There were 6 new provinces and 139 new municipalities/cities formed 
during 1999-2003 and one province was formed in early 2004 while there were only 301 
municipalities and 26 provinces shortly in post East Timor secession. From Ministry of 
Home Affairs (MOHA), there are 27 municipalities/cities formed in 2007 and there are 
more of 8 new municipalities/cities formed in 2008 as reported by Ministry of Home 
Affairs (MOHA 2008). 
                                                 
1
 The Decentralization Law No. 22/1999 introduces a “decentralized procedure on local government 
formation”. Empowered legislative institutions have been involved in proposals for new municipalities and 
in the approval process of new local government creation during the decentralization period. Prior to this 
1999 Decentralization Law, the formation of new local government were processed within the central 
bureaucracy (the President) without involving legislatures either in the central or local government. 
2 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Number of Province, Municipalities, and Cities 1998-2005 
 
Administrative Level 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Province 27* 26 32 30 31 30 33 33
Municipality 249 268 268 268 302 349 349 349
City 65 73 73 85 89 91 91 91
Total 314 341 341 353 391 440 440 440
Sub Districts 4,028 4,044 4,049 4,224 4,918 4,994 5,277 5,641
Villages 67,925 69,065 69,050 68,819 70,460 70,921 69,858 71,555
 
Note: A reduction in the number of provinces in 1999 due to East Timor Independence, and the Law on 
Papua proliferation into three provinces (stipulated in year 2000) were abolished in 2001. Meanwhile, a 
reduction in the number of villages in 2004 is due the amalgamation of villages to follow a boundary based 
on nagari (tradition) in West Sumatera. Village is the lowest administration unit while subdistricts 
(kecamatan) are subsidiaries of municipality/city. 
Source: CBS (2006) 
 
Relying on the theory of fiscal decentralization, we use Arzaghi and Henderson 
(2005) theoretical analysis, and introduce intergovernmental transfers to fit the case of 
Indonesia assuming that the specific question on the determinants of local government 
formation can be viewed in the same manner as the question on why a country decides to 
decentralize (Arzaghi and Henderson 2005; Panizza 1999). The potential economic gains 
and loss from the proliferation, specifically the one that embedded in the 
intergovernmental transfers, explains the competing channels in which the initiative to 
local government proliferation occurs. Previous empirical studies are based on local 
government formation in developed democratic countries, mostly in the U.S or Canada 
(Burns 1994; Meligrana 2000). These countries obviously have different institutional 
settings when compared to the case of Indonesia.  
3 
 
 
Furthermore, in explaining the creation of local government, there has not yet 
been uniformity in the empirical methods as well as the variety of theoretical approach 
relying on case study specific. Some studies focus on the factors affecting the number of 
local governments (Fisher and Wassmer 1998; Martinez-Vazquez, Rider, and Walker 
1997), while other studies examine how differences in the collective decision process 
might affect the support of new local governments (Austin 1999, 1998). 
While our study is not intended to reconcile various theories on local government 
formation, the study offers a more comprehensive empirical approach for evaluating local 
government formation. By exploring the local government proliferation in Indonesia as 
events, it is one of few studies that examine how the pattern of local government structure 
evolved. The panel estimations may shed light on the underlying cause of proliferation 
and its relationship with the on-going process of decentralization.
2
 This dissertation 
improves upon previous studies on local government proliferation by exploring the 
channels by which intergovernmental transfers may affect the proliferation policy as in 
the case of Indonesia. 
In that context, we investigated the occurrence of proliferation events as the binary 
choice outcome, the extent of fragmentation, and in terms of the duration or hazard risk 
to the event occurrence. We addressed the following questions: (1) what economic and 
political factors determine the decision to proliferate as well as the extent of government 
fragmentation, (2) whether the time varying factors affect the probability of local 
                                                 
2
 Fitrani, Hofman, and Kaiser (2005) pioneered an empirical evaluation of what motivates Indonesia 
municipalities’ proliferation, but their findings are less clear cut on the role of decentralization.  
 
4 
 
 
government proliferation, and (3) whether the factors that affect the hazard of splitting 
are similar to the ones affecting the occurrence of proliferation.  
As stated in each Law for new local governments, the statutory objective of local 
government formation is to improve the efficiency of service delivery either by 
incorporating heterogeneous preferences (to better match the local needs) and/or by 
eliminating or by reducing any geographical constraints.
3
 This objective is mainly based 
on the theory of fiscal decentralization that posits that smaller governments can perform 
better and may lead to costs saving either through the intensified correspondence between 
benefit coverage and cost sharing or local preferences (McGuire 1991, Oates 1972, 
1999), or as a result of competitive decentralization (Tiebout 1956).4  
Following Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) theoretical model, we lay out the 
hypothesis on the plausible impact from local government proliferation policy on service 
delivery outcome in education and health. This is the first study associating local 
government proliferation with local government service outcomes in Indonesia as well as 
for the case of developing countries in general. Furthermore, the analysis may indirectly 
show the outcome of general decentralization policy in Indonesia even though we focus 
on the outcome effect of the proliferation (i.e., the creation of new local governments—
one part of the decentralization program in Indonesia). 
Based on municipality panel data from 1993-2005, we apply Difference-in-
Difference (DID) approach to test whether the proliferation improved or deteriorated 
                                                 
3
 Incorporating heterogeneous preferences reflects the allocative efficiency objective while an example of 
reduction in geographical constraints reflects technical efficiency objective. 
4
 Lower costs of services are expected to be the consequence of higher competition across local (smaller) 
governments (Tiebout 1956). 
5 
 
 
quality of education and health outcomes. In this case, we aim (1) to examine whether 
there is uniform impact of the proliferation policy within the proliferated local 
governments on each measured outcomes and thus accounted the plausible heterogeneity 
within the treatment group, and (2) to explore whether the effect of proliferation policy 
on measured outcome(s) follows an instantaneous or gradual path that may signal the 
sustainability of the impacts. 
For policymakers, understanding the causes and the impact of decentralization 
policies (i.e., fiscal and administrative decentralization) is necessary to make 
decentralization “work” in the sense of increasing efficiency or improvement in income 
distribution. The recent trend of local government formation in Indonesia is only one 
example of how stakeholders may respond to an implemented decentralization policy. 
The outcome of any government policy will be influenced by how the policy creates 
appropriate incentive mechanisms for their stakeholders. This dissertation aims to better 
understand an applied decentralization policy and its impact using the case of Indonesia 
local government proliferation. 
We approached the analysis on the determinants of local government formation 
through the initiative process at local level. Therefore, the examination of the economic 
consequence on the approval process of local government formation is beyond the scope 
of this study. By focusing on the initiative process at the local level, this dissertation 
simplifies the competing factors only within one local government. Furthermore, this 
dissertation also limits impact evaluation only on the case of how the proliferation may 
affect service outcomes in education and health sectors. The measured impact of 
6 
 
 
proliferation policy on service outcome is only one of several plausible outcomes that 
may have been affected from the occurrence of proliferation. 
The remaining chapters would be organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the 
theoretical model of local government proliferation, abstracting from theory of fiscal 
federalism developed by Arzaghi and Henderson (2005). The maintained hypothesis is 
empirically tested using the panel logit and panel hazard risk estimation as well as count 
data analysis on number of new local governments. Chapter 3 evaluates the impact of 
Indonesian proliferation policy in terms of how it affects the service delivery outcomes in 
education and health. We assume that standard output measures of education (graduation 
rate, test scores, enrollment rate, and dropout rate) and health (infant mortality rate) 
represent increased efficiency in the public sector.
5
  An estimation approach of 
Difference-in-Difference panel regression is applied. A concluding chapter 4 summarizes 
the results of the two essays and ties them together in the context of the theory and 
practice of fiscal decentralization in Indonesia.
                                                 
5
 In terms of local service provision, there are local public goods that may be affected more by 
decentralization since tastes and preferences vary across the country. The education sector is mostly studied 
to represent local provision, and to a degree is health sector as well. The efficiency in analyzing the impact 
of local government formation as one of decentralization outcome refers to the allocative efficiency (Oates 
1972) 
7 
 
CHAPTER II 
THE DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROLIFERATION 
 
Introduction 
The objective of this essay is to examine empirically the determinants of local 
government proliferation in Indonesia under its ongoing program of decentralization. 
Following Arzaghi and Henderson’s (2005) theoretical analysis, we introduce 
intergovernmental transfers to fit the case of Indonesia, assuming in doing so that the 
specific question of the determinants of local government formation can be viewed in the 
same manner as the question of why a country decides to decentralize (Arzaghi and 
Henderson 2005; Panizza 1999). In this study, we explore the plausibility of a connection 
between the trend toward local government proliferation in Indonesia as an event 
associated with the country’s overall decentralization policies. 
Previous studies on what may cause proliferation have ranged from the efficiency 
argument of proliferation, which may relate to the allocative efficiency of the fulfillment 
of local preference (Oates 1972; Tiebout 1956), to the productivity argument on the 
presence of economies of scale (Fox and Gurley 2006; Sole-Olle and Bosch 2005) as well 
as to the financial incentive of fiscal resources (Haimanko, Le Breton, and Weber 2005; 
Le Breton and Weber 2003) or the preference for smaller-size income redistribution 
(Buchanan and Faith 1987; Epple and Romer 1989). Meanwhile, the political bargaining 
process may also drive local government proliferation (Krause and Bowman 2005; 
Tyrefors 2006); thus, we can view decisions on proliferation as manifestation of policy 
disagreements between party interests. 
8 
 
 
Focusing on the 1999-2003 proliferation events, we applied a binary outcome as 
well as a count data analysis to explore the determinants of the proliferation. Aside that 
the panel estimation provides more information than the static cross-section binary 
outcome estimations, we applied the panel logit and probit estimations to examine the 
time-varying intergovernmental transfers. We also applied hazard risk estimation, which 
has not been used in other studies on local government formation (i.e., amalgamation or 
proliferation).  This empirical strategy may supplement previous studies on the dynamics 
of local government proliferation concerning the issue of sequential proliferation events, 
which is a special case in the current trend of proliferation in Indonesia. Alternatively, we 
also analyzed the proliferation trend as a form of government fragmentation as count 
data, and the analysis of this count data refers to estimation at the province level. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes 
the structure of local government in Indonesia, which also reveals the structure of the 
intergovernmental system before and after the 1999 decentralization legislation. Past 
studies on the motivation underlying local government proliferation is discussed in the 
literature review. In the theory section, we review the Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) 
model of fiscal federalism in the context of Indonesian local government proliferation. 
Using an estimation approach explained in the empirical section, we test the hypothesis 
derived from the theoretical model. The last two sections contain an analysis of the 
results and a discussion that synthesizes the results. 
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 Local Government in Indonesia 
The following section briefly describes the intergovernmental structure in 
Indonesia as a link to the pattern of Indonesian decentralization policies. The description 
of the law concerning the creation of new local governments shows how the 
administrative procedure was part of a political process at both the local and central 
government levels. 
The Intergovernmental Structure 
Indonesia is a unitary system with a two-tier subnational level of government. The 
subnational governments are referred to as provincial and municipalities/cities. The 
province and the municipality/city levels are general purpose types of government. Below 
a municipality are other local units, subdistricts (kecamatan) and villages. In this case, 
subdistricts (kecamatan) are subdivisions of a municipality, and a village is the lowest 
local administrative unit.  
Before 2001, the local bureaucracies were all appointed by the central government 
and local assemblies were all relatively weak. The central government gave direct 
assistance and financial support to all lower levels of governments. The de-concentrated 
central government employees directly conducted the development programs in the 
regions (e.g., the education and health sectors). The central government essentially 
handled the provision of all public services because the decentralization policy before 
2001 was only a form of de-concentrated government (Alm, Aten, and Bahl 2001). 
However, real decentralization began to occur starting in 2001. The “Big Bang” 
decentralization policies that began in force in 2001 were a reform of intergovernmental 
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hierarchy. Under Law No. 22/1999, which was then amended by Law No. 32/2004, the 
autonomous subnational governments gained more discretion over expenditure 
allocations and were given more resources under the new intergovernmental transfer 
system.  
The 1999 Decentralization Law introduced devolution on expenditures 
specifically at the municipality level but kept taxation centralized. There are options to 
levy fees and charges (i.e., new taxes), but as part of its oversight power, the central 
government (i.e., MOHA with the Ministry of Finance [MOF] in an advisory role) may 
overrule new fees and charges set by lower level governments. The limited fiscal 
autonomy of subnational governments before and after the 1999 Decentralization Law is 
offset by the presence of intergovernmental transfers that are still the main source of 
revenue for most provinces and municipalities/cities (Hofman, Kaiser, and Suharnoko 
2006). The lowest local unit (villages) receives financing from either the municipality or 
province level or directly from the central government. In the course of decentralization, 
the central government has become clearer and more specific about the funds that 
subnational governments are entitled to. These changes in the way intergovernmental 
transfers are handled are viewed as benefits to the subnational governments by helping 
them better plan their budgets (World Bank 2005).   
Law No. 22/1999 not only rearranged and introduced some autonomy within the 
subnational bureaucracy, the law also gave substantial authority to previously weak 
legislative institutions. The post-1999 structure of intergovernmental systems has also 
recently changed in response to the amended 1999 Decentralization Law. Figure 1 and 
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Figure 2 show how the 1999 decentralization altered the intergovernmental system in 
Indonesia not only in terms of hierarchy across levels of government but also in terms of 
the relationship between the executive and legislative (i.e., assembly) branches. Figure 1 
and Figure 2 show large changes in the number of local units after 1999 because of the 
addition and subtraction of governmental units at almost all levels of subnational 
government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The structure of local government refers to Law No 5/1974. The number of local government units 
refers to the average of 1998 data. 
Source: Law No 22/1999, CBS (2006) 
Figure 1. Government Structure Before 1999 
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Source: Law No 22/1999, CBS (2006) 
Figure 2. Government Structure Based on 1999 Decentralization Law 
 
In 2004, Law No. 22/1999 was amended and replaced by Law No. 32/2004. This 
brought major changes in the functions assigned to each level of government, and   the 
role of local legislatures (DPRD) was affected by the new requirement for direct election 
of the head of the region. Figure A1 in the Appendix A shows the changes in the 
intergovernmental system in effect after Law No. 32/2004. Starting in 2004, the 
representative system of appointment of the head of the region was changed to direct 
election. Direct election also was instituted at the municipal and provincial levels of 
government. In this case, Law No. 32/2004 also reassigns to the provincial level some 
oversight functions regarding lower levels of government, especially municipalities. 
These constant changes in the intergovernmental system were part of a quest to improve 
the accountability of central and local governments; this quest implicitly shows a shift 
from administrative to political decentralization. 
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The Intergovernmental Transfers 
These changes in intergovernmental relations were intertwined with the 
introduction of intergovernmental transfers. The 1999 Decentralization Law also consists 
of Law No. 25/1999, which outlined the framework of intergovernmental transfers during 
the decentralization period. In this case, the law introduced the concept of revenue 
sharing of natural resources taxes (DBH), central taxes (i.e., property and income taxes), 
and equalization grants, which consist of general unconditional grants (DAU) and 
conditional grants (DAK). 
 The pool of funds for the DAU consists of a constant percentage of central 
government net domestic revenue. In Law No. 25/1999, the pool grant for the DAU is set 
as 25 % from total net domestic revenue, and this pool of grant revenue stayed the same 
for 2001-2004, but increased to 25.5 % in 2005.  The new Law No. 33/2004 stipulates a 
second increase of equalization grants (DAU) to 26 % in the last couple of years (Sidik 
2007). At the same time, the central government increasingly resorted to DAK, which 
basically is similar to mandated expenditure programs. In 2002-2004, the amount of 
DAK was less than 3 trillion Rp (MOF 2007); however, the amount of DAK soars, as 
shown by the total amount of transfers of around 21.2 trillion in 2008. However, this 
amount of DAK is still 10 % of DAU pool funds, which total 179. 5 trillion Rp planned 
for allocation to provinces and municipalities in 2008.  
Other than an increased share of the DAU pool as well as of the DAK in the 
national budget, the early stages of implementation of the 1999 Decentralization Law 
were characterized by frequent changes in the allocation scheme (formula) of DAU. 
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According to Hofman, Kaiser, and Suharnoko (2006) and Sidik (2007), the changes in the 
allocation scheme of the equalization grants (DAU) are in (1) the weighted index 
between the costs reimbursement part of the grants and the allocation based on the 
formula part of fiscal capacity and proxy of fiscal need,
6
 (2) the shared weight indicators 
used within the basic allocation or in the formula part of the grants, and (3) the indicators 
used to represent fiscal capacity and fiscal need.  
In this case, the lump sum part of the equalization grants (DAU) and the “hold 
harmless” clause may intensify the common resource problem embedded in DAU 
allocation scheme. In this case, the originating local government does not bear the real 
cost of its smaller jurisdictions because of the “hold harmless” clause in DAU, which 
implies there is no need to adjust its current smaller jurisdiction. The cost-reimbursement 
part of the DAU made lower level government’s power non-binding in re-sizing local 
administration (Hofman, Kaiser, and Suharnoko 2006).  
Thus, it seems that the decision to increase allocation of the grant pool as stated in 
the 2004 Decentralization Law is owed more to the use of persistent ad hoc practices for 
cost reimbursement in the DAU than to the formula part of the equalization grants. In this 
case, the lump sum weight and the “hold harmless” requirement which was phased out 
too slow in the face of the expansion in numbers of local governments eliminated the 
ability to use the law’s specified formula. Higher pool of grants put pressure on the 
stability of the national fiscal budget. 
                                                 
6
 As for the weighted index between the lump sum part of the grants and their formula part, the share of 
weight on the formula allocation part of the equalization grants allocation had increased up to 65 % in 2004 
but declined to 50 % 2005-2007.  See Sidik (2007). 
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Meanwhile, with respect to the DAK allocation,
7
 basically municipalities within 
the special autonomy regions as well as the proliferation of local governments (i.e., new 
local governments) were granted higher lump sum amounts of DAK (Sidik 2007, 412-
413). Based on the DAK allocations in 2003-2005, the new local governments received 4 
billion Rp of lump sum DAK each year to set up new infrastructure for at least two or 
three years. The current law concerning new governments explicitly stipulates that the 
originating local government is required to allocate this central lump sum transfer amount 
to the new local government. The pertinent clause about the financing source is also 
stated in current regulation, PP No. 78/ 2007. In this case, there is an increase in  lump 
sum DAK transfers to 5 billion Rp for the new local governments formed in 2007-2008, 
an allocation that is specified in each law concerning these new local governments 
(MOHA 2008). The possible gains in lump sum transfers received by new local 
governments are higher when the new local government is relatively small in comparison 
with the average.  
In terms of natural resource tax sharing (DBH), Law No. 25/1999 clearly states 
the scope of natural resource taxes that are subject to revenue sharing and the allocation 
scheme of the transfers. In this case, tax sharing from natural resources is allocated to the 
producing municipalities as well as to the other municipalities within the province. These 
neighboring non-producing municipalities within a province receive “lump sum” natural 
resource tax sharing that reflects the spillover effect of the transfers. As stated in a report 
                                                 
7
 The allocation of DAK is more complex and less transparent than the DAU formula, given that there are 
many types of conditional grants including the fact that there are still de-concentrated funds (Dana 
Dekonsentrasi dan Tugas Pembantuan) that involve various ministries within the central government that 
are responsible for the formulation and allocation of the grants to the region. 
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by Decentralization Support Facilities (DSF), the new local governments have benefited 
by these lump sum transfers that at the same time have reduced the share of natural 
resource transfers to nonproducing local governments within the province (DSF 2007). 
The new and originating local governments may end up receiving more shares of the 
grants at the expense of other local governments’ transfers, which in the case of natural 
resources, refers to the neighboring local governments within a province. To some extent, 
natural resource tax sharing may also provide a proliferation incentive similar to how the 
lump sum part of specific grants have acted  as a direct incentive for the creation of new 
local governments.  
Overall, developments in central and local government finance reflect an 
increased trend in the use of intergovernmental transfers, which is shown by a growing 
pool of transfers not only in the form of equalization grants but also in terms of 
conditional grants. As a comparison with cross-country intergovernmental transfers 
elsewhere, the pool of equalization grants, even excluding the share of conditional grants, 
in the case of Indonesia is far above the average vertical sharing typical of developing 
countries. The average vertical sharing figure is around 13.3 % of total central tax 
revenues (Bahl and Wallace 2007).8 Furthermore, the high percentage of costs 
reimbursement as indicated by the current Indonesian transfers system implies that the 
overall transfers system tends to be not unconditional, which may downplay the 
expenditures devolution given to the local governments. As noted by Bahl and Wallace 
                                                 
8
 As shown in Bahl and Wallace (2007) in Table 1, pp. 209.   
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(2007), the ideal approach in devolution of expenditure responsibilities should be taken 
through unconditional transfers.  
The Process of Local Government Formation 
The definition of local government formation in Indonesia follows government 
regulations as stated in the amended Peraturan Pemerintah (PP) PP No. 129/2000 as well 
as PP No. 78/2007. Jurisdiction formation is defined as any change in political 
administration status that involves changes in the structure of one’s jurisdiction. PP No. 
129/2000 states that the creation of new subnational governments (i.e., municipality/city 
or province) can take the following forms: (1) municipalities secede from one particular 
province to form a new province; or (2) division of one municipality into several new 
municipalities; or (3) creation of one municipality from parts of two or more existing 
municipalities.  
The formation of new subnational governments, up to 2003, was typically a result 
of the division of an existing province, municipality, or city (as in the type (2) form of 
local government formation). No amalgamations occurred at the municipality/city or 
province levels of government (as in the type (3) form of local government formation). 
Amalgamation, which is defined as the merging of two or more local governments, only 
occurred at the lowest level of government (i.e., the village). The formation of new 
villages, either as a result of amalgamation or of division, is not within the scope of this 
study because changes at this level involve procedures that differ from the way that 
municipalities/cities and provinces are formed. Under Law 32/2004, a village unit as 
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defined in Law 32/2004 is now basically a subunit of municipalities/cities, which thus 
municipality has authority over any changes in its territory. 
PP No. 129/2000 lists the general requirements for the formation, expansion, 
elimination, and unification of local government(s). To date, the government has issued 
new Law No. 32/2004 on local government that amends Law No. 22/1999. In this case, 
the government just issued PP No. 78/2007 on December 10, 2007, as a follow-up 
regulation to Law No. 32/2004 to replace PP No. 129/2000, which referred to Law No. 
22/1999. The three-year lag between the stipulation of Law No. 32/2004 and PP 
No.78/2007 represents the “moratorium” that existed 2004-2006 on the formation of new 
local governments. 
Given the empirical focus here on events from 1999 to 2003, we review local 
government (municipalities/cities) proliferation in accordance with Law No. 22/1999 and 
PP No.129/2000. The current new regulation, PP No. 78/2008, differs from the previous 
regulation, PP No. 129/2000, in terms of the required local documentation for initiating  a 
proposal for a new local government but retains the general approval procedure within 
the central government. Unlike the previous regulation in which opinion at the grass-
roots level was optional (i.e., supporting documents), PP No. 78/2007 states that the a 
local legislative or mayoral decision that originates a proposal for a new local 
government must have approval from a majority of villages council (BPD) and subdistrict 
councils (Forum Komunikasi Kelurahan) that would come under the jurisdiction of the 
new local government. Furthermore, the law now governing formation of new local 
governments requires separate approval of each one, disallowing the pooled approval of 
19 
 
 
several new governments stated in one law as under the earlier practice. The law now in 
effect also states the amount of funds that the new local government will receive and their 
source.  
In addition to governing the general formative procedure and the approval 
process, PP No. 78/2007 also explains financing sources to the new local governments. In 
this case, the current law on new local governments states the amount of funds and 
financing sources available to them. Nonetheless, the law only refers to the allocation of 
central governments funds that are channeled through the originating local governments 
as well as provinces. In this case, the stated amount of funds allocated to the new local 
governments is legally binding on the originating local governments and provinces as to 
the mandated use of the funds.
9
 This is also resembles the requirement that local 
legislatures and mayors must have majority support at the community level before they 
originate any proposal for a new local government.  
Box 1 presents the list of documents that should be sent by the proposing agency, 
which is usually the originating local government. As shown in Box 1, the proposal for 
creating new local government(s) should be supported by the local assembly and/or head 
of region of the existing (i.e., originating) municipalities and higher level government 
(i.e., province).10 In practice, the initiative to form a new local government generally 
comes from the local legislatures. During 1999-2003, the local legislatures initiated more 
than 62% of the proposals for new local governments, and only about 15% of such 
                                                 
9
 There is a claim that the new local governments frequently did not receive the full amount of the grants 
(DSF 2007). 
 
10
 The decision making does not necessarily represent majority rule referring to the median voter. 
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proposals originated with a mayor (MOHA 2005). The governor may also propose new 
local governments, which is the case in municipality expansion in Papua. 
 
 
Box 1. The Legal Process of Municipality/City Formation 
 
A. Legal proposal documents for new local governments 
(submitted by the originating local government):  
• Local council approval (SK DPRD II) 
• Head of region’s approval (SK head of region) 
• Governor’s approval (letter of recommendation) 
• Provincial Legislature approval (SK DPRD I) 
• Regional regulations on new jurisdiction: name and location of new capital city.  
 
B. Supporting Documents  
(from local community and/or the originating local government): 
• Public initiative (letter of support from community/group). This type of support letter (i.e., 
community groups or NGOs) is not mandatory. 
• Preliminary viability study (financed by the originating local government). 
• Field survey* 
• Maps of new local governments (draft of new local government’s regulations, which should also 
include the candidates for a new municipality’s capital) 
 
C. The approval process  
(at the central level): 
• The head of the region (of the originating region) and/or the local assembly submit the proposal of 
the new local government and the evaluation result to MOHA (Ministry of Home Affairs). The 
proposal includes all the documents shown in A and B. 
• DPOD (Regional Autonomy Council) creates a field survey* team that will check the reports (i.e., 
the evaluation results) submitted by the region (originating region). In this case, MOHA is the 
head team within DPOD. 
• MOHA will submit the proposal of new local government to the National Assembly, based on the 
completeness of the proposal for a new local government**, including the DPOD evaluation from 
the field survey report. 
• The National Assembly (Committee II) will process and can either jointly approve (with MOHA) 
or independently approve the proposal of new local government(s) and issue drafts of new local 
government laws.  
• The draft of the law approved in the National Assembly is signed by the president. The law takes 
effect when the president signs the law (i.e., legal background) for the new jurisdictions. 
 
*The field survey can be done by either the provincial legislature, central legislature, DPOD/DPD or central government (MOHA)  
** MOHA approval of the administrative process is mostly based on completeness of  the paperwork and the impact on national 
politics. 
Sources: Law No. 22/1999 and PP No. 129/2000. 
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The approval process starts after the proposing agency submits the proposal for a 
new local government to the central government. MOHA is the agency that evaluates the 
paperwork and assesses the feasibility studies for the proposed new local governments. A 
field survey done by the Regional Autonomy Council (DPOD) and/or Regional 
Representatives (DPD) is the next step in evaluation, which gives input to the National 
Assembly.
11
  
MOHA is the executive agency within the central government with responsibility 
for evaluating proposed new local governments and submitting the proposal to the 
National Assembly for joint approval. Thus, no direct referendum is needed for approval 
of new jurisdiction(s). Furthermore, the joint approval between the executive branch and 
the National Assembly is not the only approval mechanism. The National Assembly can 
also independently approve proposed new local governments, and its decisions cannot be 
reversed by the executive branch. Thus, within the central government, the legislators in 
the National Assembly tend to play a larger role than the central administration in the 
approval of the new local governments. Local government can submit a proposal for a 
new local government directly to the National Assembly, although the draft of the 
legislation must eventually be signed by the president.  
                                                 
11
 DPOD (Dewan Pertimbangan Otonomi Daerah) is an independent commission on decentralization. This 
commission reports directly to the president on decentralization issues, including assessing new local 
government proposals. Meanwhile, the DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah) consists of local elected 
representatives in the National Assembly who have no political party affiliation. DPD representatives do 
not have the same full rights as elected representatives from a political party, such as the right to vote on a 
draft bill submitted to the National Assembly (DPR). Thus, their role is somewhat the same as DPOD’s. 
They can only give input and recommendations to the National Assembly on regional or decentralization 
issues. 
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In the case of a proposed new local government submitted to the MOHA, this 
ministry would assess the viability of the feasibility studies submitted along with the 
administrative paperwork before submitting the proposal to the National Assembly. The 
existing laws (No. 22/1999 or PP No. 129/2000 and Law No. 32/2004 or PP No.78/2007) 
do not specify a time limit for submission of a proposal to the assembly once it has been 
submitted to MOHA or on the approval process after the proposal is submitted to the 
National Assembly.  
In the proliferation that occurred 1999-2003, the time required from submission to 
approval ranged from one year to three years.12 In general, the draft for a new local 
government can be approved within a year once it is submitted to the National Assembly. 
However, even after a proposal is approved and enacted as law, the approved new local 
governments do not automatically become autonomous local governments at that point. 
Instead, new local governments undergo a transition phase in which they are still 
managed under the originating local governments, at least for the time required to set up 
the infrastructure (i.e., the local legislatures and administration).  
Overall, Table 2 presents the number and date of stipulation, 1999-2004, of new 
municipalities, new cities, or new provinces. Note that in any given year, the National 
Assembly frequently pooled its approval of proposed new local governments. 
Proliferation occurs in most provinces as an outcome of decentralization policies. 
                                                 
12
 MOHA officials stated that there are also cases in which proposals for a new local government(s) are 
processed in less than one year, as in the case of the creation of the new city of Batu in East Java, which 
seceded from the municipality of Malang (MOHA, 2005). Nonetheless, there are also cases in which the 
evaluation process of a proposed municipality is halted in the National Assembly. For example, in 2006, 
the National Assembly only approved 12 of 31 drafts for new municipalities/cities. Discussion of other 
drafts (18) were postponed. 
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However, the number of new local governments varies across provinces. Table 3 shows 
the distribution of new local governments across provinces. Table 3 shows these changes 
in the number of municipalities within each province in comparison to 1998.   
 
Table 2. Number of New Provinces, Municipalities, and Cities, 1999-2004 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Provinces 0* 5 0 1 0 1 
Municipalities 36 0 1 33 48 0 
Cities 6 0 12 4 1 0 
Date of Stipulation 20-Apr-
99
1)
 
4-Oct-99
2)
 
12-Apr-
00 
21-Jun-01
3)
 
3-July-01
4)
 
10-Apr-02
5) 
25-Oct-02
6) 
11-Dec-02
7)
 
23-Feb-03
8)
 
18-Dec-03
9)
 
5-Oct-04 
Note:  
(1) 6 cities and 5 new municipalities were approved April 20, 1999 
(2) 31 new municipalities were approved October 4, 1999 
(3) 12 new cities were approved June 21, 2001 
(4) 1 district (Kepulauan Seribu) in DKI Jakarta was approved July 3, 2001 
(5) 19 new municipalities and 3 cities were approved  April 10, 2002 
(6) The central assembly approved 1 new province, Riau Islands,  October 25, 2002. 
(7) 14 new municipalities in Papua Province and 1 city in West Java were approved December 11, 2002.  
(8) 24 new municipalities were approved December 18, 2003. 
(9) 24 new municipalities and 1 city were approved February 23, 2003. 
 
Sources: Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA 2005), Ministry of State Secretary (2005), and Central Bureau 
of Statistics (CBS) (2007) 
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Table 3. Number of Municipalities and Cities by Provinces in 1998 and 2005 
 1998 2005 
Province Municipalities Cities Total Municipalities Cities Total 
NAD 11 2 13 17 4 21 
North Sumatera  11 6 17 18 7 25 
West Sumatera  8 6 14 12 7 19 
Riau 5 2 7 9 2 11 
Riau Islands 2002)    4 2 6 
Jambi 5 1 6 9 1 10 
South Sumatera  7 3 10 10 4 14 
Bangka Belitung 2000)    6 1 7 
Bengkulu 3 1 4 8 1 9 
Lampung 5 2 7 8 2 10 
DKI Jakarta 0 5 5 1 5 6 
West Java  14 7 21 16 9 25 
Banten 2000) 3 1 4 4 2 6 
Central Java  29 6 35 29 6 35 
Yogyakarta 4 1 5 4 1 5 
East java 28 9 37 29 9 38 
West Kalimantan  6 1 7 10 2 12 
Central Kalimantan  5 1 6 13 1 14 
East Kalimantan  4 3 7 9 4 13 
South Kalimantan  9 2 11 11 2 13 
Bali  8 1 9 8 1 9 
West Nusa  6 1 7 7 2 9 
East Nusa  12 1 13 15 1 16 
South Sulawesi  19 2 21 20 3 23 
West Sulawesi 2004)    5 0 5 
Central Sulawesi  6 1 7 9 1 10 
North Sulawesi  4 3 7 6 3 9 
Gorontalo 2000)    4 1 5 
North East Sulawesi 4 1 5 8 2 10 
Maluku 3 2 5 7 1 8 
North Maluku 2000)    6 2 8 
Papua 9 1 10 19 1 20 
West Papua 2000)    8 1 9 
East Timor
1)
 12 1     
Total 241 73 314 349 91 440 
Note: The year when each new province is formed is in parentheses, (1) East Timor became an independent country in 1999. 
Sources: Compiled from Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA 2005) and Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS 2006)    
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In summary, the administrative process describes how the initiatives to propose 
new local governments or the decisions of the originating local government to proliferate 
are generally conducted at local level, but the approval process is handled by the central 
government. However, the decision-making that goes into the approval process and 
influences how long the process takes is less clear. One reason for this murkiness is that 
no proposed new local government has been rejected. Indeed, it seems that the approval 
process that occurs at the central government level is not necessarily an indicator that the 
central government plays a decisive role in the creation of new local governments.  
This administrative process of local government formation leads us to focus on 
what factors at the local level affect the initiative to form new local governments and thus 
assume that those factors also correspond to the approval process. Given the positive 
context within which new local governments are formed in Indonesia especially because 
a proposal for a new local government has ever been denied, it is better to assume that the 
proliferation is a result of the initiation process and thus limit the decision making 
process at the local level. The following section reviews the general plausibility factors 
that may affect the formation of local governments either as proliferation or 
amalgamation. 
 
 Literature Review 
This section briefly describes the previous literature on local government 
formation and the potential problems presented by proliferation. We review the factors 
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that may drive proliferation, drawing from studies of other countries’ experiences. We 
cast the discussion in terms of Indonesia whenever possible. 
What May Motivate Proliferation? 
 
The creation of new political jurisdictions means a location change of government 
(i.e., changes in the location of the capital for new municipality), smaller territorial 
boundaries for the originating municipalities, and a change in population (i.e., 
demographic change) for both the new and originating municipalities. Diseconomies of 
scale because of jurisdictions that are too large may be a reason in some cases for local 
government proliferation in Indonesia. The changes that result from proliferation (i.e., 
smaller jurisdictions) may affect government cost structures, and cost-saving in the 
provision of services may result either from reduced (dis)economies of scale or from 
improvement in allocative efficiency because of better use of resources (Oates 1972; 
Tiebout 1956).  
Based on Spanish local governments, Sole-Olle and Bosch (2005) found the 
presence of economies of scale was not influential because of an increase in per capita 
costs for jurisdictions with larger populations. They explained that the presence of service 
delivery consumed by non-residents may be one of the reasons for higher per capita costs 
in larger jurisdiction (i.e., local government with high population).  Also, Nelson (1992), 
based on a case in Sweden, found larger jurisdiction size is associated with higher public 
sector size, measured in terms of the growth of real per capita government expenditures. 
 When the initial jurisdiction coverage is large, spatial (benefit) decay in providing 
local services would hamper government services effectiveness. Spatial decay is loosely 
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translated as the economic and political costs of providing local services (Arzaghi and 
Henderson 2005; Panizza 1999). Larger-sized local government may be associated with 
heterogeneous preferences, and thus it may reduce the ability of local government 
redistribution (Oates 1972). Some studies show that individuals tend to increase 
redistribution in a less ethno-fragmented population (Alesina and Spolaore 2003; Alesina, 
Baqir, and Hoxby 2004; Bjorvatn and Cappelen 2006; Luttmer 2001). 
In terms of tax administration, a smaller jurisdiction may imply better assessment 
of some tax bases and thus improved efficiency (Bahl and Linn 1994). Furthermore, local 
and central tax administration may also be used to check for possible fraud, implying that 
the potential efficacy of audit and enforcement to deter corruption may cancel out the loss 
of efficiency because of duplication services (Mikesell 2007). 
The creation of new local governments can also be viewed as a preference for a 
smaller size of redistribution (Buchanan and Faith 1987; Epple and Romer 1989). The 
jurisdiction with more higher-income individuals may decide to discontinue subsidizing 
those jurisdictions with larger concentrations of low income individuals by forming new 
local governments because larger transfers may translate into higher tax rates that they 
(i.e., the high income jurisdiction) should bear (Buchanan and Faith 1987). Brink (2004), 
using the case of Sweden municipality secession, shows that residents in the wealthy part 
of the municipality tend to support secession more than residents from other parts of the 
municipality.  
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Meanwhile, proliferation results in a higher number of local governments that 
may represent various choices in local services that allow individuals to self-select on 
local governments that better suit their preferences (Tiebout 1956). This “voting with 
your feet” view associates proliferation with more competition that leads to lower cost of 
services. Nonetheless, geographical constraints that are not uniform across the country 
suggest that a higher number of local governments may not be an indication of more 
competitive local governments.   
In the case of Indonesia, the formation of new local governments has given the 
new local government access to central government transfers (Fane 2003; Sakai 2003). 
With respect to proliferation, Fane (2003) thinks that the lump sum component of the 
equalization grant (DAU) favors to a degree the new smaller local government. Figure 
A2 in Appendix A shows an increasing total share of grant-formula allocations over the 
years to the proliferated local governments. On average, the equalization grants (DAU) as 
a share of the total pool of grants received by the proliferated local governments has 
increased during decentralization, but even excluding lump sum supporting grants 
(infrastructure grants to the proliferated local governments), the total share of DAK 
grants to the proliferated local governments has also increased. Nonetheless, a more 
transparent formula-based grants allocation can mitigate concerns that grants dependency 
might only lead to rent-seeking local government (Ahmad et al. 2005; Seabright 1996; 
Shah 1998). 
The theory of fiscal federalism (Oates 1972) emphasizes how accountability may 
be more sustained in a lower level government; Matsubayashi (2007) in a similar 
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approach, shows that less populous and highly decentralized states are associated with 
higher democracy as a result of higher system support, which in this case, refers to 
citizen’s support for a democratic regime. Also, Besley and Case (1995) view political 
competition as a way to measure whether the performance of neighboring local 
governments may be perceived as a benchmark of whether or not voters view the 
incumbent politician as successful. In this setting, a higher number of local governments 
would signal the extent of political competition, which also is in line with the context of 
Tiebout (1956). 
However, political competition can also be viewed in terms of party or electoral 
competition. In this case, higher voting power for smaller local governments has also 
made politicians favor proliferation because of the higher return of votes from local 
government with a relatively lower population (Grossman 1994; Krause and Bowman 
2005). However, as in the context of representative governance, there is also a tradeoff 
from proliferation policy in which the originating local government would have lesser 
voting power. In a decentralized system, the vote competition between the elected 
incumbent politician and a legislator proposing proliferation may well explain 
proliferation policy as a bargaining process at local level.  
To sum up, previous studies on what may cause proliferation range from the 
efficiency argument of proliferation, which may relate to the following factors: (1) the 
internalization of coordination costs in the presence of spillovers (Bahl and Linn 1994; 
Oates 1972; Sole-Olle and Bosch 2005; Tiebout 1956); (2) the equity on tax preferences 
(Le Breton and Weber 2003; Haimanko, Le Breton, and Weber 2005) as well as (3) the 
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preference heterogeneity represented by the ethno-fractionalization index (Bjorvatn and 
Cappelen 2006; Luttmer 2001); and (4 the vote maximizing local legislatures or 
constituency expansion (Grossman 1994; Krause and Bowman 2005; Tovmo and Falch 
2002).  
Nonetheless, there are also competing studies that oppose the proliferation which 
use similar arguments. For example, instead of enhancing redistribution, proliferation or 
smaller local government may reduce redistribution and dissipate efficiency gains in the 
presence of economies of scale or tax competition or a relatively less significant effect of 
fractionalization as a measure of demand differences in local service provision.  
The Conflicting Arguments for Proliferation 
A major impediment to new local government formation is the high fixed costs of 
reorganizing and setting up administration. In the presence of economies of scale in the 
providing of services, a decrease in the population size as a consequence of a smaller 
jurisdiction implies a loss of efficiency, at least in the short term (Fox and Gurley 2006; 
McGuire 1991). In this context, a higher number of local governments may drive up 
administrative and coordination costs (Breton 1987). Abstracting from U.S county 
formation, Burns (1994) shows how private firms through their financial resources can 
make local government fragmentation possible.  
The view of the benefits from higher competition, as in Tiebout (1956), is 
contrasted with the tax competition hypothesis that shows local government competition 
may result in under-provision of services. In this case, Lago-Penas and Ventelou (2006) 
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state that there is a risk that a small jurisdiction might underestimate the productive 
efficiency resulting from the spillover effect and “predators” behavior. Given that local 
governments levy taxes on a less mobile tax base (i.e., land or property), a higher 
inefficiency in tax collection may still occur in a smaller jurisdiction when there is low 
technical capability (Smoke and Lewis 1996).  
With regard to the argument  that diverse preferences would instead lead to 
smaller size jurisdiction, Roe (1995) thinks that ethno-linguistic fractionalization is not a 
strong enough incentive to prevent amalgamation. Examining the case of racially 
different local authorities’ amalgamation in Zimbabwe, he thinks the success of this 
territorial reform refutes the case for strong political decentralization (i.e., from ethnic 
fractionalization) as previously claimed.  
The extensive use of intergovernmental transfers may imply an increase of 
smaller size municipalities (i.e., municipalities with low population) from proliferation 
would also associate with more municipalities dependent on the transfers, although 
higher dependency of transfers does not necessarily imply more redistribution prevail. In 
this case, Rowland (2001) shows that the redistributive impact referring to the positive 
association between local poverty and the allocation of intergovernmental transfers may 
be different between small and large municipalities. She shows that the 
intergovernmental transfer does not affect redistribution in small municipalities in 
Bolivia, but it does in Mexico.  
Studies on country secession show that financial incentives from budget policy 
can reduce the probability of governments “spinning off” (Le Breton and Weber 2003; 
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Haimanko, Le Breton, and Weber 2005). For example, based on U.S school districts, 
Gordon and Knight (2006) found evidence of the influence of the grant system and public 
school consolidation. The foundation aid in school grants allocated by the federal 
government is intended to provide a fiscal incentive to merge, and to a small degree, it is 
a driving factor behind school district consolidation (Gordon and Knight 2006). 
However, unlike those studies that evaluate the explicit objective from the formula of the 
grants that are intended to change the behavior of local government (i.e., the incentive to 
amalgamate for school districts), in the case of local government proliferation in 
Indonesia, the effect of the equalization grants seems to be unintended (Fane 2003).   
Meanwhile, the view that smaller governments might increase accountability is 
also contested by studies that found just the opposite. For example, Lowery and Lyons 
(1989) found no evidence that the residents in small, fragmented jurisdictions are better 
informed than those in larger jurisdictions. They argue that fewer opportunities to opt out 
in larger jurisdiction may instead increase voters’ involvement. Furthermore, the 
sensitivity of voters in smaller jurisdictions may be illusive when there is a natural 
geographic constraint in the existing political boundary (Fisher and Wassmer 1998). 
To conclude, the arguments in opposition to proliferation are based on contested 
empirical evidence of (1) high start-up costs from bureaucracy expansion (Burns 1994); 
(2) the presence of externality from smaller jurisdictions (Musgrave 1997; Roe 1995; 
Tiebout 1956); (3) the effectiveness of larger jurisdictions in redistribution (Gordon and 
Knight 2006; Musgrave 1959); and (4) negative association between accountability and 
size of jurisdiction (Lowery and Lyons 1989). The similarity of factors that affect local 
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government proliferation to those that promote amalgamation implies competing 
dynamics within local government structure. 
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Theoretical Framework 
We begin with the Brennan and Buchanan (1980) Leviathan assumption of 
political behavior13 that is limited under decentralization regime. The “Big Bang” 
decentralization policy marks a different decision-making process within local 
government before and after 1999 after a major devolution of government functions to 
subnational governments and the introduction of a new scheme of intergovernmental 
transfers. Applying the Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) and Panizza (1999) theoretical 
models, we incorporated fiscal decentralization in the form of different tax sharing 
schemes that may induce the creation of new local government(s). The following section 
provides the framework of the mechanics of local government formation. 
General Setting 
 
The model of local government formation is viewed as the “central-periphery” 
model. In this setting, the center and the periphery do not correspond to central versus 
local government; instead it reflects different jurisdictions within one local government. 
In our view, one local government setting is adequate because in analyzing the cause of 
proliferation, we focus on the initiative to proliferate and not on the approval process. 
Furthermore, the positive context of local government proliferation in Indonesia implies 
that the decision of whether or not to separate is a political decision, which in this case 
refers to the politicians at local levels (Sakai 2003). 
                                                 
13
 The government is assumed to extract maximum rents from provision of local public goods (Brennan and 
Buchanan 1980). In the case of Indonesia, even when grants are the main financial source, we argue that 
local government still has the option to change its spending. The central government’s approval of the 
planned budget set by local government implies that the local government has discretion over its spending, 
although this discretion is not in the form of autonomy on the tax-expenditure package.   
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The model is set up as follows. The local economy consists of two jurisdictions, 
the center (Jurisdiction 1) and the periphery (Jurisdiction 2). The center refers to the 
center part of local government (i.e., the capital of the municipality), while the periphery 
refers to the distant jurisdiction of a particular municipality. In this case, proliferation is 
defined as one or more jurisdictions that separated from one municipality or city into 
autonomous municipalities or cities.  
As for the initiative to proliferate, a politician associated with either the center or 
the periphery can initiate the proliferation from the union to form a separate, smaller local 
government.14 In the general case for both jurisdictions, the politician will support the 
formation of a new local government if the expected gains from the separation are higher 
than under the union. In deciding whether local services would be best provided under 
the union or under separation, the politician’s personal preference is constrained to some 
extent by the preference of the majority of voters. Under the union, the majority of voters 
would be represented by voters in Jurisdiction 1, but under separation, the politician in 
each jurisdiction may be held to account by a different set of majority voters. 
In this analysis, we introduced a natural resources tax that might lead to different 
tax sharing between the center (Jurisdiction 1) and the periphery (Jurisdiction 2).15 
During decentralization, there also is a change in the intergovernmental grants scheme 
that results in a more transparent source of revenue sharing that is clearer to voters in 
both Jurisdiction 1 and Jurisdiction 2. Based on this tax sharing arrangement, we also 
                                                 
14
 Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) assume that the separation initiative can only come from the periphery 
and not from the center, although it is plausible that the initiative for separation is supported by one or both 
jurisdictions. 
15
 The Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) model assumes similar tax sharing within the union. 
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include central government grants in the local government budget constraint. The local 
governments receive the following transfers: 
- Revenue sharing (R) comes from natural resource taxes (τ ). This revenue sharing 
will be distributed to both Jurisdiction 1 and Jurisdiction 2 under the union, without 
regard to which jurisdiction has natural resources. In this case, we assume that the 
natural resources are in Jurisdiction 2. Thus, R = f (τ Y2) where τ  is the share of 
natural resource income from the total Jurisdiction 2 income level. The 1999 
decentralization law in Indonesia offered higher revenue sharing and a more 
transparent approach to distribution of transfers. 
- The lump sum part of an equalization grant (T ) that may incorporate local 
government’s fixed costs (i.e., it may offset the potential increased cost of 
administration). The 1999 decentralization law also introduced a lump sum 
component for equalization grants, in addition to the fiscal gap formula part, because 
the government attempted in the early stages of decentralization to smooth out local 
government’s  provision of services because of larger expenditure functions that 
would be devolved.  
 The following section describes the setting of utility for voters and politicians, the 
budget constraint under union and separation, and the objective function of the politician 
associated with Jurisdiction 1 and/or Jurisdiction 2 on the decision to stay or to proliferate 
from the existing union. 
 
37 
 
 
Utility 
 
We assume that the politician at the local level behaves as a Leviathan. 
Originally, a Leviathan politician would try to maximize rents by maximizing spending 
(i.e., local provision), which implies the following utility function: gLpu =)( , where g  
is the local service provision per capita, and L  is total population. Meanwhile, the 
resident(s) or voter’s utility is represented in the following functional form: 
βα
cgxvu =)( ,  where x  is private consumption and cg  is local service consumption 
value, while α  and β  represent the utility elasticity from consumption of private goods 
( x ) and public services ( cg ).  
In this analysis, the politician provides local public goods ( g ), but whether the 
voters will either receive the same or different level of services ( cg ) depends on the 
extent of the spatial decay (δ ). A positive spatial decay (0<δ <1) reflects lower benefits 
of consumption from a given provision of local public goods ( )1( δ−= ggc ). In the 
absence of spatial decay (δ = 0), the consumption value of local public goods will be 
equal to its provision value ( cgg = ).  Thus, the voter’s utility is the following: 
ββα δ )1()( −= gxvu            (2.1) 
where 0 ≤≤ δ 1; 0>α ; 0>β  
Arzaghi and Henderson (2005), like Panizza (1999), define spatial decay broadly 
as the political and economic costs of consuming local services. The individuals’ utility 
may decrease because of spatial decay resulting from the presence of congestion costs 
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that might occur in the center (Jurisdiction 1) or the high cost of providing public services 
in remote areas or at the periphery (Jurisdiction 2). Spatial decay may also reflect a 
degree of locality or heterogeneity in preferences that might be associated with 
differences in income or differences in community characteristics (i.e., differences in 
language, history, or ethnicity). In this case, the center is likely to have more 
heterogeneity (in preferences) than the periphery. Thus, spatial decay may occur in both 
the center (Jurisdiction 1) and the periphery (Jurisdiction 2). 
Introduction of Taxes 
 
Local public goods ( ig ) are financed through per capita tax sharing ( it ), which is 
the same irrespective of whether the individuals live in Jurisdiction 1 or Jurisdiction 2, 
and natural resource taxes ( iτ ), which are attached to  jurisdiction characteristics.
16
 In 
this case, a representative voter’s utility ( iu ) will consist of private consumption ( ix ) 
from disposable income ( )1( iii ty τ−−  ) and local public goods ( ig ). 
 ββαα δτ )1()1( iiiiii gtyu −−−=        (2.2) 
where i = 1, 2 and 1)(0 <+< iit τ ; 10 << iδ  
 From Eq. (2.2), the following are the voter’s utility function in Jurisdiction 1 ( 1uˆ ) 
and the voter’s utility function in Jurisdiction 2 ( 2uˆ ) under the union: 
                                                 
16
 The natural resources tax may be viewed as a property tax, and thus it is assumed that local jurisdictions 
have direct discretion over this type of tax, which is associated with the change in the size of the local 
jurisdiction. Meanwhile, proportional income tax sharing is associated with larger jurisdictions. But, in the 
case of separation, the distinction of which type of taxes is used is not discussed. In the case of Indonesia, 
local government may perceive the natural resource taxes as a local tax in a context similar to a property 
tax.  
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ββαα δ )1()1(ˆ 111 −−= gtyu         (2.3) 
ββαα δτ )1()1(ˆ 2222 −−−= gtyu  given 1)(0 2 <+< τt      (2.4)  
Within the union, there is a higher tax sharing on natural resources jurisdictions as a 
consequence of the tax preferences of a majority of voters (i.e., voters in Jurisdiction 1).  
In a similar fashion, different tax preferences may also drive the periphery (i.e., 
voters in Jurisdiction 2) to choose separation, possibly  because under a separate local 
government,  the natural resources tax will belong exclusively to the jurisdiction that has 
natural resources. Separation means both jurisdictions (Jurisdiction 1 and Jurisdiction 2) 
will independently choose their own tax sharing.
17
 Given that Jurisdiction 1 and 
Jurisdiction 2 are both an independent local government, the following voter’s utility 
function prevails:  
βαα
iiii gtyu )1(
~ −=  where i = 1, 2 and 10 << it       (2.5)  
Budget Constraint 
 
 The 1999 decentralization law that devolved various functions from the central to 
local governments under the centralized tax system meant that the high expenditure needs 
of local government should be met by grants. Under the 1999 fiscal arrangement, 
equalization grants (T ) will fully compensate for the local deficit that is expected 
because of the devolution of larger expenditure responsibilities. The local revenue source 
                                                 
17
 Local government still has the discretionary power to set local tax rates and to levy fees (i.e., permits) as 
well as charges that were levied through the local government’s own company operations. 
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consists of an equal part of tax revenue (Yt) and additional taxes levied on jurisdictions 
endowed with natural resources ( )( ii yLτ ).   
Under the union, the total tax sharing revenue (Yt and )( ii yLτ ) is used to finance 
the provision of local public goods  (g) allocated to voters in Jurisdiction 1 and 
Jurisdiction 2 in addition to the transfers (T ) that are used as the entitlement costs of the 
government. Given that population (L) reflects both the number of taxpayers and 
beneficiaries,18 the following is the government budget constraint under the union:  
gLLTyLYt ii )()( 21 ++=+τ         (2.6)  
and 2211 yLyLY +≡  is the total income in both Jurisdiction 1 and Jurisdiction 2, where 
1y is a voter’s income at the center and 2y  denotes a voter’s income at the periphery. 
Similarly, 1L is the population at the center and 2L is the population at the periphery. 
Rearranging Eq. (2.6), the equal part of tax rate sharing ( t ) 
YyLgLLTt ii /)]()([ 21 τ−++=         (2.7)  
 Under separation, the budget constraint of Jurisdiction 1 and Jurisdiction 2 is:  
iiiiii gLTtyL +=)(  where i = 1, 2        (2.8)  
And thus,  
iiiii ygLTt /)/( +=           (2.9)  
                                                 
18
 To this point, the theoretical model assumes fixed population distribution, and thus any response will 
come solely from the government or special interests (politicians). When the assumption of population 
immobility is relaxed, the separation that changes spatial decay will be conditional on the change in 
population distribution affected by the government policy.  
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When Jurisdiction 1 and Jurisdiction 2 are separate local governments, not only do they 
have their own tax sharing ( it ) and different levels of local service provision ( ig ), both 
jurisdictions are still entitled to a given level of lump sum transfers. The lump sum part of 
the equalization grant ( iT ) is only one part of the total equalization grants ( iT ) received 
by the local governments, and I admit there is also a formula for part of the grants that 
likely may differ across the jurisdictions.
19
  
Objective Function 
 
Based on the Leviathan objective function, the politician faces a tradeoff between 
the voters’ preference for lower shared taxes ( t ), which implies lower local provision, 
while the politician tries to maximize rents from higher spending ( g ). In this case, voters 
with higher tax rates may challenge the politician’s behavior by threatening to exit, thus 
reducing the politician’s opportunity to collect rents. In this setting, the rent-seeking 
politician is constrained by the voters’ mobility or by voters’ bargaining capacity (i.e., to 
form a new local government) that make the politician relatively accountable. Given that 
θ  is the degree of accountability, the following objective function for the politician 
essentially balances the voters’ utility and his/her own utility:  
                                                 
19
 In this case, the initial lump sum equalization grants represent the formula that is based on the historical 
value of the population and of local government expenditures. Brodjonegoro and Martinez-Vazquez (2004) 
argue that the previous SDO and INPRES, because they are used as hold-harmless, reduces the extent 
equalizing impact of the grants. Meanwhile, the formula part of the equalization grants th21at is based on 
population is not part of this “lump sum” equalization because (T ), the population variable, is included in 
part of the exogenous factor in the budget constraint of Eq. (2.8). As explained later in the empirics, the 
inclusion of only “lump sum” equalization grants controls the possible multicollinearity between the 
variables of grants and population. 
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( ) θθ −= 1)())(( puvuW .20        (2.10) 
Therefore, based on the budget constraint in Eq. (3.1), the politician with 
motivation to maximize voting is also affected indirectly by the change in lump sum 
transfers (T ) and natural resource shared taxes (τ ). In the case of Indonesia, we think 
that local government has a degree of discretion in determining the overall level of 
spending, although it is not in the form of full autonomy in the tax-expenditure package. 
High dependence on grants limits the local governments’ power to set spending levels  
( g ); however, differentiation among expenditures (i.e., across sectors) is possible 
because the major grants have no conditions attached. 
Under the union, the politician will be concerned with how a voter’s utility in 
Jurisdiction 1 might affect the politician’s effort to extract rents from higher government 
spending, as shown in the following Leviathan objective function:  
θ
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the first bracketed term represents the voter’s utility of Jurisdiction 1 and the second term 
outside the bracket reflects the utility obtained by the politician. In this case, the inclusion 
of natural resource taxes (τ ) or unequal shared taxes between Jurisdiction 1 and 
Jurisdiction 2 indirectly gives an incentive to politicians in the union
21
 to favor natural 
resource taxes (τ ) as shown by the optimum level of local provision ( gˆ ):  
                                                 
20
 The utility function is a convex utility function because 0)(' >vu , 0)(' >pu and  0)(" <vu , 
0)(" <pu . 
 
21
 The politicians in the union refer to a politician in Jurisdiction 1. 
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 In this setting, under the union the politician may prefer to increase natural 
resource taxes (τ ) given that an increase of natural resource taxes will not burden the 
voters in Jurisdiction 1. The choice of the tax rate would be in favor of Jurisdiction 1 ( 1uˆ ) 
but not of voters in Jurisdiction 2 ( 2uˆ ) because the local provision ( gˆ ) has a positive 
relationship with natural resource tax rate (τ ). Under the union and given homogenous 
income, the utility of voters in Jurisdiction 2 ( 2uˆ ) is lower than the utility of voters in 
Jurisdiction 1 ( 1uˆ ) as shown below: 
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where 
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))1((
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+−+
≡C  
The transparent program of tax sharing (τ ) limits the free-riding incentive in 
cost-sharing under the union, given that jurisdiction i may opt out of the union when the 
Leviathan objective function leads to higher voter’s utility for Jurisdiction 2. Thus, under 
the separation, the Leviathan’s objective function in jurisdiction i is the following: 
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Although a voter’s utility in Jurisdiction 2 is lower under the union than under 
separation )~ˆ( 22 uu < , a voter’s utility in Jurisdiction 1 under separation )
~( 1u  may either 
increase or decrease his or her utility relative to (union) utility )ˆ( 1u . For example, 
separation would increase voters’ utility in Jurisdiction 1 in a situation in which initial 
spatial decay is higher under the union, because it will reduce provision costs and may 
lead to lower tax sharing; however, the separation may reduce the voters’ utility in 
Jurisdiction 1 when instead there are spillovers from Jurisdiction 1 local provision (i.e., to 
neighboring jurisdictions) that result in higher tax sharing.   
The following separation process explains a politician’s decision to choose 
between staying in the union or leaving in the case of Jurisdiction 2, as well as why a 
45 
 
 
politician in Jurisdiction 1 may actually support the separation, even when this decision 
results in a  lower utility of voters in Jurisdiction 1. 
The Separation Process 
The separation process that allows participation of politician at local level was not 
possible under the law before the decentralization period. Only since decentralization is it 
possible for local politician(s) from either Jurisdiction 1 or Jurisdiction 2 to influence the 
local territorial government. A politician from either Jurisdiction 1 or Jurisdiction 2 may 
decide to stay under the same local government or to form a new local government, 
defined as a local government that autonomously determines its own local services.  
A politician who’s associated with either Jurisdiction 2 or Jurisdiction 1 will 
compare the expected welfare gained under union and separation with whether his or her 
utility may improve, which also indirectly influences the associated voters’ preference. 
For example, a politician from Jurisdiction 2 will compare the Leviathan objective 
function of the separated Jurisdiction 2, ( 2W ), with his or her welfare under the union, 
(W ), and he or she will support the separation process when gains expected from the 
separation exceed the current gains under the union ( WW >2 ). The politician from 
Jurisdiction 2 may claim support from voters of Jurisdiction 2, and he or she only needs 
to ensure that the utility of voters in Jurisdiction 2 under separation ( 2
~u ) is not less than 
the utility under union ( 2uˆ ).     
Meanwhile, a politician who comes from Jurisdiction 1 has a choice of either 
keeping the existing structure of local government or separating. A politician in 
Jurisdiction 1 may actually support the separation process if the separation possibly will 
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not reduce fiscal resources received under separation (T), while the separation policy may 
lower the utility of voters in Jurisdiction 1 because of spillover.22 In this case, the existing 
structure of local government in which there is joint provision of local services by both 
Jurisdiction 1 and Jurisdiction 2 can still be preserved when the following inequalities 
hold: 
WW ≤2            (2.18) 
WW <1            (2.19)  
When the inequality in Eq. (2.19) is less than in Eq. (2.18), then there is a window 
for the local governments to stay with the existing local governments. Thus, the 
following Eq. (2.20) is the welfare comparison from (2.18):   
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where 
αθθβθ 222
02
1
122 CCC
−+≡ and θαθθβ 0
1
1 CCC
−+≡  are both  constant terms. 
 
From (2.20), lower welfare under the union and/or an increase of potential welfare under 
separation (lower RHS/ higher LHS) would lead to favoring separation, which is 
influenced by the following factors: an increase in the jurisdiction population ( 2L ), a 
reduction in (union) population ( L ), an increase in one’s own jurisdiction income ( 2y ), a 
decrease in Jurisdiction 1 income ( 1y ), an increase in lump sum grants ( 2T ), higher initial 
                                                 
22
 With the possibility of expenditures (inertia) after separation, the voters in Jurisdiction 1 may face higher 
tax sharing ( it ). 
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grants (T ), a reduction in spatial decay ( 2δ ), or a wider income gap between Jurisdiction 
1 and Jurisdiction 2 in which 2y < 1y . 
Meanwhile, from (2.19), the welfare comparison between pre- and post-separation 
in Jurisdiction 1 that preserves the existing local government is the following: 
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Eq. (2.21) implies that the threat of separation may occur in Jurisdiction 1, all things 
being equal, when one of the following changes has occurred: an increase in the 
population of Jurisdiction 1 ( 1L ), an increase in Jurisdiction 1 income ( 1y ), an increasein 
spatial decay ( 1δ ), an increase in lump sum grants ( 1T ), and a similar direction of changes 
on 12 /,, yyTL .   
Factors that may change the inequalities between Eq. (6.1) and Eq. (7.1) are summarized 
in the following testable hypotheses on local government formation. In this case, the 
predicted sign of each hypothesis is based on static comparative results of differentiating 
Eq. (2.20) and Eq. (2.21) with respect to those as shown in Eq. (B.31) - Eq. (B.52) in 
Appendix B.  
Testable Hypotheses 
 
The probability of local government formation would be influenced by the 
following factors: 
1. H1: An increase in spatial decay will increase the threat of separation.  
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A decrease in spatial decay under separation means smaller differences between the 
provision of local services and the level demanded by the community. Oates (1972; 
1999) thinks that in the case of high preference heterogeneity, local services are better 
provided at the local level. The heterogeneity preference usually is associated with 
either the more populous jurisdiction (the center) or a large geographical jurisdiction 
size, which describes the remote area (the periphery). The smaller size jurisdiction 
might be chosen to create a less fragmented population within the local jurisdiction. 
Given an assumption that differences in preferences are spatially correlated with 
community characteristics (Alesina and Spolaore 2003), the ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization index is included as a proxy for preference heterogeneity.   
H1A: Jurisdictions with high ethno-linguistic fragmentation have a higher 
probability of local government proliferation. 
Preference heterogeneity over the provision of the same set of local public goods is 
usually observed among different communities (Alesina,  Baqir, and Hoxby 2004; 
Panizza 1999), and thus a smaller jurisdiction usually characterizes a less fragmented 
population.  In a less fragmented population, there usually is more redistribution or a 
higher provision of social services that are plausibly demanded by the population. 
Therefore, a high ethno-linguistic fractionalization index may be associated with a 
higher probability to proliferate.  
2. H2: An increase in population will increase the threat of separation up to a certain 
population level. 
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There are cases in which an increase in population leads to a higher threat of 
separation. For example, local governments with relatively low populations are less 
likely to take advantage of economies of scale in the face of an increase in population.  
Thus, they may forgo economies of scale in return for better preference-matching, or 
they may take advantage of higher grants that are biased in favor of smaller 
jurisdictions and work to stay small (splitting if necessary). Similarly, a politician 
may prefer to allocate grants to a relatively small jurisdiction because of a higher 
return (i.e., vote return) from the population compared with the vote return he or she 
could expect from a local government (Grossman 1994) with a larger population.  
However, as population increases and attains a certain threshold of economies of 
scale, an increase in population will reduce the probability of a local government 
proliferation. High expected efficiency gains from lower cost sharing can be 
maintained in a more populated local government, in addition to preventing a 
relatively diminishing representation power in the case of proliferation. 
3. H3: An increase in income level will increase the probability of a local government 
proliferation.  
High income jurisdictions (i.e., jurisdictions with initially large tax bases from natural 
resources) will be more likely to form new local governments than relatively poorer 
jurisdictions. The positive effect of income as in Hypothesis 3 requires that an income 
source would be generated in either Jurisdiction 1 or in Jurisdiction 2, and thus 
excludes income originated from both jurisdictions. Similarly, as in a case in which 
income comes from revenue sharing, each jurisdiction would identify the type of 
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revenue sharing as its own source of potential income, given that there are distinctive 
differences in the revenue sharing type each jurisdiction can be associated with or that 
there is uneven distribution of the tax base.  
Meanwhile, income in the form of equalization grants is considered as a common 
source fund, and whether it increases or decreases the probability of a  proliferation 
may depend on the allocation specifications for the grants. In a case in which 
equalization grants favor a smaller local government, the incentive effect of the 
equalization grants would increase the probability of proliferation, and vice versa. 
H3A: Higher jurisdiction income will increase the probability of a proliferation.  
The high income areas, jurisdiction with higher Gross Regional Product (GRP) may 
decide to discontinue subsidizing the low income (GRP) areas by forming new local 
governments, thus pooling higher revenue sharing in a smaller jurisdiction. Brink 
(2004) uses the case of a seceded municipality in Sweden to show that residents in the 
wealthy part of the municipality tend to support secession more than residents from 
other parts of the municipality. 
H3B: Higher initial unconditional lump sum grants will increase the probability 
of a proliferation.  
In the case of Indonesia, lump sum inertia of equalization grants that also imply the 
extent of a large local administration may enhance the threat of proliferation. In a 
slight departure from Fane (2003), the lump sum grants in this context represent the 
inertia that results from the initial size of the public sector. In this case, the initial 
share of the grants may initiate expansion in the bureaucracy as a form of the local 
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government’s effort response to receive higher grants. The entitlement costs coverage 
to some extent correlate to the inertia of an existing large bureaucracy (Brodjonegoro 
and Martinez-Vazquez 2004, Hofman, Kaiser, and Suharnoko 2006). 
4. H4: A potential increase in a voter’s bargaining power under separation will 
increase the threat of a local government proliferation, but a voter’s initial high 
bargaining power is associated with a low probability of a local government 
proliferation. 
A voter’s bargaining power or the degree of local government accountability may be 
associated with community participation and political competition. In this case, a high 
number of nongovernment organizations as well as a fractionalized local assembly is 
an example of high political competition. 
H4A: An increase in a voter’s bargaining power under separation will increase 
the probability of a proliferation. 
The number of nongovernment organizations that have activities in each local 
government can be used as a proxy for a voter’s bargaining power. Warren (2005) 
associated the role of local NGOs with a higher level of community participation. The 
positive relationship between the number of NGOs and the probability of proliferation 
possibly shows community support for local government proliferation. Thus, a larger 
number of NGOs, which is associated with an increased probability of a proliferation, 
may signal that the proliferation is supported by at the grass-roots level.  
H4B: High initial political competition will be associated with a lower degree of 
local government proliferation. 
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High initial political competition (i.e., a more fractionalized legislature) in the 
originating local government may reduce the threat of separation because it increases 
a voter’s utility by limiting the politician’s ability to extract rents (Rogers and Rogers  
2000). However, highly fractionalized legislatures may be associated with a longer 
decision-making process that diminishes administrative efficiency and thus motivates 
proliferation (Bourdeaux 2005). 
 
 In general, we summarize the above hypotheses from the theoretical model in the 
following predictive coefficient sign as shown in Table 4. The predicted sign of each 
hypothesis is constructed based on a comparison of the welfare prospects under the union 
and under separation. Alternatively, one can view the separation process based on the 
welfare comparison under separation to the initial welfare in each jurisdiction. From the 
hypotheses, historical variables such as (1) fiscal resources (2) spatial decay, (3) 
economies of scale, and (4) degree of accountability explain the demand for proliferation. 
The empirical design for testing these hypotheses will be shown in the next section. 
 
Table 4. Hypotheses and Predicted Sign 
Hypothesis  Predicted Sign 
  
Spatial Decay Hypothesis   
( H1A) i
δ (+) 
Economies of Scale Hypothesis 
 (H2) 
iL (-/+) 
Fiscal Resources Hypothesis  
(H3, H3A) 
iy (+);T (+) 
Accountability  Hypothesis  
(H4A, H4B) i
θ (+) 
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Empirical Model 
In terms of the choices available on proliferation, the empirical strategy 
emphasizes the treatment of proliferation as an event, and thus the specification model 
handles the presence of sequential proliferation events. In addition to the binary 
estimation commonly used to examine the determinants of event occurrence, we further 
analyze what determines the risk of the proliferation over the years by applying hazard 
risk estimation. Additionally, we also estimate the number of new local governments 
across all province levels to check whether the factors affecting government 
fragmentation in a province aligned with factors affecting proliferation of local 
government unit.  
The Choice Decision in Local Government Formation  
 
The binary choice variable on the decision to proliferate would basically reflect 
the net benefit derived from the decision to separate. However, the actual net benefits to 
politicians (or citizens) from choosing whether to proliferate or stay is unobservable. 
Here, the proliferation event is the only observable variable that can be used to 
approximate the net benefit from the decision to proliferate at time t as shown in the 
following: 
1=
ti
y  0* >ityif        (2.22), 
where 
ttiit WWy −=
*    
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As previously noted in the theoretical framework, iW  is welfare under separation and W  
is welfare under the union. The estimation on ity  would be based on the logit 
specification technique. The choice of whether to use logit estimation or probit estimation 
usually does not matter because both approaches are likely to reach a similar marginal 
effect. Given that the decision to separate is a form of local government response to 
changes in the incentive (i.e., the equalization grants variable), then the construction of a 
dependent variable as an event dummy variable may be more suitable to the Indonesian 
story of proliferation. Because the dependent variable is the event of the proliferation, 
then the observations are essentially the panel data.   
The use of panel logit estimation may be justified for the following reasons, (1) 
the time-varying covariates predicted as major determinants of local government 
proliferation (i.e., the changes in equalization grants, income level, and population), and 
(2) the need to account for the time-attributed error terms as well as the individual effects 
of the observations. The following is the panel logit estimation based on the latent 
dependent variables ( *
itY ): 
iititit vXY ++= εβ
'*  , ni ...,,2,1=   and mttt ...,,0=      (2.23),    
and based on Eq. (2.22), one can only observe  
1=ity if local government proliferated in year t 
           = 0 if local government did not proliferate in year t  
Thus, given Eq. (2.22) and Eq. (2.23), for 1=ity  
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And also for 0=ity  
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where F is cdf of itε−  and again, tiy is the proxy of the unobserved expected utility 
threshold that barely keeps the particular jurisdictions  intact ( 0* <ity ). In the case of logit 
estimation, the general case of )( itF ε  follows the following standard logistic distribution: 
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,
)1(
)(       (2.26) 
Thus, the joint densities of iTii yy ...,,1=y  in the panel logit estimation as shown in 
Cameron and Trivedi (2006, 796), are the following:
23
 
itit y
itit
y
itiiii XvXvvf
−+Λ−+Λ=∏ 1'' ))(1()(),,Xy( βββ   (2.27) 
In the context of random effect panel logit estimation, the MLE of β  and 2νσ maximizes 
the following log-likelihood: 
∑ =
:
i vii
f
1
2 ),,Xy(lnmax σβ  where 
                                                 
23
 We use notation iv as  individual-specific effect.  
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The estimator on binary outcome estimation represents the mean response probability, 
given the value of the covariates. And in general, the estimator interpretation of panel 
logit estimation would be similar to the cross-section pooled logit estimation. 
The Multiple Events of Proliferation: Hazard Risk Evaluation 
 
The use of the event of the proliferation as the dependent variable in the panel 
binary outcome estimation treats the case of the first and subsequent proliferation event 
as independent events. The panel logit estimation would be similar to the proportional 
hazard risk estimation with constant risk. However, the hazard risk analysis from survival 
regression may be better. This is because the hazard risk estimation may censor the 
sequential proliferation event without necessarily reducing the initial number of 
observations. Overall, it may be more informative to estimate the risk factor for the 
occurrence of the event rather than determine the odd ratio of the event as shown in the 
panel logit estimation. By estimating the dependent variable in the form of duration (i.e., 
duration interval) instead of the proliferation event, there is more information 
(observations) that can be pooled. 
Starting with the Cox Proportional Hazard (CPH), the hazard function is 
constructed as follows:  
),()()( 0 βφλλ XtXt =         (2.30),  
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where 0λ  is the same baseline hazard for all local governments because it is influenced 
only by t, given that all the observations start from the same first year of t (i.e., 0t = 
1999). Meanwhile, ),( βφ X is the part that corresponds only on X covariates. The CPH is 
chosen, in practice, because it is the most widely used formulation of regression analysis 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, 591), and this approach does not impose any distribution 
and thus is less restrictive than other duration approaches (i.e., Weibull, Gamma, and 
Exponential). 
The magnitude of a covariate’s estimator has an interpretation of a scale effect on 
the hazard rate because 
jx
x
t
x
xt
∂
∂
=
∂
∂ ),(
)(
),(
0
βφ
λ
βλ
       (2.31) 
jx
x
x
xt
∂
∂
=
),(
),(
),( βφ
βφ
βλ
         (2.32) 
Given that the covariates may consist of both time-invariant covariates ( X ) and the time 
varying covariates ( )(tX ), the hazard function in Eq. (2.30) should be adjusted as 
follows:   
)),(()())(( 0 βφλλ tXttXt =         (2.33)   
The inclusion of time varying covariates affects the construction of the dependent 
variable in the dataset.  In this case, we set the dependent variable as multiple-spell rather 
than single-spell data. Therefore, the duration or length of years from the starting year of 
observations period to the proliferation event is viewed as an interval duration variable, 
which also implies the count of each identified observations. This interval duration is an 
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expansion of cross-section duration, which takes a value of 1 in the starting period and 
counts up to the time of the proliferation. Thus, the maximum records duration is simply 
the interval between the starting year of the estimation and the end-year period of the 
estimation.  
One may concern of whether the exclusion of proliferation events in year 2007 
and 2008 lead to biased estimates given that the observations period is 1999-2003.
24
 The 
regression on the duration handles the issue of right censoring (Cameron and Trivedi 
2005; Kiefer 1988) which in this case implies to all other non-proliferated local 
governments at time t of observations end period. The account of right censoring refers 
not only specifically to the local governments proliferated in year 2007 and 2008, but 
also to other non-proliferated local governments that did not proliferate up to year 2003.
25
   
As regards a sequential proliferation event, we modified the event of the 
proliferation as multiple risks instead of as single-risk data. In this case, the sequential 
proliferation event starts from the first proliferation event, and thus we limit the pooling 
of observations to consist only of the proliferated local governments.
26
  
                                                 
24
 On the panel binary outcome, the use of year 2003 as end of estimation period is justified on the context 
that there was change of law in 2004 that led to a moratorium of approval process as explained in previous 
section. In this case, the issue of right censoring may be present only if there are no significant changes on 
the law. Thus, the changes on the procedure of local government formation which occurred only at the 
approval process at local level implies limiting the period of estimation up to 2003 may not lead to biased 
estimator on binary outcome given that the theory emphasize the decision on the setting of local 
government. 
25
 The duration end as the censoring dummy variable equals 1, which means that the observation is dropped 
from the observations pool. The censoring dummy variable ( ic ) equals to 1 ( 1=ic ) in the occurrence of 
the proliferation, or when ity  as in Eq. (2.22) equals 1, otherwise the censor dummy variable would equal 
to zero ( 0=ic ). 
26
 Box D1 in Appendix D explains these various proliferation events, which imply different censor dummy 
variables. 
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The hazard risk estimation models the risk of proliferation — the hazard rate (λ ) 
— that may depend on time (t) and/or the characteristics of the observations (X). The 
hazard rate (λ ) is the probability rate that local government will proliferate in time t, 
given that the unit had survived until t (conditional failure rate). The hazard rate of local 
government proliferated at time t is the number of the local governments that experienced 
proliferation at duration t divided by the number at “risk” at duration t. The hazard rate 
describes the risk that a local government that does not experience a proliferation during 
the observation period will eventually proliferate. Given the binomial proliferation data, 
the hazard function is set as the discrete-time hazard function. In addition, the hazard rate 
may not only be affected by time t, but also by other covariates as explained in the 
theory. Therefore, the test on the proportional hazard assumption may signal whether 
there is a need to other duration regression type that aligned with the baseline risk as 
shown by the data. 
The estimation of the hazard risk that is differentiated between the estimation on 
the first time proliferation and the estimation on its sequential proliferation event may 
avoid the bias that possibly results when the full observations, as in the case of panel 
binary logit estimation, pool together in the first time proliferation event and in the 
sequential events. The approach of different hazard risk estimation is similar to one used 
by Wheelock and Wilson (2000). In this case, the CPH with robust standard error would be 
sufficient to handle the unobserved heterogeneity. With respect to path dependence 
between the first time and sequential proliferation event, we include the dominant factors 
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that affect the first time event of proliferation, which in this case refers to the time-
varying intergovernmental transfers. 
The number of new local governments: The province level estimation 
 
In the theory section, the proliferation policy is set as the interaction between the 
center and the periphery within one local government. The theoretical section displays 
the interaction between only two jurisdictions (i.e., the center as one jurisdiction and the 
periphery as the other jurisdiction). Nonetheless, it does not mean that jurisdiction (i.e., 
the periphery) must literally represent one jurisdiction. The number of the periphery can 
consist of one or more jurisdictions, and thus the proliferation process of local 
government can also be viewed in terms of what affects the variation in the number of 
proliferated local governments across clusters.  
Given this setting, the model can also be applied in the context of the province 
level in which the evaluation of the number of new local governments may shed light on 
the proliferation determinants across the level of subnational governments. This general 
setting incorporates the presence of sequential proliferation events through an increase in 
the total number of new local governments under an assumption of no path dependence 
between proliferation events. In this case, the number of new local governments is the 
dependent variable, as shown in the following estimation: 
 
iit
k
ktkit vXY +++= ∑ εαα 0         (2.34)
 
 
where  
Y  = number of new local governments 
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X  = set of covariates 
itε  = random error term 
When the dependent variable is the number of new local governments, the 
standard normal linear regression model (i.e., OLS) may not be an appropriate 
specification model. The standard OLS model assumes the dependent variable to be 
continuous and normally distributed, while the count data are discrete and contain only 
positive outcomes. Using standard OLS estimation would lead to inconsistent estimation 
because it ignores the heteroskedastic nature of count data (Winkelmann 2003). 
Adjustments to the linear regression model are necessary to incorporate the nature of the 
dependent variable.  
Therefore, we use Negative Binomial and Poisson estimations, which in this case 
refer to the panel estimation, Fixed Effect (FE) and Random Effect (RE) of Poisson and 
Negative Binomial estimations. As a comparison, the benchmark estimation of pooled 
Negative Binomial and Poisson with robust standard errors is also shown.  
 
Data 
For the estimation on municipality level data, the unit of the proliferated local 
governments could be based on the previous union local government or based on the 
entities of the local government after separation. The theoretical section shows the 
separation process as the comparison between expected welfare under the separation and 
expected welfare under the union. From the theory section, the decision process can be 
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engaged independently (i.e., by only one jurisdiction) or as the union decision within the 
existing local government.  
In this case, the use of the union approach of the observation unit requires fewer 
assumptions on the data treatment than the retrospective approach that treats the 
proliferated local governments as independent observation units.
27
 Data before the 
proliferation event for the new local governments is limited only to the characteristics of 
the jurisdiction (i.e., population, inequality index, political competition) generated from 
household data, but prior assumptions should be set with regards to the use of aggregate 
data that are available only for the municipality/city level. For example, those aggregate 
data can be assumed to be the same between the new and the originating local 
governments.   
This union approach refers to cohort municipalities as of 1998. In the empirical 
section of panel binary outcome, the estimation emphasizes the results from this 1998 
municipality cohort. Meanwhile, the 2003 municipalities’ cohort, which represents the 
retrospective approach of the observation unit, is used in the hazard risk estimation. In 
this case, the compiling process for the new local governments follows the constructed 
crosswalk as explained in Box D1 in the Appendix. The choice of the cohort of 
observations applies only to municipalities-level data, and it is not necessarily important 
for the province level estimation either to make an aggregation unit from the 1998 cohort 
municipalities data or from the 2003 cohort data.  
                                                 
27
 The observation unit for an independent decision-making process between Jurisdiction 1 and Jurisdiction 
2 refers to the municipalities’ cohort as of postevent proliferation, and the data construction follows the 
retrospective approach. This observations that refer to the municipalities’ cohort as of 2003.  
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The rest of this section consists of a discussion of the construction of the core 
covariates from the theory and summary statistics on the municipalities and province 
level data that are used in the estimations. These covariates represent each hypothesis. 
The limitations of the measured covariates and the data issue are briefly explained as part 
of variable construction.  
List and Construction of Core Covariates 
The core covariates refer to a set of variables that represents the hypothesis 
explained in the theory. Table 5 shows the explanatory variables and the associated 
hypothesis that will be tested. In general, the core covariates consist of fiscal resources 
variables (i.e., Gross Regional Product (GRP), equalization grants, share of natural 
resources in GRP); population; heterogeneity variables (i.e., ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization index, income inequality index); and political variables (i.e., NGO and 
variables of political competition).  
 
 
Table 5. Variables and Notation 
Hypothesis Variables 
  
Spatial Decay Hypothesis   
( H1A) 
Ethno-linguistic fragmentation index; income inequality 
Economies of Scale Hypothesis 
 (H2) 
Population 
Fiscal Resources Hypothesis  
(H3, H3A) 
Income (GRP); Share of equalization grants 
Accountability  Hypothesis  
(H4A, H4B) 
Number of NGOs; political competition 
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Next, we will explain how we constructed each covariate and the justification for 
the measurement. Table D1 in Appendix D summarizes the definition of each covariate, 
the source of the data, and the period of data coverage. In this case, Table C1 in 
Appendix C lists missing observations based on the data sources, and a specific summary 
of values missing from each covariate is shown in Table C2.  
Fiscal Resources, Variation in Preferences, and Economies of Scale 
 
 The resource variables consist of the jurisdiction’s income level and share in the 
equalization grants. GRP represents a jurisdiction’s income level, which also implies a 
proxy of tax bases. The data on GRP come from the Central Bureau of Statistics, and it is 
available up to 2004. In this case, we used real GRP based on a constant price in 2000. 
Alternatively, we also used income as the growth of GRP to reflect the potential income 
that may have a similar competing hypothesis on the effect of income, union or 
proliferation income. The potential economic gains from higher income may reduce the 
threat of proliferation, both to the new and originating local governments.   
 Other variables of fiscal resources are intergovernmental transfers that consist of 
per capita equalization grants (DAU), shares of tax sharing from total local government 
revenue, and per capita lump sum DAK transfers. As explained previously, the new local 
governments would receive around a 4 billion Rp lump sum during the first two or three 
years after its stipulation. We measured per capita DAK transfers as the amount of this 
lump sum, divided by the new local government’s population, and we inserted this value 
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for the new local government for three years that started one year before its stipulation. 
However, in the case of per capita equalization grants, the term population refers to the 
(union) local government population. Thus, a new local government would have the same 
per capita equalization grants as its originating local government when these local 
governments have not issued their own budgets.   
 Furthermore, for per capita equalization grants, we differentiated the initial per 
capita grants (i.e., the endowment effect) from current per capita equalization grants. The 
initial grants that are measured in the form of cost reimbursements called SDO (Subsidi 
Daerah Otonom) grants are the central grants before the decentralization period.  This 
grant is essentially central government funds for local government salary payments that 
are being replaced by the new pattern of equalization grants. The SDO is preserved as the 
“hold harmless” guarantee of the new equalization grants allocation during the early 
stages of decentralization. 
 In the case of tax sharing, given that there is a different formula of allocation as 
stated in Law No. 22/1999, we differentiated between natural resource tax sharing and 
tax sharing from the nonextractive sector (i.e., property tax sharing). Similar to a case 
concerning other local finance variables, we inserted , respectively, natural resource tax 
sharing and a share of no-extractive tax sharing for the new local governments as well.   
The ethno-linguistic fractionalization index variable reflects differences in 
preferences within local government (Besley and Coate 2003). We used ethno-linguistic 
data from the 2002 to 2004 SUSENAS household survey and constructed the ethno-
linguistic Taylor and Hudson (1972) fractionalization index. The SUSENAS survey 
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records around 23 ethno-linguistic groups. The ethno-linguistic data refer to the ethnicity 
of the head of household. From this survey data, we compiled the number of households 
for each distinct ethnic group and aggregated it into a municipality level (or province). 
Based on the number of households of each ethno-linguistic group across municipalities 
(province), we calculated Taylor and Hudson’s (1972) fractionalization index for each 
municipality (province). 
The inclusion of income inequality may control income heterogeneity within a 
local government. The variable of income distribution is commonly included to net out 
the effect of income (Arzaghi and Henderson 2005) through controlling variation in 
consumer preferences (Fisher and Wassmer 1998; Martinez Vazquez, Rider, and Walker 
1997). In this case, the Gini index of household expenditures is a measure of income 
inequality, but in the case of Indonesia, household income may be the best proxy for 
family expenditures data because it allows incorporation of the relatively high informality 
of the economy (Lanjouw et al. 2002). The data for household total monthly expenditures 
are extracted from the SUSENAS-core household survey. 
Economies of scale are reflected by the population variable. The majority of past 
studies, as stated in Byrnes and Dollery (2002), find a conditional state of economies of 
scale on the overall or sector-specific government size. Therefore, the estimation would 
include a population variable at the unit level as well as its square unit.  The nonlinear 
relationship between population and the probability of separation implies there is a 
population threshold in which the case of economies of scale might be the major 
determinant in the reduction of the threat of separation; on the other hand, when 
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economies of scale are absent, there would be a positive relationship between population 
and the probability of separation. 
 In addition to the economies of scale, fiscal incentives, and variation in 
preferences, other variables exist that may influence the probability of local government 
formation.  The following are political variables that are believed to play a role in the 
proliferation trend of local governments. 
Political Variables 
To test whether the formation of new jurisdictions was influenced by the extent of 
community participation, we included the number of NGOs in the estimation. Activities 
of an NGO, in general, produce the same output as government activities (Gideon 1998). 
Several studies associate the presence role of a local NGO with higher community 
participation (Warren 2005). In this instance, we assumed a positive relationship between 
higher numbers of NGOs and the probability of a local government proliferation.  This 
implies a “community voice” as one of the factors influencing splitting. The data on the 
number of NGOs comes from a 2003 village survey (PODES 2003). The number of 
NGOs in each municipality is the sum of the total number of active NGOs in villages 
within each of those municipalities. 
We also included the initial level of electoral competition to identify the 
accountability of local government. One might expect that one motivation for the creation 
of new local governments is to reduce political competition at the outset and 
subsequently pursue increased governmental effectiveness as the result of a simpler 
decision-making process (Bourdeaux 2005). In this case, we constructed a variable of 
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political competition similar to the one used by Villarreal (2002).
28
 Based on PODES 
2003, the head of the each village was asked the names of the (three) parties that won the 
1999 legislative election. A percentage based on the number of villages in which parties 
other than GOLKAR won the election is used as a proxy for the political competition 
variable.  The GOLKAR party is the second largest party after the PDIP, which won the 
popular vote in the 1999 national legislative election and thus can be treated as a 
competitor (opposition) party.  
Descriptive Statistics 
 The statutory definition of a new local government refers to several subunits of 
the (originating) local government that became autonomous as stated in the law (of new 
local governments). Thus, the originating local governments are those local governments 
as of 2003 that proliferated during 1999-2003 and represent administrative continuity 
from previous local governments. In this case, we refer to both the new and the 
originating local governments as the proliferated local governments. Figure 3 shows the 
number of new local governments and the number of originating local governments 
referring to the proliferation events 1993-2005. 
 
                                                 
28
 Based on the case of Mexico, Villarreal (2002) uses the voting percentage of parties other than PRI 
(Partido Revolucionario Institutional) to represent how the dominant party has weakened, which also to a 
degree implies the emergence of political competition. PRI is one dominant party that has ruled the 
Mexican political system for around 70 years. A similar situation has also occurred in Indonesia in which 
GOLKAR is a “one-party” rule that has governed with no significant competing opposition for around 30 
years under Suharto, who was president 1967-1998. 
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  Source: Compiled from CBS (2007) and number of provinces from CBS (2006) 
 
Figure 3. Number of New and Originating Local Governments and Total Number of 
Provinces 1993-2005 
 
The proliferation events that started in 1999 reflects the year when the 
Decentralization Law (UU No. 22/1999) was passed. Our observations of proliferation 
events ends with 2003 because no new local governments were formed after 2003, a 
hiatus that continued up to 2006. Overall, the data consists of 293 municipalities at the 
start in 1999, a number that had expanded to 434 municipalities at the end of 2003. 
Referring to Table 3, the number of municipalities totals 440 when six municipalities 
within DKI Jakarta province are counted. However, these municipalities within DKI 
Jakarta are not included as observations because of DKI Jakarta’s special status as the 
capital of the country (i.e., the municipalities in this province are not autonomous).  
As shown in Table 6, the proliferation of local government in Indonesia is marked 
by the division of existing local government units into two or more separate units, some 
of which subsequently proliferated again; however, for the most part, these subsequent 
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sequential divisions were confined to the original local government units. Table 6 shows 
that the proliferation during 1999-2003 covers 11 percent of the total observations, which 
includes both the originating and new local governments. Ninety-three local governments 
(i.e., the original local governments) underwent proliferation, which is about 30 percent 
of the eligible local governments as of 1998. This proliferation from those originating 
local governments added 138 new local governments.
29
 
 
Table 6. Characteristics of Municipality Proliferation, 1999-2003 
Variable # Failures # Subjects # of records Avg Time at risk 
Proliferation (Pair) Event 231 434 4,391 10.117 
First Time of Proliferation Event 93 296 1,315 4.443 
Formation Event of New LG 138 231 2,320 10.043 
Sequential Proliferation Event 11 231 813 3.519 
     Sources: Table D3 and Table D4 in Appendix D 
 
Regulation PP No.129/2000 does not restrict either the procedural timing or the 
sequential formation new local governments. And as shown in Table 6, there are around 
11 proliferated local governments that experience sequential proliferation event, which 
equates to about 15 percent of the originating local governments. Because the estimation 
period is up to 2003, then the estimation on duration is plausible as a way to handle the 
occurrence of sequential proliferation events.   
Meanwhile, the current new regulation, PP No. 78/ 2007, limits the period in 
which the newly created local governments (the new local governments) can have further 
                                                 
29
 There are actually 141 new local governments, but because three of these new local governments 
experienced another proliferation and are excluded from the estimation, the total number of local 
governments in the dataset becomes 138. 
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proliferation. Thus, the consideration of sequential events is not an issue for the case of 
proliferation events that happened in year 2007 and on forward proliferation. 
Furthermore, there is no right censoring on the case of sequential proliferations with 
respect to the 1999-2003 period of estimation. Table D5 and Table D6 in Appendix D 
show, respectively, the summary statistics of the proliferation events of 1999-2003 
duration differentiated by the scope of and the definition of the proliferation events (i.e., 
first time vs sequential proliferation event). 
As for the appropriate construction of the duration variable as well as the 
construction of the censor dummy variable, Box D1 in Appendix D explains the details of 
the duration and the illustration of censoring. Based on either the statutory approach or on 
the 1998 municipality cohort, the censor dummy variable ( ic ) equals one ( 1=ic ) if there 
is a proliferation event within the existing local government referring to the originating 
local governments. The proliferation event on the new local governments at the time of 
its formation is not part of this right censoring because the duration of these observations 
have just started when one enters the observations pool. Meanwhile, the time interval 
from the first time event to the sequential event marks the period of estimation, which 
emphasizes evaluation of the hazard risk of the sequential proliferation event. This case 
of censoring on sequential proliferation event refers to case (4) of the duration variable 
construction as shown in Box D1 of Appendix D.  The following Figure 4 shows the 
Kaplan-Meier Hazard Ratio based on different type of risks. 
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:ote: x-axis for a sequential proliferation event refers to time interval duration, while the first time 
proliferation event refers to the duration that started in 1999 up to the event (first time proliferation),  and 
the maximum duration time spell is 5, given the period of 1999-2003. 
Figure 4. Kaplan-Meier Hazard Ratio from a Proliferation Event based on the 
1998 Cohort and Differentiated by Type of Proliferation 
 
 
Meanwhile, the purpose of the 2003 municipality cohort is to track those 
proliferation events that occurred before 1999 and also to include the occurrence of 
proliferation events in the new local governments. In this case, the censor dummy 
variable ( ic ) equals to one ( 1=ic ) to any proliferated local governments at the time 
when the proliferation event occurred, and it equals zero ( 0=ic ) in any given year when 
no proliferation occurs. Box D1 in Appendix B illustrates the timing of when censorship 
occurs, which in this case refers to the setting of Case (1). 
Figure 5 presents the scatter plot of each province’s unconditional hazard ratio of 
proliferation across years. Figure 5 shows a relatively high value of averages and a large 
variation of hazard ratios 1999-2003. For 2002 and 2003, a high proportion of 
proliferation seems to counter the trend toward a low hazard ratio. Meanwhile, Figure 6 
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shows the distribution of the cumulative hazard ratio across regions during a similar 
1993-2005 period. 
   
 
:ote: Scatter plot of province hazard ratio 
Figure 5. Hazard Ratio of 1993-2005 (Exit) year Based on 2003 Cohort 
 
 
:ote: Municipalities cohort is year 2003 
Figure 6. Cumulative Unconditional Hazard Ratio to Proliferation Events Differentiated 
by Region 
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 Table 7 gives the characteristics of local governments that proliferated and of 
local government that did not proliferate during the 1999-2003 observations period. Table 
7 shows a relatively lower average population in proliferated local governments, although 
the population level varies considerably across the proliferated local governments 
compared with the nonproliferated local governments. In terms of preference 
heterogeneity, the proliferated local governments have a higher average ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation index than the overall municipalities. As expected, the mean of income 
inequality varies little between the proliferated and the nonproliferated local 
governments, given that the Gini inequality index is based on household expenditures. 
Nonetheless, the proliferated local governments tend to have a lower average of Gini 
income inequality. The proliferated local governments also have a lower average number 
of NGOs and relatively low initial political competition compared with the overall 
observations. 
 
Table 7. Mean and Standard Deviation of Variables on Proliferated and Nonproliferated 
Local Governments: Municipality Level Data 1999-2003 
 
 1999-2003 
Panel 
 
Proliferated LG 
Non-
proliferated 
LG 
 : Mean (SD) : Mean (SD) : Mean (SD) 
Proliferation Event 2170 0.112 1155 0.211 1015 - 
  (0.316)  (0.408)   
Population  1998 493.163 998 320.969 1000 665.014 
(thousand)  (546.212)  (489.367)  (546.088) 
Income GRP  2080 3042 1070 2099 1010 4041 
(million Rp)  (14207)  (3522)  (20020) 
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation Index  1626 0.314 621 0.436 1005 0.238 
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  (0.268)  (0.245)  (0.252) 
Gini Inequality Index  1938 0.259 947 0.253 991 0.264 
  (0.046)  (0.051)  (0.040) 
Per Capita Initial Equalization Grants (Avg 1993-1998)2030 82.920 1060 93.067 970 71.832 
(thousand Rp)  (73.402)  (68.823)  (76.613) 
Per capita Equalization Grants 1857 332.862 932 365.151 925 300.330 
(thousand Rp)  (326.291)  (359.624)  (285.365) 
Per capita Lump sum DAK transfers 2170 6.055 1155 11.377 1015 - 
(thousand Rp)  (25.029)  (33.419)   
Share of nonextractive tax sharing 1790 9.337 897 9.697 893 8.975 
(% of Total Revenue)  (6.809)  (7.623)  (5.860) 
Share of natural resource tax sharing 1729 4.702 869 6.971 860 2.409 
(% of Total Revenue)  (10.451) (12.621) 12.621  (6.951) 
Number of Active NGO (2003) 2040 21.245 1025 19.395 1015 23.113 
  (18.399)  (19.396)  (17.142) 
Political Competition (1999) 2060 62.494 1060 53.169 1000 72.377 
(Max. Index 100)  (30.845)  (27.891)  (30.761) 
Note: The parentheses in column (1) show the availability of annual data, which also informs the time 
varying and the time invariant variables. The summary is based on the 2003 municipalities’ cohort which 
implies that the data average of the proliferated local governments also consists of pre-event period, thus it 
is comparable to the non-proliferated local government summary statistic. Table D2 in Appendix B shows 
the panel summary statistics based on the 1998 municipalities’ cohort.  
 
With respect to intergovernmental transfers, the summary statistics in Table 7 
show proliferated local governments have received higher intergovernmental transfers 
than the nonproliferated ones. On average, both nonproliferated and proliferated local 
governments still rely on equalization grants. Furthermore, the proliferated local 
governments also typically have a higher share of tax sharing, which consists of natural 
resource tax sharing and tax sharing from the nonextractive sector (i.e., property taxes).  
Table 8 shows the cumulative distribution of new municipalities in a typical 
province, which shows the extent of fragmentation across provinces before and after the 
stipulation of the 1999 Decentralization Law.  Table 8 shows that about 60 percent of the 
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provinces had an increase in the number of municipalities, with the additions ranging 
from two to five.  
 
Table 8. Summary of the Number of New Municipalities 
1999-2003 1993-1998 
# :ew  
Municipalities 
Freq.
(Province)
Percent Cum. # :ew  
Municipalities 
Freq.
(Province)
Percent Cum.
0 3 9.38 9.38 0 23 71.88 71.88
1 1 3.13 12.50 1 2 6.25 78.13
2 5 15.63 28.13 2 7 21.88 100.00
3 4 12.50 40.63
4 4 12.50 53.13
5 6 18.75 71.88
6 2 6.25 78.13
7 1 3.13 81.25
8 4 12.50 93.75
9 1 3.13 96.88
10 1 3.13 100.00
Total 32 100 Total 32 100
Note: The dataset excludes DKI Jakarta (the capital of the country).  The provinces are recorded as of 2003. 
Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics (2007), Ministry of Home Affairs (2005) 
 
The extent of proliferation varies widely across provinces, and some provinces 
experience extensive proliferation. For example, Papua has been extensively proliferated. 
There are total of 19 new municipalities in the provinces of Papua and West Papua. 
However, before decentralization, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics (2007), 
only 12 new local governments were formed, 1993-1998. Two-thirds of these new local 
governments are new cities that previously had the status of kota administratif (town). 
Thus, while there was no change 1993-1998 in the number of municipalities/cities in the 
majority of provinces, rapid territorial change occurred after 1998 in a majority of 
provinces as shown in Figure 7.  
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 Source: compiled from CBS (2007) 
Figure 7. Frequency of New Local Governments, 1999-2003 
 
78 
 
 
Results 
This section displays results from binary event estimation of the panel binary 
outcome estimation, the panel hazard risk estimation model, and the panel count data 
analysis on the number of new local governments. The empirical results confirm the 
following dominant factors affecting local government proliferation: (1) the extent of 
(dis) economies of scale, (2) the fiscal resources benefits, and (3) the politics to gain 
more vote power at local level by the national dominant political party.  In this case, the 
analysis of results will emphasize on the effect of intergovernmental transfers on 
proliferation or the fiscal resources hypothesis. The empirics addressed the determinants 
of proliferation in terms of the factors affecting the probability of event occurrence, the 
duration to the proliferation event, as well as the extent of fragmentation or the 
determinants on the number of new local governments. 
Determinants of Proliferation: The Panel Binary Outcome Results 
Table 9 presents the empirical results of the random effect (RE) panel logit and 
the random effect (RE) panel probit estimation. The dependent variable based on panel 
binary outcome approach is the event of proliferation in a given year which equals to zero 
when the event has not occurred and equals to one when local government experienced 
proliferation at that given year. In this case, we only present the panel binary outcome 
estimation that applies random effect (RE). As explained in the methodology, the use of 
conditional logit (fixed effect (FE) panel logit) leads to large attrition of the observations 
and therefore although conditional logit offers a robust estimation, this estimation is not a 
comparable specification of the random effect (RE) logit estimation in the presence of 
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large observations’ attrition. While the result of random effect (RE) panel logit and 
random effect (RE) panel probit estimations in Table 9 yield a relatively similar 
qualitative finding, we review findings from these random effect (RE) estimations in 
terms of random effect (RE) logit estimation.  
 
Table 9. Random Effect (RE) Logit and RE Probit Estimations of 1999-2003 Proliferation Event: The Odd 
Ratio of Time Varying Intergovernmental Transfers  
Based on 1998 Cohort RE Logit RE Probit 
 Coeff. Coeff. 
 (SE) (SE) 
   
(Log) Per Capita of Equalization Grants  0.165849 0.085631 
 (0.167) (0.084) 
(Log) Per Capita Lump-sum DAK 0.795793 0.448983 
 (0.343)* (0.212)* 
(Log) Share of non-extractive Tax Sharing 0.012355 0.00714 
 (0.297) (0.147) 
(Log) Share of Natural Resource Tax Sharing 0.194846 0.086951 
 (0.085)* (0.041)* 
   
Observations 1155 1155 
Log Likelihood -202.91 -202.774 
AIC 443.8286 443.5482 
Note: 
 + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
The panel binary outcome estimation results signal the political economy of 
intergovernmental transfers. The results from random effect (RE) panel logit and random 
effect (RE) panel probit estimations show significant positive effect of both per capita 
lump-sum DAK grants and the share of natural resource tax sharing on the probability to 
proliferate. The results in Table F1 in the appendix F which based on retrospective cohort 
of municipalities also show higher per capita lump-sum DAK grants associate with 
higher probability of local government proliferation. Furthermore, Table 9 also shows 
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there is an insignificant effect of per capita equalization grants on the probability to 
proliferate. In this case, the inclusion of initial per capita equalization grants has not 
changed the lax influence of equalization grants on the probability of local government 
proliferation.  
With respect to other variables, the inverted U shaped relationship between 
population and the probability of splitting suggests the creation of new municipalities 
were originated in small size local governments. Table 9 shows higher population in 
(union) municipality may increase the probability of splitting. At low level of population, 
a positive relationship between the probability of splitting and population may as well 
driven by vote seeking politician which may or may not correspond to the efficiency 
argument of mitigating existing sub-optimum of (union) local government.  
An explicit political gain of supporting the formation new local governments is 
caused by a given lower quota of votes necessary to get elected in a smaller size local 
government. Nonetheless, as stated by Grossman (1994), there is a trade off from 
supporting proliferation for the politician associated with the originating local 
governments. Aside of higher votes return, there would be also fewer representatives in 
the originating local governments given there is now higher number of local governments 
for the same level of population served. 
The results of random effect panel binary estimations in Table 9 shows political 
competition associates negatively with the probability of local government proliferation. 
In contrary to Fitrani, Hofman, and Kaiser (2005), the finding shows that initially low 
81 
 
 
political competition tends to be associated with higher probability of splitting.
30
 Given 
that GOLKAR has its majority wins outside Java but only came as the second largest 
party in the national assembly during 1999-2003, this result shows that dominant 
(national) opposition party in the sub-national level increases the probability of local 
government proliferation. 
 As proliferation could be driven by the party within the government (i.e., 
bureaucrats or political party), exploring the role of the grassroots is part of examination 
on whether proliferation follows the demand of the majority at local level. Based on the 
1998 municipalities’ cohort, there is no evidence that higher number of active NGO 
influence the probability of local government proliferation. Nonetheless based on 2003 
municipalities’ cohort, Table F2 in appendix F shows that higher number of active NGO 
has positive effect on the probability of local government proliferation. The significant 
positive effect of number of active NGO on the probability to proliferate under the 
retrospective municipalities’ cohort may imply plausible higher participation of 
grassroots in the new local governments rather than in the originating local governments. 
Hazard Risk Estimation 
The hazard estimation results are shown in terms of the hazard ratio which has 
interpretation of change in scale of the baseline hazard. The hazard ratio greater than one 
represents the scaling up magnitude of the baseline hazard risk, and similarly, the hazard 
ratio less than one implies the magnitude in which the baseline hazard risk is scaled 
                                                 
30
 Fitrani, Hofman, and Kaiser (2005) find the negative effect of Golkar majority on the probability of local 
government split given that they only considered of split event that occurred in year 1999. 
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down. As the dependent variable is the duration to the event, positive difference of the 
hazard ratio from the value of one refers to the faster path of time in which municipalities 
may actually proliferate, while the negative difference of the hazard ratio from the value 
of one represents the influence of the covariate to slow down the timing to the event of 
proliferation. 
The estimation results in Table 10 represent the determinants of the duration to 
the occurrence of the overall proliferation event and the duration to the occurrence of 
sequential proliferation.
31
 In this case, the estimation results in Table 10 refer to the Cox 
proportional hazard specification model which includes both the time varying and time-
invariant covariates.  The time varying variables are represented by population, 
population square, jurisdiction income (Gross Regional Product), and the Gini income 
inequality index, and the dummy of higher share of grants. Meanwhile, the time invariant 
covariates consist of the geographic dummies, number of active NGO, political 
competition, and per capita initial equalization grants.
32
 As shown in Table 10, the time 
varying covariates as well as time invariant characteristics affect the hazard of splitting. 
Overall, the factors affecting the probability to proliferate and factors that may play role 
in influencing the hazard risk of splitting in terms of time varying factor are quite 
different. 
                                                 
31
 In Box D1 in appendix D, we explain how the proliferation event can be defined in various plausible 
alternative hypotheses. However, we focus our analysis of proliferation as pair event (definition number 1 
in Box D1) and on the duration to the sequential event (definition number 4 in Box D1). 
 
32
 The number of active NGO and the extent of political competition are set as time invariant given the 
setting of estimation period between years 1999-2003 as well as data source characteristic. As explained 
previously, these variables are constructed from specific questions which only available in a given year of 
the survey. 
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In this case, contrary to a claim of prevalent gaming in equalization grants, the 
hazard risk estimation results show that higher per capita equalization grants tend to slow 
down the proliferation event. Meanwhile, as the tax sharing tends to induce faster 
proliferation, higher tax sharing on local government revenue also associates with lower 
hazard risk of sequential proliferation event. With respect to natural resource tax sharing,  
this variable positively influences the probability to proliferate, while it does not seem to 
affect the hazard risk to sequential proliferation event. 
 
Table 10. Cox Proportional Hazard (CPH) Estimations on 1999-2003 Proliferation Event(s): The Hazard 
Ratio of Time Varying Intergovernmental Transfers 
 
Duration Period   1993-2003 2000-2005 
Duration to 
Proliferation (pair) event 
sequential proliferation 
event 
Municipalities Cohort 2003 1998 
Observations Full Obs. Proliferated LG 
   
(Log) Per Capita Equalization Grants 0.942771 3313.626 
 (0.021)** - 
(Log) Per Capita Lump-sum DAK Transfers 1.018175 2.00E-06 
 (0.030) - 
(Log) Share of non-extractive Tax Sharing 1.017152 0.427357 
 (0.031) (0.008)** 
(Log) Share of Natural Resource Tax Sharing 1.017894 0.271404 
 (0.008)* - 
Observations 2748 174 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -491.644 1.21E-06 
AIC  3.92E+29 
Proportional Hazard Test: Prob> Chi2 0.0474 1.000 
Notes: Standard error is robust standard error; On log-logistic and weibull Constant is not shown; The choice of 
survival regression is based on which specification model with lowest AIC. 
 
Furthermore, there is a positive association between higher share of non-
extractive tax sharing and the formation of new local governments and higher tax sharing 
also associate with reduction of hazard risk on sequential proliferation event. Table 10 
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shows that 1% increase in tax share of tax sharing associate to one tenth faster for the 
jurisdiction to form new local governments. While higher tax sharing may drive faster 
time to the formation of new local government, the estimation on the duration to the 
sequential event also shows that higher shared tax may slow down the occurrence of 
sequential event. 
Meanwhile, the equalization grants during decentralization period seems to reduce 
the risk of proliferation. The hazard ratios of duration to first time proliferation event are 
shown in Table F3 in appendix F. In this case, the per capita lump-sum DAK does not 
increase the hazard risk to first time of proliferation event. In the case of time to first 
proliferation event, the value of 1.22 hazard ratio of log per capita lump-sum DAK means 
1 % increase in per capita lump-sum transfers would increase the risk to proliferate 
around one fifth faster than its counterpart. 
Table F3 also shows a complete estimation on the duration to (pair) event of 
proliferation as well as duration to the sequential proliferation event. On other time 
varying variables, the value of hazard ratio of inequality index that is less than one seems 
to be counterintuitive. Nonetheless, the effect of income inequality is not robust and the 
estimator sign also sensitive to the definition of the proliferation event.  
Furthermore, unlike the results from the binary outcome estimations, the results 
on duration estimations do not find a significant effect of population when the event of 
proliferation is defined as the formation of new local government as shown in Table F3 in 
appendix F. Meanwhile, in terms of variables that measure accountability of the 
government, the impact of political competition and grassroot influence on the hazard 
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risk of first time proliferation and on the hazard risk of sequential proliferation event is 
different. In general, the findings may also indicate that the event of proliferation 
between first time event and sequential event do not follow any path dependence.  
As shown in Table F3, the duration to first time proliferation event is significantly 
influenced by the time invariant variable of political competition. Higher index of 
political competition associates with a slightly longer period to the event of proliferation. 
However, there is no evidence that political competition also affects hazard risk of 
sequential proliferation. Instead, higher number of active NGO associates with slower 
duration to the event of sequential proliferation while higher number of active NGO 
associates with shorter period to the first time proliferation event given that the 
proliferation event occurred in the origin and the new local governments is treated as the 
same type of event. The less than one value of the hazard ratio from the number of active 
NGO on the duration to sequential proliferation event may explain a moderate grassroots 
influence on stability of new local governments.  
In regards to the time invariant covariates, the significant effect of covariate is 
generally sensitive to the type of the proliferation event that is emphasized. The time 
invariant variables do not influence the duration in which jurisdiction(s) become new 
local governments. Meanwhile, the spatial characteristics have consistent influence on the 
duration to the event of splitting for the case of Sumatera and Borneo. Across the 
specification model, the duration to the event of proliferation seems to be faster in the 
case of municipalities within the region of Sumatera and Borneo. Meanwhile, the 
proliferated municipalities within region of Sulawesi tend to be more stable than other 
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proliferated municipalities as shown in Table F3 column 1. Note that similar to the case 
of binary outcome panel estimations, the control region or the non-included region 
dummy variables is Java and Bali.   
The :umber of :ew Local Government: The Province Level Estimation 
In terms of the number of new local governments, Table 11 shows the empirical 
results of random effect and fixed effect of panel count regression (i.e., Poisson and 
Negative Binomial). In this case, Fixed Effect (FE) Poisson regression leads to different 
qualitative results than the Random Effect (RE) Poisson, and similarly for the case of 
panel Negative Binomial regression. The fixed effect (FE) of negative binomial results in 
Table 11 is preferable based on lower log likelihood and lower AIC statistic in 
comparison to random effect (RE) of negative binomial regression. Based on 1993-2003 
period of estimation, we include the year dummy variable of prior 1999 to represent the 
different institution between the pre- and the decentralization period. 
 
Table 11. Random Effect and Fixed Effect of Negative Binomial Panel Regression 
Results on the Number of New Local Governments in 1993-2003 
 RE :egbin FE :egbin RE Poisson FE Poisson 
     
Province Population 0.000085 0.000384 5.27E-05 0.000688 
 (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000)* 
Province Population Square -2.38E-09 -7.90E-09 -1.61E-09 -1.16E-08 
 (0.000) (0.000)+ (0.000) (0.000)+ 
Income Province GRP -8.71E-07 -1.85E-06 -5.89E-08 -7.03E-06 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Province Household Expenditure Gini 
Inequality  -12.7617 -8.99379 -15.6086 -20.8787 
 (3.876)** (6.908) (2.840)** (4.205)** 
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization  1.008681 -4.09035 1.741249 1.850759 
 (0.655) (2.297)+ (0.477)** (0.940)* 
Median of Municipalities Share of 
Equalization Grants 1.860803 1.817689 1.501231 -2.57882 
 (1.000)+ (1.148) (0.777)* (0.396)** 
Number of Active NGO 0.000449 0.001587 -0.00012  
87 
 
 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)  
Political Competition -0.00954 -0.04099 -0.00366  
 (0.006)+ (0.017)+ (0.004)  
Year 1993-1998 -2.3132 -2.29779 -2.54809  
 (0.394)** (0.426)** (0.341)**  
Aceh and Papua 1.500032 2.780822 1.311958  
 (0.392)** (1.479)+ (0.286)**  
Constant 2.103412 3.546627 2.990339  
 (1.209)+ (2.527) (0.874)**  
     
Observations 346 314 346 314 
Provinces 32 29 32 29 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -229.134 -147.577 -256.215 -190.493 
AIC 484.268 317.154 536.431 392.988 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Overall, the results show the presence of economies of scale. There is an inverse 
U shaped relationship between population and the number of new local governments. 
Meanwhile, fixed effect (FE) negative binomial results show the variable of political 
competition has a marginal negative significance on the number of new local 
governments. In this case, higher political competition associates with fewer numbers of 
new local governments in a province. Also, in terms of spatial distribution of new local 
governments, there is a significant positive region effect on the number of new local 
governments in the case of Aceh and Papua provinces. Meanwhile, high ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization index within a province also tends to associate with lower number of 
new local governments. 
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Concluding Remarks 
This chapter examines the determinants of Indonesian local government 
proliferation that is differentiated in terms of local government decision to initiate 
proliferation, the extent of government fragmentation in a province, and the timing to the 
event which represents the hazard of splitting. The latter approach tests on what factors 
affect the duration of local government to the proliferation event which may or may not 
be similar to the factors affecting the probability to proliferate. Given that the theory part 
focuses on the common pool aspect of intergovernmental grants largely lies on the lump-
sum part of the grants, the empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis of fiscal 
resources as important determinants that influence proliferation.  
In this case, the empirical results suggest that the economic incentive play role on 
the probability of local government proliferation as well as on the extent of local 
government’s fragmentation. However, the results also show the panel binary outcomes 
and the survival regression lead to different qualitative results when the variable is 
disaggregated across type of transfers. Meanwhile, the empirical results from count 
regressions tend to be in line with the binary outcome estimation results. 
The random effect (RE) panel binary outcome estimation find a positive effect of 
lump-sum DAK grants and tax sharing and an insignificant effect of per capital 
equalization grants on the probability of local government proliferation. Meanwhile, the 
survival regressions show the pattern that higher tax sharing links to shorter duration to 
the event of proliferation is only applied for the case of first time splitting. The survival 
regression on duration to the sequential proliferation event also suggests higher tax 
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sharing associate with longer duration to the proliferation. In regards to inter-
governmental grants, the results on duration to first time proliferation find that higher per 
capita equalization grants associate with slower duration to the event of proliferation. 
Meanwhile, the lump-sum DAK transfers tend to shorten the duration of the existing 
local government to the event of proliferation, thus similar to the case that this type of 
grants also induces the probability to proliferate.  
Studies focus on the impact of intergovernmental transfers on proliferation should 
also put attention on the effect of different type of transfers. Unlike DAU or equalization 
grants, lump-sum DAK grants is a specific grants generally associates with “mandated 
national program” which in this case refer to the administrative devolution of apparatus 
to the new local governments from the originating local governments. Based on DSF 
report (2007), the devolution of the administrative apparatus does not really follow the 
central government expectation. In this case, Besley and Coate (2003) view the 
representative decision-making may restrict the central government ability to cater its 
mandated expenditure program through intergovernmental transfers.  
While the empirical results find a support that proliferation may come as a form 
local government competition on intergovernmental transfers, the positive effect of tax 
sharing on the probability of local government proliferation challenged the argument of 
financing incentive as solely a tactical central-local government behavior. As shown in 
the result section, higher non-extracting tax sharing associates with shorter duration to the 
event of new local government formation but this financing source tends slowing down 
the duration of first time proliferation to the occurrence sequential event. The finding 
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may suggest the new local governments that rely more on non-extractive tax sharing is 
relatively more stable than its counterpart in which stability refers to a lower hazard risk 
of sequential events. 
Meanwhile, the panel count analysis that finds an inverse U shaped of the 
relationship between population and the number of new local governments in a province 
may also reflect the presence of scale economies suggesting that the proliferation would 
be inefficient at higher level of population. The inverse U relationship between the 
population and the probability to proliferate also suggest that the trend of higher disparity 
in size across local governments. The proliferated local governments with relatively 
smaller size population and the relatively large population size of non-proliferated local 
government imply scale economies are viewed as a relative term to the initial level of 
existing local government population. 
In regards to other hypothesis, the empirical results that confirm the hypothesis of 
scale economies compete with the politics that view demographic change following 
proliferation leads to higher votes return. The evidences of an inverted U-shaped effect of 
population variable as well as the negative effect of political competition variable on the 
probability of local government proliferation suggest politician’s expectation to capitalize 
the return of votes through proliferation. Furthermore, we only weakly observed the role 
of the grassroots affecting the probability to proliferate, while we do not find evidence 
that grassroots may affect the extent of fragmentation or the duration to the event of 
proliferation. 
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CHAPTER III  
THE IMPACT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FORMATION ON HEALTH AND 
EDUCATION OUTCOMES 
  
Introduction 
The objective of this essay is to examine the potential impact of local government 
proliferation in Indonesia. Based on municipality panel data from 1993 to 2005, we 
applied a Difference-in-Difference (DID) approach to test whether this proliferation 
improved or deteriorated the quality of education and health outcomes, measured in terms 
of test scores and rates of graduation, dropouts, and infant mortality. We seek (1) to 
determine whether the proliferation policy uniformly affects each of these outcomes 
within the proliferated local governments, and (2) to explore whether the effect of the 
proliferation policy on these measured outcome(s) follows a gradual path that may signal 
the sustainability of the impacts. 
Studies on the impact of government formation have varied in terms of their 
conclusions about the possible outcomes from the policy (Bourdeaux 2007; Brancati 
2005; Brasington 1997; Duncombe , Miner, and Ruggiero 1995; Geys 2006; Tyrefors 
2006).  In the case of proliferation in Indonesia, we start with the impact of proliferation 
on service delivery outcomes. This is used as the starting point mainly because improved 
delivery of services is the statutory objective of local government proliferation as stated 
in each law of each new local government.  Because in the context of Indonesian 
proliferation, events intertwine with the overall decentralization policies, we constructed 
the channels that link the outcome of government services delivery and the proliferation 
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policy in the context of Oates’ (1972) Decentralization Theorem as explained in the 
theoretical model by Panizza (1999) and by Arzaghi and Henderson (2005). This analysis 
may indirectly show the outcome of general decentralization policy in Indonesia even 
though we focus on the outcome effect of the proliferation (i.e., the creation of new local 
governments—one part of the decentralization program in Indonesia). 
The choice to use education and health outcomes as the measured impact of the 
proliferation policy also is based on the change in the central-local expenditure 
assignments after the implementation of decentralization policy in Indonesia. Based on 
the amended Law No. 22/1999, management of primary education and basic healthcare 
falls more on the shoulders of local governments. Several studies of the effect of 
Indonesian decentralization policies on service delivery point out the gradual 
involvement of local governments in primary education and basic health service 
programs (Bjork 2003; Booth 2003; Yoonjoung et al. 2006). However, none of these 
studies were empirical, and none of the studies of the effects of decentralization on the 
education and health sectors took into consideration the role of the proliferation policy.  
The rest of this essay will be organized in the following manner. In the section on 
literature review, we briefly discuss the channels through which the proliferation policy 
may affect outcomes. In the methodology, we discuss the specification model and 
identification issue in regards to the treatment group, and the construction of variables 
and data issues is reviewed in the data section. The final section presents analysis and 
discussion of the results. 
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Literature Review 
This section emphasizes studies that may support the hypothesis on the 
relationship between proliferation policy and service outcomes in the education and 
health sectors. This review of the channels through which proliferation affects service 
delivery outcomes may shed light on an association between proliferation policy and 
education or health decentralization. 
The Proliferation Policy and Service Delivery Outcomes  
 The improvement in education and health outcomes essentially corresponds to the 
improvement in welfare, in which the welfare outcome is assumed to be initiated in the 
context of the Leviathan local government objective function (W). For the proliferated 
local governments, the autonomous Jurisdiction 1 and Jurisdiction 2 will possibly 
determine different local provision of services. Eq. (2.15) shows the general context of 
the Leviathan objective function under separation, and the following Eq. (3.1) applies Eq. 
(2.15) to the case of Jurisdiction 1. 
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From maximizing the objective function in Eq. (3.1), the costs of local provision of 
services ( 1g ) under separation is shown in Eq. (3.2). 
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Meanwhile, in  the case of Jurisdiction 2, the politician in Jurisdiction 2 will also 
face the level of local provision cost ( 2
~g ) from maximizing the objective function  as 
shown in Eq. (3.3). 
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In comparison with the level at which public services were provided under the union as 
shown in Eq. (2.12), both the originating local government and the new local 
governments do a better job of providing these services because lower costs of provision 
( ig
~ < gˆ ) given that Jurisdiction 1 and Jurisdiction 2 are homogenous. 
 The comparative statistics on differences in providing local public goods under 
the union and under separation with respect to the determinants of proliferation may be 
associated with different levels of net gains of welfare (W). Given that iW  incorporates 
more groups of iu  under separation (i.e., a higher number of local governments), higher 
net gains (W) associates with improved outcome because of lower costs for service 
delivery ( ig
~ - igˆ < 0), and a reduction in net gains (W) may be present if the impact of 
proliferation suggests the measured outcome has deteriorated because of increased costs 
in service delivery ( ig
~ - igˆ > 0).  
Based on Eq. (3.2) and Eq. (3.3), the following factors also, by anticipating future 
results, determine the decision to proliferate as shown in Eq. (2.20) and Eq. (2.21). 
Several channels of how local government proliferation might affect government services 
delivery are ( 1) economies of scale, (2) the presence of spatial decay, (3) fiscal 
95 
 
 
resources, and (4) accountability or local responsiveness. Taking into account different 
channels that would explain how proliferation affects outcomes, Table 12 shows the 
following hypothesis of proliferation’s impact on education and health outcomes.  
The Channels of How Proliferation May Affect Service Delivery 
Table 12 summarizes the predicted impact under different dominant factor(s) and 
thus the predicted sign for the proliferated local governments in response to the change of 
their jurisdiction. In this case, the partial derivative of outcome ( ig
~ ) with respect to the 
proliferation factor is shown in Appendix B. 
 
Table 12. Dominant Factor(s) and Hypotheses of Post-Event Impact of Proliferation 
Dominant Factor(s) Impacts Predicted Sign 
Spatial decay Worsen IMR(+), Dropout Rate (+), Test Scores (-), Graduation Rate (-) 
Economies of scale Worsen IMR(+), Dropout Rate (+), Test Scores (-), Graduation Rate (-) 
Fiscal resources Improved IMR(-), Dropout Rate (-), Test Scores (+), Graduation Rate (+) 
Accountability Improved IMR(-), Dropout Rate (-), Test Scores (+), Graduation Rate (+) 
 
It is all but impossible to measure the wants of local residents, but in this case, we 
assume that fewer dropouts, more graduates and higher average student test scores are 
measures of improved outcomes in education. Similarly, a lower infant mortality rate 
represents improved health care. These education and health outcomes are common 
development indicators.  Admittedly, we are assuming that such improvements represent 
the demands of the local population. We regard improvements in these indicators as 
reflective of a positive impact from local government proliferation.  Given the 
importance of these sectors and these outcomes for growth in Indonesia (Besley and Cord 
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2007; Garcia and Soelistianingsih 1998; McMahon and Boediono 1992), this may not be 
such a bad assumption. In the following discussion, we describe how the policy of 
proliferation might affect outcomes in terms of these hypotheses. 
As for the economies of scale hypothesis, proliferation may decrease the 
provision of services by local governments because of capacity constraints (i.e., a low 
level of population). Given changes in the structure of government, economies of scale 
are generally represented by a change in population (Bish and Ostrom 1973; Tiebout 
1956).  A loss in population as a result of the proliferation policy in the presence of 
economies of scale may worsen outcomes (i.e., education and health outcomes). For 
example, the number of schools in the original local government may be used less with 
lower population or a similar issue may occur in terms of a shortage of inputs (i.e., 
teachers) in the new local governments. 
The efficiency gains from economies of scale originated from fixed costs of 
providing services. These costs would decline with an increase in population, which in 
turn benefits both the beneficiary and the taxpayer. Byrnes and Dollery (2002) state that 
majority of past studies find a conditional state of economies of scale, or a U-shaped 
curve relationship, between population and government efficiency. A larger jurisdiction 
can also lead to higher costs of service because of bureaucratic complexities involved in 
delivering services to remote jurisdictions, a situation referred to as bureaucratic 
congestion (Boyne 1992).   
Some studies indicate that local government interjurisdictional externality may 
lead to under-provision of local public goods, a situation that may dissipate the potential 
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benefit of lowering bureaucratic congestion (Bardhan 2002; Bardhan and Mookherjee 
2006; Case, Rosen, and Hines 1993). In case that the proliferation policy is associated 
with direct access to the education and health facilities in each respective jurisdiction of 
the proliferated local governments, higher spillover in the proliferated local governments 
may occur because of the relatively unrestricted access of nonvoters to benefits available 
from neighboring local governments. The local government’s strategic-response to 
proliferation policy may well result in lower expenditures in the proliferated jurisdiction 
based on a potential spill-in of services. But at the same time, neighboring local 
governments may cut expenditures because of the potential spill-out of the services.  
Nonetheless, whether interjurisdictional externality is larger under smaller size 
jurisdictions is less obvious when the local legislatures can play out the allocation of 
transfers through access to central legislatures (Besley and Coate 2003). In this case, the 
potential benefits of proliferation may also be associated with changes in fiscal 
decentralization. The fiscal resource hypothesis takes the form of intergovernmental 
grants and is generally based on the effect of grants on local government expenditures, 
which in this case are education and health expenditures, or directly affect outcomes 
through economic growth. Meanwhile, studies have reviewed from the context of 
common pool problems the effect on the political economy caused by grant financing on 
local government formation (Tyrefors 2006). In terms of impact on the delivery of 
services, this common pool characteristic of grants represents lower cost (for the gainers) 
of service, and thus the proliferation policy is expected to have a positive effect on 
service delivery outcome.   
98 
 
 
A change in the central grants may also reflect redistribution demand (Barankay 
and Lockwood 2007; Ginsburgh 2005; Hagihara and Hagihara 1991). Meanwhile, 
various U.S case studies on school district performance examine the direct effect of 
central government grants on education outcomes (Baicker and Gordon 2006; Gordon 
and Vegas 2005). In this case, the formula used in central government grants is intended 
to increase school consolidation (Gordon and Knight 2006). Hammed and Philemon 
(2007), based on the case of South Africa, argued that the major change in the 
intergovernmental system that also characterized territorial change has improved the 
effectiveness of public service delivery. In terms of the redistribution, education and 
health service delivery are part of a local government’s redistribution policy (Bahl, 
Martinez-Vazquez, and Wallace 2002).  
The accountability hypothesis is associated with how local government can be 
made accountable for the local services affecting its community. Other than fiscal 
autonomy (Bish and Ostrom 1973; Bird and Slack 2007; Slack 2007), accountability is 
usually measured through political competition (Bardhan 2002; Besley and Case 1995; 
Powell and Witten 1993). Based on the Powell and Whitten (1993) hypothesis, one might 
argue that proliferation is weakly associated with improvement in outcomes when the 
dominant party is influential. Only when proliferation policy is a result of more party 
competition, the proliferation of local government may drive service outcomes 
improvement.  
Nonetheless, Besley and Case (1995) show that in the presence of yardstick 
competition, there is pressure on the incumbent government to improve service delivery 
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within the existing local government. In ex-ante context of Buchanan and Faith (1987), 
the proliferation policy also implies that the positive impact of the policy on service 
delivery outcomes may also result in the prevention of proliferation or, in the case of 
proliferated local government, prevention of further proliferation. In terms of 
accountability by an incumbent politician intent on gaining maximum votes, the 
incumbent may use improved service delivery to try to prevent voters in some part of his 
or her jurisdiction from choosing to leave the existing structure of local government.  
 
Empirical Model 
The choice of a specification model depends on the availability of data before and 
after the policy change as well as on an assumption of whether the policy change is an 
exogenous variation in the treatment variable.
33
 We used DID estimation mainly because 
pre- and post-event data are available. In case the proliferation policy is possibly 
nonrandom, we take into account the channels through which the proliferation policy 
may influence the outcomes. 
Given that the central governments set uniform standards for education and 
primary health outcomes, the endogeneity that usually occurs in the outcome under the 
decentralized education standard is absent. In this context, the local government 
proliferation would be viewed as to how the policy might affect the attainment of the 
                                                 
33
 Empirical impact evaluation studies of local government proliferation (or amalgamation) use an 
unbalanced panel of local governments’ “population” in Regression Discontinuity (RD) estimation (Jorhdal 
and Liang 2006, Tyrefors 2006) to match regression in the case of education or health center proliferation 
(Luoma, Moisio, and Aaltonen 2007) or Difference-in-Difference estimation by comparing two regions, 
with one region serving as the control group and other region with institutional change serving as the 
treatment group (Lowery and Lyons 1989). 
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outcomes. For example, the central government mandates nine years of primary 
education, which consists of elementary and middle school education; in this context the 
outcomes would be either the dropout rate or enrollment rate. Meanwhile, the test scores 
and percentage of students’ graduated is associated with the central government policy on 
national exams that must be taken by all eighth- and eleventh-graders as a requirement to 
receive a diploma. In terms of decentralization in the health sector, the infant mortality 
rate is part of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that has been extensively 
prioritized by both the central and local governments. 
The DID specification under the different timing of the proliferation implied that 
the interest of the variable would be on the impact of proliferation when the Law of new 
local government is in effect to both the originating local government and the new local 
government. Various studies on the difference-in-difference estimation focus on the 
individual or household level when there is a different timing of the law adoption (i.e., 
state law, school program) or the years of funding have been received by the lower unit of 
government to identify the period of when post-event (Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggiero 
1995; Hoxby 2000; Nelson 1992) and thus estimate the impact of the policy. In this case, 
we construct the fixed unit of local government as of 2003, and the following estimation 
model in Eq. (3.4) incorporates both the pre-event estimation period and the post-event 
period:  
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Where t is the estimation period, Y  the measure of outcomes, DT is the time dummy 
variables (t-1), and time invariant variables are nDS  as the dummy variable of new local 
101 
 
 
governments and 
oDS as the dummy for the originating local governments. In this case, 
∑ ntn DSxDS  is the post-event dummy for the new local governments and 
∑ oto DSxDS  is the post-event dummy for the originating local governments, and X ’s 
are a set of other covariates. In the context of panel setting, ti ,ε is a time variant error 
term,
 
while iv  is a time invariant error term (i.e., specific individual error term). 
Given that  
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 is the post-event estimation, the estimation model in 
Eq. (3.4) essentially controls the initial differences between the control and the treatment 
group. The post-event series will be observed from the year when the proliferation event 
takes place to one or more years after the proliferation event, depending on the length of 
the observation periods. 
Evidence of proliferation is supported when 1+Tα  and/or 2+Tα in Eq. (3.4), the 
estimator(s) of the proliferated local government post-event dummy variable(s), are 
significantly different from zero. Overall, the estimation in Eq. (3.4) includes both the 
time invariant dummy variable of proliferated local government ( nDS ,
oDS ) and time 
dummy variables (∑
=4T
T DTα ) to isolate the effect of initial characteristics and time trend 
that may affect differences in outcomes, and the post-event dummy variable(s) 
( xDS n ∑ ntDS , ∑ oto DSxDS ). Those sets of covariates would be referred to as the 
basic specification model. 
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In this case, the post-event dummy variable of proliferated local governments 
represents the net effect of proliferation. This time variant post-event dummy variable(s) 
( ∑ ntn DSxDS , ∑ oto DSxDS ) is the main variable of interest because it captures the 
impact difference of the proliferated local governments from the change in the 
administration (i.e., the proliferation policy). Note that the post-event dummy variable 
started one year after the proliferation law was stipulated, and instead this statutory 
(year=0) event of the proliferation would be a separate dummy variable. The use of the 
proliferation event as a separate dummy variable is to control the plausible window 
period of the policy impact. The proliferation policy has an uncertain immediate impact 
on the measured outcome(s). 
Meanwhile, the time invariant dummy variable of the treatment group controls the 
effect of the time variant dummy variables (post-proliferation event) from the embedded 
characteristic of the treatment group. In this case, the new local governments ( nDS ) and 
the originating local governments ( oDS ) are separate treatment groups because of the 
likely different impact between the new local governments and the originating local 
government. Pooling the treatment observations into one single dummy variable may not 
be adequate and could lead to a flawed post-event estimator when there is an issue of 
within-group heterogeneity. Other than a change in the size of the jurisdiction, the 
creation of a new local government refers to a new administration being formed that is 
different from the previous government, and the originating local government may or 
may not adjust its administration. 
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The post-event dummy variable that pooled all-year responses into one covariate 
(i.e., the pooling of year responses), represented by ∑ ntn DSxDS and ∑ oto DSxDS ,  is 
adequate when the number of years after the occurrence of proliferation may not affect 
the outcome. However, given the various different years of proliferation events, the 
disaggregation of all year post-event proliferation may avoid potential heterogeneity bias 
because of the influence of the differences in elapsed time across the observations of the 
treatments. The choice of whether to differentiate the impact response by the length of 
years can either be applied to one or both treatment groups, depending on whether the 
time variant contributes to the within-group heterogeneity. The following estimation 
model as in Eq. (3.5) incorporates these transition dummy variables:  
)()()( ,
1
,
)()(
4
321, tii
qk
timq
mpq
mtoo
mp
mhp
mtnn
mh
h
h
on
ti vXDSxDSDSxDSDTDSDSY εααααααα ++++++++= ∑∑∑∑
+=
+
+=
−
+
+=
−
+
=
 (3.5)
 
 
The estimation model in Eq. (3.5) retains most of the basic covariates that supposedly are 
included in the DID estimation. The estimation model in Eq. (3.5) is different from the 
estimation model in Eq. (3.4) only in its inclusion of the duration of post-events for the 
proliferated local governments. In this case, the post-event impact of the proliferated 
local governments consists of several set of dummy variables as follows: 
)( )( mtnn DSxDS −  = post-event dummy of new local governments after m year lag 
from proliferation event 
)( )( mtoo DSxDS −  = post-event dummy of originating local governments after m year 
lag of proliferation event 
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The DID Estimation in Panel Setting 
 Although the estimation model in Eq. (3.4) as well as the estimation model in Eq. 
(3.5) refers to the pooled cross-section estimation, the use of more than one year on the 
pre-event values as well as on the post-event values would allow the estimation to be set 
as panel regression. In terms of which linear panel estimation should be used, a Hausman 
test (Hausman 1978) is conducted for Eq. (3.4) and Eq. (3.5). The null hypothesis of the 
Hausman test is that the time invariant ( iv ) and time variant error terms ( ti,ε ) are 
correlated, and thus the rejection of the null hypothesis supports the use of FE panel 
regression. Meanwhile, the failure to reject the null hypothesis would suggest that either 
the OLS (i.e., pooled OLS) or the RE panel regression is a better specification model. 
Table E1 in Appendix E shows the results of Hausman tests on basic specifications as 
well as on extended specification, in which the latter implies the inclusion  of a complete 
set of covariates ( tiX , ).  
In this case, the Breusch-Pagan LM test (Breusch and Pagan 1979) helps 
determine whether RE panel estimation is necessary or whether pooled ols estimation is 
sufficient. The Ordinary Least Squares (i.e., pooled OLS) generates a consistent 
estimator, given that there is no correlation between either iv  
or ti,ε  with all covariates  
( tiX , DTDS,, ) as shown in Eq. (3.4) and Eq. (3.5). In other word, the pooled OLS 
estimators are preferable when 0
2 =vσ . However, the heteroskedastic nature of the 
variation of measured outcomes across municipalities implies that use of the RE would 
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be beneficial so as to avoid the substantial loss in efficiency that biases the standard error 
of the estimator. Table E2 in Appendix E shows the superiority of RE panel regression 
over OLS.  
The Treatment 
In the panel setting estimation, we include the covariates of the proliferation 
determinants and thus control the indirect channels in which proliferation policy may 
influence differences in outcomes. Furthermore, in a RE panel estimation, we also control 
for regional characteristics. The difference in spatial characteristics that may influence 
the demand for education has been posited in past studies on education outcomes in 
Indonesia (Breierova and Duflo 2004; Pradhan 1998). In this case, Breierova and Duflo 
(2004) used time and region varying characteristics as instrumental variables to estimate 
the effect of education on fertility and child mortality. 
In this case, the adjusted estimation that controls for selectivity under the panel 
setting of DID is preferable when the heterogeneity across observations is rampant. The 
use of a pooled cross-section would essentially mean that we might lose too many 
degrees of freedom in order to handle the unobserved heterogeneity that basically has 
been taken care of under FE panel regression. Furthermore, as previously explained, the 
Breusch-Pagan Test suggests the use of panel regression. The inclusion of a richer set of 
covariates other than the basic covariates ( nDS ,
oDS ,∑
=4T
T DTα , ∑ ntn DSxDS , 
∑ oto DSxDS ) would be called as the extended specification model. The extended 
specification model may correct the plausible bias from the basic specification model. 
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Furthermore, we also applied estimation only to the restricted observations and 
thus excluded the issue of self-selection and tested the impact of a subtreatment group, 
which in this case refers to the new local governments. Nonetheless, these restricted 
observations can only be informative when there is less unobserved heterogeneity across 
the observations in comparison with the full sample observation pool. The use of FE 
panel regression and controlling for the determinants that generally influence the 
production function of outcome may handle the unobserved heterogeneity. Within the 
linear estimation, the use of robust standard error mitigates the heteroskedastic nature of 
the data generating process. 
The control group should ideally be similar in all observable variables to the 
group of local governments that proliferate, and thus any variation between the two 
groups came from the proliferation policy. In that setting, the restricted sample that 
covers only proliferated local governments is an attempt to create a relatively 
homogeneous observations pool as well as to avoid the selectivity issue. However, we 
cannot be sure that the restricted sample actually provides a better comparison group. 
Therefore, we display the empirical results from both the full and restricted observations 
to shed light on the appropriate control group in terms of proliferation policy. In this case, 
we do not make any a priori assumption on which set of the observations pool produces a 
relatively homogeneous observations pool of both the control and the treatment group.   
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Data 
The data is based on the panel of municipalities. In this case, municipalities, 
which are the unit level of observations, refers to municipalities/cities as of 2003 and 
includes 434 local governments. Municipalities within DKI Jakarta are excluded from the 
observations. Meanwhile, the treatment group is the proliferated local governments and 
pursuant to the statutory definitions of the law, the proliferated local governments consist 
of the originating local governments and the new local governments.   
As explained in the empirical model, the DID approach requires the availability of 
the pre-event value. In this case, the use of municipalities cohort as of 2003 implies that 
an adjustment of the pre-event values for the originating local governments should be 
made, along with a determination of the pre-event values of the new local governments, 
given that the statutory status of the new local governments occurred only after the 
proliferation event. Based on the crosswalk of the proliferated local governments’ data, 
we extracted the pre-event values for the new local government as well as adjusted values 
for the originating local governments. The procedure with which we constructed the 
crosswalk that is in line with the 2003 cohort of municipalities is shown in Box C1 in 
Appendix C. 
With regard to the estimation period, each outcome may apply a different 
estimation period depending on the availability of data. However, the pre- and post-event 
period adequacy for each estimation is still maintained. In this case, the dropout rate or 
infant mortality estimations cover the period 1993-2005, but the tests scores and 
graduation rate estimations cover four years (2001, 2003-2005). The following section 
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explains the choice of outcomes in the education and health sectors, the definition and 
scope of the treatment variable, and the descriptive statistics of the education and health 
outcomes. As explained earlier, Table D1 in Appendix D lists the description and data 
source(s) of each variable.   
The Choice of Education and Health Outcomes 
  For the education outcomes, we used dropout rates constructed from the 
SUSENAS individual core survey, the total test scores of third-year students in the first 
middle school (equivalent to the eighth-grade of U.S secondary schools) and graduation 
rates (the graduation rate of first secondary school students) constructed from national 
exam (EBTANAS/UNAS) results available from the Ministry of National Education 
(MoNE) website. We focused on the education outcomes at the middle school level and 
not the primary school or the second secondary school levels for the following reasons: 
(1) The government has eliminated the standardized test at the primary level as part of its 
implementation of a nine-year primary education program (MoNE Decree No 011/2002); 
and (2) the second secondary schools are not available in all municipalities, especially in 
the case of new local governments.    
  Because the SUSENAS survey is not longitudinal, a dropout refers only to status 
and not to the event. The question in the SUSENAS core survey only asks the status of an 
individual dropout, not the year when the dropout occurred. Therefore, measuring by age 
range and school level is the best proxy for the dropout rate. In this case, the number of 
dropouts is the number of the first secondary school-age population (i.e., individuals in 
the age range of 13-15 years) that already has passed elementary school but no longer 
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attends school.
34
 Thus, the dropout rate is a percentage of individuals ages 13-15 in the 
population who have elementary school degrees.  
  We measured the dropout rate by specifying the last educational attainment (i.e., 
elementary school degree) and the age range in order to avoid the over-age enrollment 
(Jones et al. 1998, Pradhan 1998).
35
 This measure of the dropout rate also is adequate to 
test the effectiveness of the national nine-year primary school program. Although the 
measure of the dropout rate is part of a redistributive program, student test scores from 
national examinations and their associated graduation rates may reflect the efficiency 
outcome in education sector. 
 The national exam is part of the standardized students’ performance evaluation, 
and since 2002, the test covers both national and local curricula. However, the available 
data as publicized by the MoNE are only for the test scores on national materials. Since 
2002, the test consists of three courses that are based on national curricula. These are 
math, the national language (Bahasa Indonesia), and English, all drawn from five related 
courses of the national curricula: science, social studies, math, national language, and 
English. Since our data began in 2001 and in order to make the data comparable across 
years, we measured the average test score data for the years before 2002 to only take the 
average score on the three courses in the national exams after 2002.  
  Meanwhile, the graduation rate refers to a percentage of the number of students 
who have average scores above the threshold scores for the total number of students who 
                                                 
34
 The age range follows the UNDP (2004) report, which is based on CBS classifications, that the school 
age range for junior school is 13-15 years old. 
35
 Based on field surveys, Jones et al. (1998) noticed the presence of over-age enrollment in East Nusa 
(NTT). They also pointed out that the over-age enrollment is more apparent in poor regions.  
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participated in the exams. Based on a MoNE decree, the threshold passing score is an 
average of 5.0 (out of 10.0) for the three courses. However, we only have data on the 
distribution of students by groups of tests scores, and the threshold average of 5.0 lies 
within a group of 4.5 -5.5 test scores. Therefore, the number of students who graduate 
refers to the cumulative frequency of students whose total test scores are higher than 4.5 
on the distribution of students’ scores. 
 In terms of health outcomes, the infant mortality rate is a common measure of 
health outcomes, especially in evaluating the efficacy of the public sector on primary 
healthcare. However, no annual data on the infant mortality rate exists at the municipal 
level. In this case, we constructed a variable for the infant mortality rate based on 
SUSENAS core data and on the definition of the infant mortality rate as stated in UNDP 
(2004). The SUSENAS data have variables on the number of infants that died before 
reaching one year of age, the number of infants within the age range who survived more 
than one year, and the number of live births. Aggregated into municipality-level data 
scaled with household (population) weight, we extracted the number of live births and the 
number infants who died within the age range of less than one year. The infant mortality 
rate is the number of one-year-old (or younger) infants who died divided by the total 
number of live births for that year, with the rate expressed in terms of deaths per 
thousand live births. 
The Treatment Variable  
The treatment variables are the proliferated local governments, which consist of 
the new local governments and the originating local governments. Based on each of the 
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new local government(s) laws, we identified the original and the new local governments. 
In terms of sequential proliferation, most of the sequential events occurred in the 
originating local governments. Only two new local governments experienced sequential 
events. Thus, we treat these two observations as originating local governments so as to 
prevent interaction across the time invariant dummy variables. As a result, the total 
observations of treatment group(s) that refer to proliferation events 1999-2003 involve 
138 new local governments and 93 originating local governments of a total 434 local 
governments.  
  Based on the proliferation events from 1999 up to 2003, the post-event dummy 
variable is constructed either as an all-year response or is based on how many years 
elapsed after its proliferation event (i.e., duration specific of post-event dummy 
variables), and it is applied only to the treatment group (the proliferated local 
governments). For the all-year response dummy variable, the variable equals to one on 
years after the proliferation occurred and zero otherwise. Meanwhile, in terms of the 
year-by-year response dummy variable(s), a total of six dummy variables show the 
gradual length of the year response because the earliest post-event started in 2000 and the 
end of the estimation period is 2005. 
Descriptive Statistics  
Table 13 presents descriptive statistics of municipal level data on all observations 
(full sample) and the proliferated local government subsamples (i.e., the originating and 
the new local governments) for 2001-2005. The data summary from Table 13 shows the 
characteristics of education and health outcomes across the subsamples. At a glance, 
112 
 
 
there are improvements in both the education and health outcomes during the 
decentralization period, and these occur in both the proliferated  and overall local 
governments.  
  
Table 13. Summary Statistics of Health and Education Outcomes 1993-2005 
 Full Sample New Local Government Origin Local Government 
 1993-
2000 
2001-05 1993-2000 2001-05 1993-2000 2001-05 
Proliferation Event 1999-2003 0.009  0.035  -  -  0.040  0.163  
 (0.093) (0.184)   (0.197) (0.370) 
New Local Government 0.318  0.318  1.000  1.000    
 (0.466) (0.466)     
Origin Local Government 0.214  0.214  -  -  1.000  1.000  
 (0.410) (0.410)     
Total Test Scores  - 16.869   16.459   16.144  
   (2.441)  (2.257)  (2.209) 
% Students Graduate - 73.445   68.069   68.560  
   (24.304)  (26.288)  (26.305) 
Dropout Rate 9.754  5.683  10.551  5.380  8.733  5.892  
 (10.211) (5.696) (12.994) (4.904) (6.498) (4.624) 
Infant Mortality Rate 56.806  44.899  81.437  52.365  59.818  47.709  
 (43.549) (34.390) (60.115) (45.276) (38.345) (30.930) 
Note: Total test scores, percentage of students graduated, and local governments with higher grants are 
compiled for 2001-2005, and not for 1993-2005. Meanwhile, the proliferation event refers to the 
proliferation event for the years 1999-2003, which means that we do not consider three proliferations 1993-
1998 as in the same proliferation event category.  Table C1 and Table C2 in the Appendix show the details 
of the number of observations for each variable across the year. 
 
 
Table 14 presents summary statistics in the proliferated local governments 
differentiated between pre- and post-proliferation events. A similar improvement on these 
outcomes in the proliferated local governments as shown in Table 13 and Table 14 might 
suggest that the effect of both the proliferation and general decentralization policies may 
work in a similar fashion. The descriptive statistics comparison of the education and 
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health outcomes that are based on a calendar year as shown in Table 13 and the summary 
of outcomes surrounding the event year of proliferation as in Table 14 also suggest, 
because they are not qualitatively different, a need to differentiate between the effects of 
the proliferation policy and those institutional changes caused by the decentralization 
policy. By doing so, we account for the confounding events of the proliferation policy 
and for the institutional changes caused by the general decentralization policies. 
 
Table 14. Health and Education Outcomes in Pre- and Post-proliferation Events (1993-2005) 
 New Local Government Origin Local Government 
 Pre Post Pre Post 
New Local Government 1.000  1.000    
 0.000  0.000    
Originating Local Government   1.000  1.000  
   0.000  0.000  
Total Test Scores 14.847  16.660  14.942  16.368  
 (1.317) (2.270) (1.233) (2.279) 
Percent of Students Graduated 86.377  65.577  88.888  65.587  
 (18.068) (26.262) (15.713) (26.244) 
Dropout Rate 9.629  7.958  8.369  7.019  
 (12.081) (10.190) (6.046) (5.934) 
Infant Mortality Rate 77.280  64.611  58.220  52.557  
 (59.770) (53.418) (36.541) (35.743) 
Note: Some of the new local governments proliferation after their formation, which explains the positive 
value of new local government “observations” that are also considered as the originating local 
governments. In this case, the post-event proliferation took effect one year after the law on new local 
government(s) was . 
 
To further illustrate possible observed changes in education and health outcomes, 
Figures 8-15 presents annual patterns of the outcomes (i.e., dropout rate, infant mortality 
rate, student test scores, and graduation rate) between the control and treatment groups as 
well as across treatment groups. Annual comparisons of education and health outcomes 
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between the nonproliferated and the proliferated governments as well as within local 
governments will show how changes in outcomes might be different between the 
proliferated and the nonproliferated local governments. These annual comparisons also 
will show whether the patterns of changes were similar between the new and the 
originating local governments. Referring to the empirical model, the nonproliferated local 
governments represent the control group, and the proliferated local governments are the 
treatment group, which consists of both new and originating local governments.  
Figures 8-11 shows the annual pattern of dropout and infant mortality rates 
between the proliferated and the nonproliferated local governments. Figure 8 and Figure 
9, respectively, present the pattern of the dropout rate and infant mortality rate 1993-
2005, which may further differentiate between the patterns of these outcomes before and 
after the advent of the “Big Bang” decentralization policies. In contrast, Figure 9 and 
Figure 10 present the patterns of education and health outcomes in the proliferated local 
governments in which a proliferation event is the cutoff point because we used the 
proliferation year (year=0) as a benchmark.  
Figure 8 shows a lower average dropout rate in middle school  1993-1999 in the 
proliferated local governments in comparison with the average dropout rate in the 
nonproliferated local governments. In this case, the gap between the average dropout 
rates for the two groups slowly narrowed in the early period of the proliferation trend 
(1999-2002). However, the average dropout rate in the proliferated local governments has 
declined faster than in the nonproliferated local governments in years since proliferation 
(2003-2005). 
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Source: Calculated from SUSENAS 1993-2005 
 
Figure 8. Middle School Dropout Rate in the Proliferated and Nonproliferated Local 
Governments 1993-2005 
 
In term of health outcomes, Figure 9 shows a higher average infant mortality rate 
in proliferated local governments than in the nonproliferated ones. The pattern of infant 
mortality rate in Figure 9 may imply how the reduction in the infant mortality rate has 
been faster in the proliferated local governments in recent years. Before decentralization, 
the period before 1999, there was a persistent large gap in the infant mortality rate 
between the proliferated and the nonproliferated local governments, but since 1999, the 
gap between these two groups has narrowed rapidly. Overall, Figure 8 and Figure 9 
reveal that since the advent of the decentralization policy, the rates of infant mortality and 
middle school dropouts have moved closer for both the proliferated and the 
nonproliferated local governments.  
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Source: Calculated from SUSENAS 1993-2005 
 
Figure 9. Infant Mortality RateS in the Proliferated and Nonproliferated Local 
Governments 1993-2005 
 
As shown in Figure 10 and in Figure 11, the pattern of outcomes within the 
proliferated local governments is not uniform. Within the proliferated local governments, 
the new and the originating local governments have different initial outcome conditions 
before proliferation. Figure 10 and Figure 11 signal improvements in outcomes for both 
the new and originating local governments, with more apparent improvement of 
outcomes in the new local governments, as in the case of the infant mortality rate. The 
wide gap in infant mortality rates between the originating and the new local governments 
has narrowed dramatically over the post-event years.  
The pattern of changes is quite different across the outcomes (i.e., dropout rate, 
infant mortality rate). Figure 10 shows an apparent decline in the average dropout rate in 
both the new and the originating local governments. On the other hand, changes in the 
infant mortality rate since the proliferation event are not immediate. Figure 11 shows a 
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relatively constant gap before proliferation in health outcomes between the new local 
governments and the originating local governments. The gap persisted in the early years 
of proliferation, but quickly diminished in the post-proliferation period. 
 
 
Note: Time (0= year of proliferation);  
Source: calculated from SUSENAS 1993-2005 
 
Figure 10. Middle School Dropout Rate in the Proliferated Local Governments in Pre- 
and Post-proliferation 
 
 
 
 
 Note: Time (0= year of proliferation);  
Source: Calculated from SUSENAS 1993-2005 
 
Figure 11. Infant Mortality Rate in the Proliferated Local Governments in Pre- and Post- 
proliferation 
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Figure 12 presents the pattern in test scores and graduation rates of the 
proliferated local governments in comparison with the nonproliferated local governments. 
A similar pattern for student test scores occurs in the proliferated and nonproliferated 
local governments. Figure 12 shows the nonproliferated local governments have only 
slightly higher average student tests scores than the nonproliferated local governments. 
However, the average percentage of student graduates in the nonproliferated local 
governments is relatively higher than in the proliferated local governments, especially for 
2003 and 2004. Furthermore, Figure 13 and Figure 14 also imply that the patterns for test 
scores and graduation rates are not much different between the new and the originating 
local governments.  
 
Test Scores                                             Graduation Rates 
 
Source: Calculated from EBTANAS/UNAS 1998-2006 and Ministry of National Education (MoNE 2007)  
Figure 12. Mean Test Scores and Graduation Rates in the Proliferated and 
Nonproliferated Local Governments (2001, 2003-2005) 
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Figure 13 shows the average of total tests scores is barely similar to the threshold 
average of passing scores, and the average is relatively constant, 2001-2004, for both the 
new local governments and the originating local governments. However, Figure 14 shows 
the average graduation rate for both the originating and the new local governments has 
declined for the year 2003-2004 in comparison with 2001. Although students who passed 
the secondary level of education is around 80 per cent in 2001, the average percentage of 
graduates dropped significantly to less than 60 per cent in the next year, 2003-2004.  
 
New Local Governments  Originating Local Governments 
    
Source: Calculated from Ministry of National Education (MoNE 2007), EBTANAS/UNAS 1998-2006 
database. 
 
Figure 13. Mean Test Scores in the Proliferated Local Governments (2001, 2003-2005) 
 
 
The large decline in the graduation rate for 2003 and 2004 may be because of the 
change in the system of exams from EBTANAS (Evaluasi Belajar Tahap Akhir 
:asional), which does not affect the students’ graduation status with UNAS (Ujian Akhir 
:asional), the exit exams that determine graduation status. Before 2002, the EBTANAS 
system of exams only applied as a uniform evaluation. The test scores would only affect a 
120 
 
 
student’s chance of entry to a higher level of education. In this case, the graduation status 
of the students is based on weighted scores of regional exams called EBTA (Evaluasi 
Belajar Tahap Akhir) and a school’s annual evaluation of a student’s performance.  
High average test scores in 2005 and similarly high average graduation rates as 
shown in Figure 14 may partly be attributed to a MoNE policy of that year that allowed 
students who failed the exams to retake them in the same year. In previous years, students 
who failed the test had to repeat a grade and thus must wait one year to retake the exam.  
 
 
New Local Governments        Origin Local Governments 
   
Source: Calculated from Ministry of National Education (MoNE 2007), EBTANAS/UNAS 1998-2006 
database. 
 
Figure 14. Graduation Rates in the Proliferated Local Governments (2001, 2003-2005) 
 
 
Results 
The following section further shows the findings of the impact of proliferation 
that are measured as (1) all-year post-event impact, and (2) duration from the event of 
proliferation. Aside of all-year post-event impact, we display the impact of proliferation 
as year duration to post-event because we intend to explore whether there is a gradual 
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response from the proliferation policy. In this case, the hypothesis that supports the 
improvement of outcomes from proliferation would expect that the impact difference 
would be greater the longer the period of proliferation has lasted.   
Furthermore, based on Eq. (3.4) and Eq. (3.5), we also differentiate between the 
estimators of proliferation’s  post-event impact on service delivery outcomes between the 
new and the originating local governments. The separation of the treatment group is 
relevant when the direction of the impact of proliferation is likely to be different within 
the proliferated local governments, thus referring to the originating and the new local 
governments.  
The All-Year Post-event Impact 
Table 15 presents the empirical results from the FE panel regression for the 
following outcomes:  dropout rate, infant mortality rate, test scores, and graduation rate. 
In this case, the post-event estimator refers to the all-year response, which starts one year 
after the event of proliferation (i.e., the stipulation year of new local government) up to 
the end of the estimation period, which is 2005. 
   
 
Table 15. The (all-year) Post-event Effect of Proliferation on Dropout, Infant Mortality, 
and Graduation Rates and Test Scores in New and Originating Local Governments 
 
Model Specification :ew Local Government 
  
Originating Local Government 
  
 Full Sample Proliferated  Full Sample Proliferated  
Dropout Rate (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
RE Basic Model -0.950 -1.793  0.656 NA  
 (0.504)+ (0.587)**  (0.272)*   
RE Extended Model -3.499 -3.333  -0.289   
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 (1.066)** (0.958)**  (0.377)   
Fixed Effect Extended Model -3.345 -2.917  -0.203 NA  
 (1.361)* (1.383)*  (0.422)   
Infant Mortality Rate       
RE Basic Model -20.287 -16.195  -4.350 NA  
 (3.334)** (3.652)**  (2.251   
RE Extended Model -16.104 -10.947  -6.663   
 (9.101) (8.699)  (3.000)*   
Fixed Effect Extended Model -23.110 -17.092  -6.918 NA  
 (11.917) (12.243)  (3.328)*   
Test Scores       
RE Basic Model -0.384 0.022  -0.374 NA  
 (0.220)* (0.245)  (0.210)*   
RE Extended Model -0.213 -0.252  0.025   
 (0.339) (0.383)  (0.196)   
Fixed Effect Extended Model 0.355 -0.070  -0.048 NA  
 (0.517) (1.195)  (0.274)   
Graduation Rates       
RE Basic Model -6.089 -0.617  -6.423 NA  
 (2.644)** (3.106)  (2.698)**   
RE Extended Model -6.751 -5.187  -7.433   
 (6.273) (6.903)  (3.533)*   
Fixed Effect Extended Model -5.370 7.575  -11.733 NA  
 (12.190) (27.415)  (4.653)   
Note: 
Other covariates: population, population square, (log) income (GRP), ethno-linguistic fragmentation index, and  household 
expenditure Gini index, (log) per capita equalization grants (avg. 1993-1998), (log) per capita equalization grants, (log) per capita 
lump sum DAK transfers, (log) share of nonextractive tax sharing, (log) share of natural resource tax sharing. The detailed effects of 
other covariates from RE Panel extended specifications (all-year impact) are shown in Table F11 and Table F13 in Appendix F, while 
Fixed Effect (FE) Panel extended specification refers to results in Table F 10 and Table F12 in Appendix F. The basic specification 
(RE panel estimation) is shown in Table F4-F7 in Appendix F. 
+ significant at 10%;* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
In general, the results in the basic specification estimations show a different sign 
of post-event impact on dropout rates between the new local governments and the 
originating local governments. Although the post-event in the new local governments is 
associated with a reduction in the dropout rate, there is instead an increase in the dropout 
rate during the post-event of proliferation in the originating local governments. The 
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presence of spillover may be signaled by a relatively worse outcome in the originating 
local government during the post-event of proliferation in contrast to outcome 
improvement in the new local governments.36 The basic specification model in Table 15 
also shows that there is a reduction in test scores and the graduation rate in the new local 
governments, although there is no evidence of lower performance on tests scores and a 
lowered graduation rate in the case of the originating local governments.  
In terms of the infant mortality rate, the basic specification estimation shows a 
significant reduction in the infant mortality rate during post-event proliferation in both 
the new local governments and the originating local governments. In this case, the new 
local governments experienced a higher share of reduction in the infant mortality rate in 
comparison with the originating local governments. The all-year post-event impact of 
new local governments has a significant negative sign on the outcome under the 
estimation that is restricted to only the proliferated local governments. This is similar to 
the full sample estimation that shows the magnitude of the all-year post-event impact for 
the originating local governments is much lower than the magnitude of the all-year post-
event impact for the new local governments. 
The Year-By-Year Post-event Impact 
In general, the year-by-year response dummy variables validate the significant 
estimator of the all-year response dummy variable as in the case of the infant mortality 
rate outcome estimations. Nonetheless, Table 16 shows that the insignificant all-year 
                                                 
36
 For example, there is a possibility that the transfer of employees from the originating local governments 
(i.e., teachers) may cause input shortages. Meanwhile, the new local governments may attract skilled and 
productive labor from the originating local governments that is successfully matched to the local need. 
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response dummy variables may not necessarily indicate that the proliferation policy has 
no impact. By differentiating the duration year of the post-event, the estimation results 
add support for an effect from proliferation policy on the education and health outcomes. 
 
 
Table 16. Coefficient of New Local Governments on 2-5 Years of Response Dummy Variable 
 
Dependent Variable 2 year response 3 year response 4 year response 5 year response 
 Full 
Sample 
Proli-
ferated 
Full 
Sample 
Proli-
ferated 
Full 
Sample 
Proli-
ferated 
Full 
Sample 
Proli-
ferated 
Test Scores         
RE Basic Model -0.342 0.042 -0.826 -0.364 -0.117 0.351 -0.250 0.086 
 (0.251) (0.272) (0.306)** (0.340) (0.326) (0.346) (0.270) (0.283) 
RE Extended Model 0.099 -0.396 -0.543 0.537 -0.304 -0.501 -0.122 -0.243 
 (0.466) (0.504) (0.457) (0.508) (0.387) (0.452) (0.375) (0.441) 
Graduation Rate         
RE Basic Model -6.285 -1.703 2.204 4.544 -5.252 1.797 -9.291 0.975 
 (2.909)* (3.301) (2.871) (3.519) (3.593) (3.965) (3.689)* (4.148) 
RE Extended Model -11.118 -6.631 -0.874 12.388 -11.034 -9.364 -11.033 -6.454 
 (7.932) (8.856) (6.345) (9.168) (5.952)+ (7.826) (6.579)+ (7.470) 
Dropout Rate         
RE Basic Model -1.096 -1.617 -1.172 -2.136 -1.348 -2.403 -1.261 -1.883 
 (0.612)+ (0.607)** (0.600)+ (0.609)** (0.571)* (0.596)** (0.617)* (0.668)** 
RE Extended Model -2.577 -2.338 -2.059 -1.961 -2.675 -2.242 -4.845 -3.276 
 (1.000)** (0.934)* (1.656) (1.559) (1.157)* (1.209)+ (1.599)** (1.216)** 
Infant Mortality Rate (IMR)         
RE Basic Model -29.643 -22.289 -28.847 -23.395 -23.903 -22.329 -28.871 -21.034 
 (3.467)** (3.827)** (5.689)** (5.908)** (6.180)** (6.468)** (5.434)** (6.040)** 
RE Extended Model -34.276 -24.612 -29.381 -23.612 -17.713 -19.490 -37.460 -25.740 
 (9.051)** (9.336)** (12.354)* (12.852)+ (12.958) (13.629) (8.356)** (8.319)** 
Note: + significant at 10%;* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
The extended specification refers to the inclusion of the following other covariates: population, population square, (log) income 
(GRP), ethno-linguistic fragmentation index, household expenditure Gini index, (log) per capita equalization grants (avg. 1993-1998), 
(log) per capita equalization grants, (log) per capita lump sum DAK transfers, (log) share of nonextractive tax sharing, (log) share of 
natural resource tax sharing, and geographic dummies. The detailed effect of other covariates from RE Panel extended specification 
(year–to-year impact)  are shown in Table F15 and Table F16 in Appendix F, while the basic specification refers to results in Table F 
8 and Table F9 in Appendix F. 
 
The findings in Table 16 show a significant negative impact from proliferation on 
the dropout rate in both the full sample estimation and the restricted sample (i.e., the 
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proliferated local governments). Based on the basic estimation, the new local 
governments that have proliferated for at least three years or more tend to have a lower 
dropout rate during those post-event periods.  Meanwhile, the extended estimation results 
support a significant reduction in the dropout rate in earlier post-event periods. The 
empirical results in Table 16 show a significant negative impact of the post-event dummy 
variable for the new local governments that have proliferated for two years or more.  
The empirical results in Table 16 also show significant negative impact from 
proliferation policy for the first two years and three years of post-events on student test 
scores, based on the full sample estimation. This contrasts with the previous findings in 
which the all-year post-event impact on student test scores estimation was significant 
only for the originating local governments and not for the new local governments.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
The results of DID estimation show support for education attainment outcomes in 
new local governments as represented by lower dropout rates, but this effect does not 
appear in students’ tests scores. For the new local governments, proliferation is associated 
with dropout alleviation of 3 % or more than in the counterpart local governments used as 
a control group.  The findings on the impact of proliferation suggest the benefit from 
proliferation policy may be associated more with local objectives (i.e., lower dropout 
rates) than with efficiency as measured in terms of improvement on student test scores. 
This association with objectives over efficiency is borne out by findings of an 
insignificant impact of proliferation on outcomes in terms of lower student test scores and 
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lower graduation rates. The findings in Chapter 3 that imply the benefits of proliferation 
tend to cater to local preferences rather than to mandated national programs also is in line 
with the concept of administrative or political decentralization. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation examines the determinants of Indonesian local government 
proliferation as presented in Chapter 2 and its impact on the government service 
outcomes that are shown in Chapter 3. Based on the predicted hypotheses that were 
constructed pursuant to the theoretical model of Arzaghi and Henderson (2005), several 
economic and political variables were tested on the different measures of proliferation. 
One question examined was whether, in the case of Indonesian local government 
proliferation, intergovernmental transfers influence the decision to initiate a proliferation.  
The fiscal federalism theory (Oates 1972, 1999) views the devolution of 
expenditures to local governments as enhancing efficiency because it fits the case of 
heterogeneous local preferences, and there are intergovernmental transfers to correct the 
mismatch of local government taxes-expenditures. In this setting, intergovernmental 
transfers may compensate the centralized tax system because there is possibly 
inefficiency when taxes on a mobile tax base are administered as local taxes. 
Nonetheless, the empirical question of whether intergovernmental transfers can make 
devolution prevail may well depend on the type of transfers (Bahl 1986; Bahl and 
Wallace 2007). The theory and the empirics in Chapter 2 focus on whether and what type 
of intergovernmental transfers determine proliferation policy in Indonesia.   
Applying the binary outcome panel estimation, the empirical results show that the 
type of intergovernmental transfers have different effects on the probability of a local 
government proliferation.  The per capita lump sum DAK transfers and tax sharing 
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associated with higher probability to proliferate but it did not apply to the case of per 
capita equalization grants. The survival regression approach that estimates the duration of 
the event of proliferation shows that per capita equalization grants is associated with a 
reduction in hazard risk that also implies a longer duration to the event of proliferation. 
Furthermore, the hazard risk estimate finds evidence of tax sharing that may be 
associated with increased stability of new local governments where stability refers to the 
longer duration of the sequential proliferation event. 
The findings in Chapter 2 contribute to the positive literature of fiscal federalism 
specifically on the impact of intergovernmental transfers (Grossman 1994; Oates 1972; 
Wildasin 1984). In this case, we find the competing effect within the system of 
intergovernmental transfers affecting the duration of the proliferation event. The 
conditional grants that positively influence both the probability of local government 
proliferation and the hazard risk of the occurrence of the event suggest that tactical 
central-local behavior may be present as a result of government’s soft budget constraint.  
In Chapter 3, we further applied the hypotheses from the theoretical model to 
reflect channels in which the proliferation policy may affect the service outcome, which 
aligns with Oates’ (1972) theory of decentralization. In the theory part, the proliferation 
policy may have impact on education and health outcomes through conditionality on the 
changes in the economies of scale, the presence of spillovers, the change in fiscal 
resources, and the extent of accountability. The impact evaluation in Chapter 3 explores 
the effect of proliferation on service delivery outcomes in the education and health 
sectors, given that these two sectors are the primary beneficiaries of local governments’ 
expenditure devolution. In this case, we reference the outcomes in the education and 
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health sectors in terms of middle schools’ dropout rate, the total test scores of eighth-
grade students, and the percentage of eighth-graders passing the exit exams.  
The findings in Chapter 3 show that the impact of proliferation is not uniform 
across the affected local governments (i.e., the new and the originating local 
governments). For example, we found a significant reduction in the middle school 
dropout rate in the new local governments, but there was no significant improvement in 
the delivery of services in the case of the originating local governments. The findings of 
different policy impacts within the proliferated local governments may support a claim 
that proliferation has only benefited particular local governments but left other local 
governments with losses and therefore may lead to a different policy impact.  
However, the proliferation policy may be associated more with local objectives 
(i.e., lower dropout rates) than with efficiency as measured in terms of improvement on 
student test scores. This association with objectives over efficiency is borne out by 
findings of an insignificant impact of proliferation on outcomes in terms of lower student 
test scores and lower graduation rates. The findings in Chapter 3 that imply the benefits 
of proliferation tend to cater to local preferences rather than to mandated national 
programs also is in line with the concept of administrative or political decentralization.  
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APPENDIX A 
FACTS AND FIGURES ON INDONESIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Law No 32/2004 
Figure A 1. Government Structure Based on 2004 Decentralization Law 
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Notes: the share of grants is calculated as % of National DAU-Formula Grants; the  proliferated local 
governments include the new local governments and its origin local governments; we keep the same 
number of new local governments as all local government that was created in 1999-2003. Source: 
Calculated from Ministry of Finance (MOF 2007), grants archive data in http://www.sikd.djapk.go.id/, 
and compile dataset of New Local Government Law   1999-2003.  
 
Figure A 2. The Share of Grants Allocation to Proliferated Municipalities or Cities in 
2002-2006 
 
Share of Education Expenditures                               Share of Health Expenditures 
  
 
 
Source: Calculated from SIKD Ministry of Finance database (MOF 2007), Local Government Budget 
Realization, and compile dataset of New Local Government Law 1999-2003 
Figure A 3. Education and Health Expenditures 1993-2002 (as % to total expenditures) 
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APPENDIX B  
COMPARATIVE STATIC RESULTS 
 
Eq. (2.20) as shown in the text should hold to prevent a separation of jurisdiction 
2 from the union: 
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which comes from the following Eq. (B.1) 
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Similarly, as shown in the text in Eq. (2.18) and Eq. (2.21), the following inequality of 
Eq. (2.21) must hold to prevent a separation of jurisdiction 1 from the union: 
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which comes from the following Eq. (B.2)  
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If Eq. (2.20) and (2.21) hold, the existing unitary local government persist, where 
gˆ  of local public goods is provided to people in both regions. The following is the 
predicted coefficient sign of each hypothesis that based on Eq. (2.20) and Eq. (2.21) in 
the text. 
 
133 
 
Hypothesis 1 spatial decay hypothesis: Jurisdiction with high ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation or religious polarization tends to have higher probability of local 
government proliferation. 
For both jurisdiction 1 and jurisdiction 2, higher expected spatial decay )( iδ  under 
separation will reduce the probability to proliferate. Meanwhile higher initial spatial 
decay (δ ) increase the probability to proliferate (i.e., reduce the utility of voters in 
jurisdiction 1). 
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Hypothesis 2 economies of scale hypothesis: An increase in population will increase the 
threat of separation. 
The effect of an increase in population in jurisdiction with relatively low population 
(jurisdiction 2) is positive on the probability to proliferate 
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Meanwhile, the effect of an increase in population in jurisdiction 1 for a relatively high 
population (jurisdiction 1) will be negatively affected the probability to proliferate. 
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Hypothesis 3 An increase in income level will increase the probability of local 
government proliferation. 
For jurisdiction 1, an increase in income in jurisdiction 1 will increase the probability to 
proliferate  
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Meanwhile, an increase in income in jurisdiction 2 will increase the probability to 
proliferate 
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Hypothesis 3A Higher revenue sharing from natural resource wealth will increase the 
probability of splitting 
For jurisdiction 1, an increase natural resource taxes will decrease the probability of 
proliferation 
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However, an increase in natural resource taxes decrease the utility of voter’s utility in 
jurisdiction 2 ( 2uˆ ) and thus might increase the probability to proliferate 
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Hypothesis 3B Higher initial unconditional lump-sum grants will increase the probability 
to proliferate. 
For jurisdiction 1, higher initial grants might either increase the probability to proliferate 
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Similarly, for jurisdiction 2, an increase in the initial grants will unambiguously increase 
the probability to proliferate 
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Hypothesis 4 A potential increases in voter’s bargaining power under separation will 
increase the threat of local government proliferation, while high initial voter’s 
bargaining power associate with low degree on the probability of local government 
proliferation. 
When θθ >i , the politician under separation essentially put higher weight on voter’s 
utility and thus increase the voter’s utility which implies that the separation will get 
support from community. 
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Meanwhile, for jurisdiction 1, holding the degree of accountability in jurisdiction i under 
separation as fixed ( iθ ), then an increase in accountability (θ ) under the union will 
decrease the probability to proliferate, given that
θ∂
∂LHS
>
θ∂
∂RHS
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APPENDIX C  
DATA LIMITATIONS 
 
Table C 1. Province and Number of New Municipalities not surveyed in SUSENAS 1993-2005 
Year Period of Survey1) Sample2) Province (not 
surveyed) 2) 
Number of New 
Municipalities (1993-
2003) not surveyed 3) 
    
 
1993 January 206,500 (H); 903,351 (I)  
9 
1994 January 206,240 (H); 904,793 (I)  
5 
1995 January 206,240 (H); 873,630 (I)  
5 
1996 January 206,597 (H); 897,382 (I)  
3 
1997 January 207,625 (H); 887,265 (I)  
3 
1998 Dec-January 205,747 (H); 879,936 (I)  
3 
1999 Jan-February 189,339 (H); 864,580 (I)  
6 
2000 Jan-February 218,568 (H); 780,141 (I) Aceh, Maluku 
44 
2001 February 218,568 (H); 889,413 (I) Aceh 
33 
2002 February-April 212,646 (H); 862,210 (I)  
28 
2003 January-February 222,791 (H); 895,427 (I)  
19 
2004 January-February 252,913 (H); 1,030,250 (I)  
6 
2005 January-February 257,906 (H); 1,052,091 (I) Aceh 
16 
Note: (H): Households; (I): Individuals.; For the year 2005, there is a separate survey specific to Aceh region and that is 
why Aceh is not included in 2005 SUSENAS survey. The regions that are missing usually the regions in the conflicted 
or subject to natural disaster, as well as the underrepresented ‘remote’ jurisdictions in the survey. 
Sources: SUSENAS Manual, RAND (2007), CBS (2007); SUSENAS 1993-2005 database 
-  
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Table C 2. Pattern of data availability of Covariates 
 
Covariates 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
              
Population              
Obs 276 280 281 283 285 285 286 272 321 338 379 430 432 
missing  23 19 13 16 14 9 7 21 22 17 8 7 5 
% mv 7.69 6.35 4.42 5.35 4.68 3.06 2.39 7.17 6.41 4.79 2.07 1.60 1.14 
              
Gini Income Inequality 
Obs 272 275 276 278 280 271 281 267 323 315 375 418 404 
missing 27 24 18 21 19 23 12 26 20 40 12 19 33 
% missing 9.03 8.03 6.12 7.02 6.35 7.82 4.10 8.87 5.83 11.27 3.10 4.35 7.55 
              
Ethnic Fractionalization Index (2002, 2004) 
Obs 265 265 265 265 265 265 265 265 303 312 329 412 412 
missing 34 34 29 34 34 29 28 28 40 43 58 25 25 
% missing 11.37 11.37 9.86 11.37 11.37 9.86 9.56 9.56 11.66 12.11 14.99 5.72 5.72 
              
Gross Regional Product (GRP) 
Obs  271 265 277 282 289 292 291 292 339 349 381  
missing  28 34 17 17 10 2 2 1 4 6 6  
% missing  9.36 11.37 5.78 5.69 3.34 0.68 0.68 0.34 1.17 1.69 1.55  
              
Equalization Grants 
Obs  259 259 259 259 262 262 261 319 318 344 346 283 
missing  40 35 40 40 32 31 32 24 37 43 91 154 
% missing  13.38 11.90 13.38 13.38 10.88 10.58 10.92 7.00 10.42 11.11 20.82 35.24 
              
Number of Active NGO (2003) 
Obs 289 289 289 289 289 289 288 288 327 338 354 400 400 
missing 10 10 5 10 10 5 5 5 16 17 30 34 34 
% missing 3.34 3.34 1.70 3.34 3.34 1.70 1.71 1.71 4.66 4.79 7.81 7.83 7.83 
              
Political Competition (1999) 
Obs 290 290 290 290 290 290 289 289 331 343 363 412 412 
missing 9 9 4 9 9 4 4 4 12 12 21 22 22 
% missing 3.01 3.01 1.36 3.01 3.01 1.36 1.37 1.37 3.50 3.38 5.47 5.07 5.07 
Notes: the municipalities in the dataset are an unbalanced panel data that is the new local governments are included once they are 
formed. 
 
 
140 
 
 
Table C 3. Pattern of Missing Values for Test Scores and Graduation Rate (2001-2005) 
Variable Type obs mv % of mv
year=2001     
test scores Float 284 153 0.27
graduation rate Float 243 194 0.40
     
year=2003     
test scores Float 342 95 0.14
graduation rate Float 344 93 0.14
     
year=2004     
test scores Float 403 34 0.04
graduation rate Float 386 51 0.07
     
year=2005     
test scores Float 347 90 0.13
graduation rate Float 329 108 0.16
Missing Values for Dropout Rate and Infant Mortality Rate (1993-2005) 
dropout rate Float 5131 517 0.05
infant mortality rate Float 5129 519 0.05
Note: For the tests scores, 2002 data are not available 
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Box C 1 Observation Identification Crosswalk  
 In the context of Indonesian proliferation, an existing municipality may change code and 
sometimes municipality name over the years. However, SUSENAS or PODES data (i.e., manual) does not 
keep track of any changes in municipality code from the previous survey. To handle this inconsistent 
municipality’s code in the survey, we use new code of municipality based on CBS document of 
municipalities’ code from 1993-2007 (CBS 2007) to complement SUSENAS and/or PODES manual.  The 
CBS document (CBS 2007) records any change in municipality name as well as the associated updated 
municipality code.  
 The crosswalk identification code started with 434 municipalities’ code excluding municipalities 
within the capital city Jakarta. I keep this number of municipalities to be the same over observation periods 
1993-2003. With respect to the new local governments, the crosswalk of the new local government is 
constructed in the following manner: 1) I make a list of sub districts based on each new local government 
stipulation Law; 2) I identify the sub-districts of the treatment by matching the name as stated in the Law 
and the sub-district name (kecamatan) and the default code in the PODES/SUSENAS manual ; and 3) I 
assign new code (based on CBS 2007 municipalities code) of associated new local government for each 
pooled of these sub-districts and inserted these codes in the survey alongside with the default survey code. 
Note that the step 2) is done after the construction of crosswalk identification of municipalities in 
SUSENAS/PODES across the years. Thus, the plausible mixed codes of similar names across sub-districts 
are avoided by matched them after municipalities are sorted accordingly. 
  By assigning the new code to these new local governments, I am able to compile the historical 
data based on municipalities as of the year 2003. Meanwhile, the municipality default code of the survey is 
used to compile data which refers to the municipalities as of the year 1998. The crosswalk identification 
code adjusts the inconsistent municipalities’ code across the year.  
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APPENDIX D DATA SOURCE AND SUMMARY STATISTIC 
Table D 1. Definition of Variables and Data Source 
Variable Definition Sources 
   
Income GRP Real Gross Domestic Product 2000 constant price) of Municipalities (million Rp)   CBS 1993-2003 
   
Population Number of Population in Municipality  or Province (million) SUSENAS 1993-
2005, CBS (2006) 
   
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation 
Index 
Index of Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation in each municipality based on Taylor and 
Hudson Index 1972)1). The index ranged from 0 to 1. 
SUSENAS 2001-
2004 
   
Number of Active NGO Total Number of Active NGO in all villages within the municipality PODTAN 2003 
   
Political Competition The number of villages in which GOLKAR is not the first winner from 3 major parties 
that wins most votes in the 1999 legislative election. 
PODTAN 2003 
 
   
Dropout Rates2) Percentage of number of individuals with age 13-15 years that have passed elementary 
school but do not continue or dropout from school over number of individuals age 13-
15 years that have passed elementary schools. 
SUSENAS 2001-
2005 
   
Infant Mortality Rates The number of infant dies before reaching 1 year of age per 1,000 live births SUSENAS 2001-
2005 
   
Test Scores The average of 3rd year middle school student total test scores on National Exams 
(EBTANAS/UNAS) on Math, Indonesian Language, and English/ 
MoNE 1998, 2001, 
2003-2005 
   
Graduation Rate The percentage of 3rd year middle school students participating in National Exams 
passed the tests (i.e., have the average scores of 5.0) 
Constructed 
   
Origin Local Government 
Dummy Variable  
=1for the origin local government. In this case,  the origin municipality refers to the 
entity that is a continuation from previous existing municipality 
CBS 2007, MOHA 
2005 
   
New local government Dummy 
Variable 
=1for new local government. In this case, the new local government refers to the entity 
that newly formed.  
CBS 2007, MOHA 
2005 
   
All year response post-event 
dummy variable 
=1 starting one year after proliferation took place in the proliferated local governments. 
 
Constructed 
   
Year response (t) of  post-event 
dummy variable 
=1 after t year transition time from the event of proliferation and local government is the 
proliferated local government. 
 
Constructed 
   
Origin (New) Local Government 
Proliferation Event (Year 0) 
=1 to local government at year when this local government proliferate. (is stipulated)  Constructed 
   
Share of non-extractive Tax 
Sharing 
Share of Municipality Non-natural resource tax sharing revenue as percentage from Total 
Municipality Revenues 
MOF 1994-2005, 
CBS 1993 
   
Share of Natural Resource Tax 
Sharing 
Share of Municipality natural resource tax sharing revenue as percentage from Total 
Municipality Revenues 
MOF 1994-2005, 
CBS 1993 
   
Per capita Initial Equalization 
Grants 
Average annual realized SDO during 1993-1998 divided  by average population during 
1993-1998. 
MOF 1994-1998, 
CBS 1993 
   
Per capita Equalization Grants Total annual realized equalization grants divided by the number of population.  MOF 1994-2005, 
CBS 1993 
   
Per capita lump-sum DAK grants Total annual lump-sum DAK grants (4 billion Rp) divided by total jurisdiction 
population of the new local governments. 
Constructed 
Notes:  
- The National Economic Survey (SUSENAS) is available on a yearly basis while Village Potential Survey is available every 3 years. The 
annual household survey (SUSENAS) and the tri-annual village survey are issued by CBS, the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistic. The 
household survey (SUSENAS) covers a random sample of households in all of the provinces. Meanwhile, DJPKPD is Autonomy Directorate 
General in Ministry of Finance (MOF), the agency in which local government submit their budget realization.  
- 1) Fractionalization Index (Taylor and Hudson Index): ∑−= 21 ii sf  where similarly, iiji :ns /=  is percentage share of 
jth in i (unit of observations); jth is number of identity group. Fragmentation index is “fractionalization index” which measures the 
probability of two randomly citizens being from different identity group with the index ranged from 0 as become complete homogenous to 
one defined as complete heterogeneous community (Esteban and Ray 1994, Taylor and Hudson 1972). 
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Table D 2 . Summary Statistics of 1999-2003 Municipality Level Data with Cohort as of 1998 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Proliferation Event overall 0.112 0.316 0 1.000 N =    2170 
 between  0.112 0 0.600 n =     434 
 within  0.295 -0.488 0.912 T =       5 
Population overall 632.621 587.946 24.193 4843.590 N =    1552 
 between  571.746 25.316 4141.540 n =     340 
 within  75.320 15.521 1402.554 T = 4.56471 
(Log) Income (GRP) overall 7.270 1.135 4.201 13.331 N =    1893 
 between  1.042 4.455 9.949 n =     425 
 within  0.471 3.588 12.509 T = 4.45412 
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation Index overall 0.314 0.268 0 0.834 N =    1626 
 between  0.267 0 0.825 n =     332 
 within  0.021 0.163 0.590 T = 4.89759 
Gini Inequality Index overall 0.265 0.040 0.181 0.529 N =    1511 
 between  0.034 0.199 0.399 n =     332 
 within  0.024 0.165 0.398 T =  4.5512 
(Log) Initial Equalization Grants  overall 10.185 0.476 8.753 11.663 N =    1480 
(Avg 1993-1998) between  0.477 8.753 11.663 n =     296 
 within  0 10.185 10.185 T =       5 
(Log) Per Capita Equalization Grants overall 332.862 326.291 0.000 3322.879 N =    1857 
 between  272.219 71.287 2152.118 n =     425 
 within  239.659 -1527.678 1503.623 T = 4.36941 
(Log) Per Capita Lump-sum DAK overall 0.434 1.209 0.000 6.017 N =    2092 
 between  0.760 0.000 3.097 n =     434 
 within  0.944 -2.663 4.788 T = 4.82028 
(Log) Share of non-extractive  overall 2.070 0.542 -0.312 4.563 N =    1790 
Tax Sharing between  0.426 1.062 3.364 n =     431 
 within  0.339 0.171 4.362 T = 4.15313 
(Log) Share of Natural Resource overall -0.267 2.150 -7.627 4.372 N =    1729 
Tax Sharing between  1.710 -4.767 4.030 n =     431 
 within  1.334 -5.401 5.524 T =  4.0116 
Number of Active NGO overall 20 18 1 101 N =    1985 
 between  18 1 101 n =     397 
 within  0 20 20 T =       5 
Political Competition overall 62.801 30.855 1.080 100 N =    2045 
 between  30.885 1.080 100 n =     409 
 within  0 62.801 62.801 T =       5 
:otes: Population Square is not shown 
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Table D 3.  Summary Statistics Province Level Data 1999-2003 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Number of New overall 0.875 1.597 0 9 N =     160
Local Government between  0.572 0 2.6 n =      32
 within  1.494 -1.725 7.275 T =       5
Population overall 6136.427 9426.417 0 37980.42 N =     160
 between  9535.704 0 36160.04 n =      32
 within  463.9156 2558.547 7956.814 T =       5
Population Square overall 1.26E+08 3.42E+08 0 1.44E+09 N =     160
 between  3.46E+08 0 1.31E+09 n =      32
 within  1.83E+07 1.11E+07 2.59E+08 T =       5
Income (GRP) overall 37446.14 74371.92 0 749554.2 N =     160
 between  63490.51 1259.744 312474.2 n =      32
 within  40019.35 95240.53 474526.2 T =       5
Gini Inequality Index overall 0.298 0.036 0.240 0.454 N =     160
 between  0.030 0.265 0.391 n =      32
 within  0.020  0.196 0.381 T =       5
Ethno-Linguistic  overall 0.493 0.214 0.053 0.806 N =     160
Fragmentation Index between  0.217 0.053 0.806 n =      32
 within  0 0.493 0.493 T =       5
Median Share of Equalization  overall 0.292 0.117 0.0002 0.665 N =     155
Grants of Municipalities between  0.093 0.153 0.528 n =      32
 within  0.073 0.030 0.600 T = 4.84375
Number of Active NGO overall 291.312 244.700 37 981 N =     160
 between  247.838 37 981 n =      32
 within  0 291.312 291.312 T =       5
Political Competition overall 55.122 28.058 3.457 97.668 N =     160
 between  28.417 3.457 97.668 n =      32
 within  0 55.122 55.122 T =       5
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Table D 4.  Correlation Matrices of  Selected Covariates Municipalities and Province 
Level Data 1999-2003 
 
Municipalities 1999-2003  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) Income 1 
(2) Population 0.712 1
  (0.000) 
(3) Gini Inequality Index 0.077 -0.059 1
  (0.006) (0.035)
(4) Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index 0.041 -0.195 0.194 1
  (0.141) (0.000) (0.000)
(5) Number of Active NGO 0.307 0.539 -0.086 -0.105 1
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
(6) Political Competition 0.402 0.365 0.090 -0.259 0.009 1
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.748)
 
Province Level 1999-2003 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) Income 1     
(2) Population 0.859 1    
  (0.000)     
(3) Gini Inequality Index 0.186 0.048 1   
  (0.020) (0.550)    
(4) Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index -0.070 -0.277 0.115 1  
  (0.388) (0.001) (0.154)   
(5) Number of Active NGO 0.496 0.542 0.128 -0.004 1 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.113) (0.963)  
(6) Political Competition 0.531 0.500 -0.016 -0.367 0.088 1
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.839) (0.000) (0.277) 
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Table D 5.  Correlation Matrices across Intergovernmental Transfers: Municipalities Level Data 1999-2003 
  (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(8) (Log) Per Capita Initial Equalization Grants 
(Avg 1993-1998) 
1    
       
(9) (Log) Per Capita of Equalization Grants 0.358 1   
  (0.000)    
       
(10) (Log) Per Capita Lump-sum DAK 0.055 -0.148 1  
  (0.057) (0.000)   
       
(11) (Log) Share of non-extractive Tax Sharing 0.096 -0.289 0.152 1 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000 )  
       
(12) (Log) Share of Natural Resource Tax Sharing 0.256 0.278 0.075 0.166 1
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) 
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Box D 1.  Definition and Scope of Duration Variable and Choice of Municipalities Cohort 
 
Figure D1 describes the how the duration of the event is defined that also implies the scope of 
proliferation event and the cohort of municipalities that are chosen. Figure D1 uses the example of 
proliferation event of one local government, as occurred in all the case of proliferation event in Indonesia. 
In Figure D1, a particular local government, in this example local government A, consists of jurisdiction 1, 
jurisdiction 2, and jurisdiction 3, which are all become autonomous local governments in year 2003. In the 
case of 2003 cohort, jurisdiction 1 is assumed to be the continuity of local government A.   
 
Figure D 1 The Timing of Proliferation Event in the Proliferated Local Government and Construction of Duration 
Jurisdiction Jurisdiction
3
case (1) 2
1
3
case (2) 2
1
3
2
1 case (3)
3
2
1 case (4)
1998 cohort 2003 cohort  
             1999         2000          2001          2002         2003 
Notes:  censor                   duration 
 
 As shown in Figure D1, there are plausible four cases in which the events of the proliferation are 
examined and each definition of event affect the different starting time of the duration as well as the use of 
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municipalities cohort as shown as the following:  
(1) The proliferation events occurred in at least two jurisdictions, the originating (jurisdiction 1) and 
the new local government(s) (jurisdiction 2 and jurisdiction 3), as the municipalities cohort is 
based on 2003 cohort.  
(2) The proliferation event refers to the formation of new local governments (jurisdiction 2 and 
jurisdiction 3). As the jurisdiction 1 is considered as the continuity of the originating local 
government A, this jurisdiction is treated as the control group. Thus, the eligible observations pool 
is the proliferated local governments and thus the observations are based on the municipalities’ 
cohort as of the year 2003.  
(3) The proliferation event only accounts the event of proliferation in the originating local government 
(local government A) and not the formation of new local government. Thereby, the observations 
are based on the 1998 municipalities cohort and the new local governments are only included once 
they were formed.  
(4) The proliferation event is emphasized only on the sequential proliferation, the formation of 
jurisdiction 3. In this example, the duration only started in the year of first time proliferation of 
local government A, that is also the same time when the new local government of jurisdiction 2 
entered the observations pool. Therefore, the municipalities’ cohort refers to the year 1998. 
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Table D 6.  Summary Statistic Proliferation Event and Duration 
 
First time Proliferation  
Category total obs. mean min median max 
      
no. of subjects 296     
no. of records 1315 4.442568 1 5 5 
      
(first) entry time  0 0 0 0 
(final) exit time  4.442568 1 5 5 
      
subjects with gap 0     
time on gap if gap 0 . . . . 
time at risk 1315 4.442568 1 5 5 
      
failures 93 0.314189 0 0 1 
 
Sequential Proliferation  
Category total obs. mean min median max 
      
no. of subjects 231     
no. of records 813 3.519481 1 3 6 
      
(first) entry time  0 0 0 0 
(final) exit time  3.519481 1 3 6 
      
subjects with gap 0     
time on gap if gap 0 . . . . 
time at risk 813 3.519481 1 3 6 
      
failures 11 0.047619 0 0 1 
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Table D 7 . Summary Statistic Proliferation Event based on 2003 Cohort with 1993-2003 period of 
Duration 
Event of Proliferation of New and Origin LG 
Category total obs. mean min median max 
      
no. of subjects 434     
no. of records 4391 10.11751 7 11 11 
      
(first) entry time  0 0 0 0 
(final) exit time  10.11751 7 11 11 
      
subjects with gap 0     
time on gap if gap 0 . . . . 
time at risk 4391 10.11751 7 11 11 
      
failures 231 0.532258 0 1 1 
 
Formation Event of New LG 
Category total obs. mean min median max 
      
no. of subjects 231     
no. of records 2320 10.04329 7 11 11 
      
(first) entry time  0 0 0 0 
(final) exit time  10.04329 7 11 11 
      
subjects with gap 0     
time on gap if gap 0 . . . . 
time at risk 2320 10.04329 7 11 11 
      
failures 138 0.597403 0 1 1 
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Table D 8.  Summary Statistics of Health and Education Outcomes in 1993-2005 
 Full Sample New Local Government Origin Local Government 
 : Mean (SD) : Mean (SD) : Mean (SD) 
2001-2005       
Proliferation Event 1763 0.04 547 0.00  381 0.17  
  (0.19)  (0.04)  (0.37) 
New Local Government 1763 0.31  547 1.00  381 0.01  
  (0.46)  0.00   (0.10) 
Origin Local Government 1763 0.22  547 0.01  381 1.00  
  (0.41)  (0.09)  0.00  
Local Governments with Higher Grants 1763 0.60  547 0.89  381 0.62  
  (0.49)  (0.31)  (0.49) 
Total Test Scores 1092 17.32  281 16.88  243 16.51  
  (2.55)  (2.33)  (2.33) 
% Students Graduate 1059 70.33  266 67.29  232 62.84  
  (24.27)  (25.62)  (26.62) 
Dropout Rate 1581 14.43  445 14.30  330 15.25  
  (5.72)  (6.11)  (5.28) 
Infant Mortality Rate 1582 93.29  446 77.24  330 97.17  
  (44.02)  (44.45)  (41.01) 
1993-2000       
New Local Government 3448 0.31  1078 1.00  736 0.01  
  (0.46)  0.00   (0.10) 
Origin Local Government 3448 0.21  1078 0.01  736 1.00  
  (0.41)  (0.09)  0.00  
Dropout Rate 3169 17.17  964 17.82  673 18.00  
  (6.43)  (7.07)  (5.28) 
Infant Mortality Rate 3166 111.10  962 104.23  673 117.69  
  (55.55)  (59.37)  (49.45) 
       
Notes: Total Test Scores, % Students graduate, and local governments with higher grants are compiled from year 2001-2005, and not 
from the year 1993-2005. Meanwhile, the proliferation event refers to the proliferation event for the year 1999-2003, which means that 
I do not consider 3 proliferations in year 1993-1998 as the same proliferation event category.  
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APPENDIX E ECONOMETRIC TESTS 
 
Table E 1. Hausman Test of Fixed Effect vs Random Effect Panel Regression   
 Basic Model Extended Model 
 all year 
response 
 year by year 
response 
 all year 
response 
 year by 
year 
response 
 
 
  
2χ  p-value   2χ  p-value   2χ  p-value   2χ  p-value 
Scores (Full Sample) -22.88  15.08 0.819 1.37 1.0000 -2.00  
Scores (Proliferated LG) -47.76  -33.42  -0.54  4.12 0.9973 
Graduation Rate (Full Sample) -52.22  15.45 0.800 10.34 0.7367 -4.95  
Graduation Rate (Proliferated 
LG) 
-74.28  -85.20  40.31 0.0001 43.07 0.0002 
IMR (Full Sample) 0.14 1.000 21.37 0.769 -26.45  32.90 0.4228 
IMR (Proliferated LG) 8.32 0.910 8.93 0.975 170.11 0.0000 -38.61  
Dropout Rate (Full Sample) -0.53  66.12 0.000 31.60 0.0477 9.30 0.9997 
Dropout Rate (Proliferated LG) -6.31  -1.35  22.73 0.2011 52.26 0.0003 
Note: we use FE panel regression if p-value is in the range of 5% significance level.   
  
Table E 2. Breusch Pagan LM Test of Random Effect Panel Regression 
 Basic Model Extended Model 
 all year 
response 
 year by year 
response 
 all year 
response 
 year by 
year 
response 
 
 
  
2χ  p-value   2χ  p-value   2χ  p-value   2χ  p-value 
Scores (Full Sample) 415.91 0.000 352.07 0.000 87.20 0.0000 86.79 0.0000 
Scores (Proliferated LG) 51.66 0.000 53.61 0.000 5.98 0.0145 5.81 0.0160 
Graduation Rate (Full Sample) 423.20 0.000 351.4 0.000 24.60 0.0000 25.43 0.0000 
Graduation Rate (Proliferated 
LG) 
57.18 0.000 60.53 0.000 2.85 0.0914 3.76 0.0526 
IMR (Full Sample) 959.71 0.000 970.90 0.000 140.88 0.0000 155.28 0.0000 
IMR (Proliferated LG) 228.71 0.000 240.73 0.000 10.49 0.0012 11.62 0.0007 
Dropout Rate (Full Sample) 7284.18 0.000 6799.67 0.000 3259.32 0.0000 3264.50 0.0000 
Dropout Rate (Proliferated LG) 1021.46 0.000 1013.42 0.000 219.15 0.0000 216.98 0.0000 
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APPENDIX F COMPLETE SET OF ESTIMATION RESULTS  
Table F 1. Random Effect (RE) Logit and RE Probit Estimations of 1999-2003 Proliferation Event 
Based on 1998 Cohort RE Logit RE Logit RE Probit RE Probit 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
     
Population 0.004559 0.004111 0.002203 0.001954 
 (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Population Square -7.68E-07 -6.86E-07 -3.83E-07 -3.37E-07 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
(Log) Income GRP -0.37051 -0.4408 -0.19446 -0.22813 
 (0.232)+ (0.225)* (0.113)+ (0.110)* 
Ethnic—Linguistic Fragmentation Index -0.54411 -0.52333 -0.1891 -0.17579 
 (0.689) (0.681) (0.340) (0.338) 
Gini Inequality Index -4.55241 -4.0637 -2.41223 -2.19216 
 (3.950) (3.909) (1.956) (1.939) 
(Log) Per Capita Initial Equalization Grants 
(Avg. 1993-1998) 0.460565  0.236033  
 (0.354)  (0.179)  
(Log) Per Capita of Equalization Grants  0.165849 0.19875 0.085631 0.099727 
 (0.167) (0.169) (0.084) (0.084) 
(Log) Per Capita Lump-sum DAK 0.795793 0.822782 0.448983 0.46468 
 (0.343)* (0.343)* (0.212)* (0.212)* 
(Log) Share of non-extractive Tax Sharing 0.012355 0.060858 0.00714 0.034192 
 (0.297) (0.296) (0.147) (0.145) 
(Log) Share of Natural Resource Tax Sharing 0.194846 0.202255 0.086951 0.090613 
 (0.085)* (0.085)* (0.041)* (0.041)* 
Number of Active NGOs (2003) 0.000103 0.000817 0.00176 0.002311 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) 
Political Competition (1999) -0.02163 -0.02326 -0.01069 -0.01147 
 (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.004)** (0.004)** 
Aceh and Papua 2.98172 3.151638 1.368129 1.461146 
 (0.763)** (0.746)** (0.358)** (0.350)** 
Sumatera Region 1.630516 1.769836 0.695062 0.762708 
 (0.532)** (0.519)** (0.252)** (0.246)** 
Borneo Region 2.690838 2.813801 1.207311 1.275916 
 (0.652)** (0.639) (0.310)** (0.304)** 
Sulawesi Region 1.046276 1.101939 0.342636 0.370581 
 (0.642) (0.643)+ (0.303) (0.304) 
Maluku Region 2.643053 2.566324 1.161205 1.13261 
 (1.243)* (1.243)* (0.646)+ (0.642)+ 
Constant -4.14322 -1.88201 -2.07287 -0.91391 
 (2.623) (1.963) (1.320) (0.981) 
     
Observations 1155 1155 1155 1155 
:umber of Municipalities 297 297 297 297 
Log Likelihood -202.91 -203.75 -202.774 -203.63 
AIC 443.8286 443.5027 443.5482 443.2703 
Note: + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table F 2. Panel Binary Estimation of (1999-2003) Proliferation Event based on 2003 Cohort 
 RE Logit RE Probit 
 Coeff. Coeff. 
 (SE) (SE) 
   
Population 0.0009902 0.0004837 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Population Square -1.48E-07 -7.69E-08 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
(Log) Income GRP -0.175219 -0.0824385 
 (0.193) (0.097) 
Ethnic—Linguistic Fragmentation Index -0.5393441 -0.19177 
 (0.638) (0.316) 
Gini Inequality Index  -4.372895 -1.909118 
 (3.269) (1.649) 
(Log) Per Capita Initial Equalization Grants (avg 
1993-1998)1) -0.288345 -0.1516738 
 (0.326) (0.166) 
(Log) Per Capita Equalization Grants1) 0.0825422 0.0387483 
 (0.128) (0.066) 
(Log) Lump-sum DAK 1.090927 0.5934507 
 (0.154)** (0.079)** 
(Log) Revenue Share of Tax Sharing 0.3118213 0.1353502 
 (0.257) (0.127) 
(Log) Revenue Share of Natural Resource Tax 0.1137267 0.0597215 
 (0.077) (0.037)+ 
Number of Active NGOs (2003) 0.01858 0.0095654 
 (0.007)** (0.004)** 
Political Competition (1999) -0.0157226 -0.0084901 
 (0.007)* (0.003)** 
Constant -1.312197 -0.7814765 
 (2.287) (1.155) 
   
Geographic Area Dummies Yes Yes 
   
Observations 1202 1202 
Log Likelihood -238.62 -238.06 
AIC 515.255 514.1241 
Note: 1) Per capita grants based on population of 1998 cohort given the grants of jurisdiction 1 and jurisdiction 2 of proliferated local 
government are pooled prior to proliferation event, and there is no detail disaggregation of grants received across jurisdictions of one 
local government. 
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Table F 3. Cox Proportional Hazard Estimation on 1999-2003 Proliferation Event(s) 
Duration Period   1993-2003 2000-2005 
Duration to Proliferation (pair) event sequential proliferation 
Metric Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio 
Municipalities Cohort 2003 1998 
 Full Obs. Proliferated LG 
Time invariant   
Aceh and Papua  3.92E+29 
  (3.99E+29)** 
Sumatera Region 2.052432 2.96E-07 
 (0.719)* (2.34E-07)** 
Borneo Region 2.559257 7.737519 
 (1.017)* - 
Sulawesi Region 1.066198 1.31E-22 
 (0.447) (1.32E-22)** 
Maluku Region   
   
Number of Active NGO (2003) 1.01444 0.874575 
 (0.006)** (0.002)** 
Political Competition (1999) 0.990433 0.68681 
 (0.005)* - 
Time variant   
Population 0.999808 0.978467 
 (0.000) - 
Population Square 1 1.000003 
 (0.000)** (2.17E-07)** 
(Log) Income GRP  0.999997 1.000058 
 (0.000) (2.42E-05)** 
Gini Inequality Index 0.473567 7.10E+29 
 (0.120)** - 
Ethno-Fractionalization 1.007322 9.30E-07 
 (0.050) - 
(Log) Per Capita Equalization Grants 0.942771 3313.626 
 (0.021)** - 
(Log) Per Capita Lump-sum DAK Transfers 1.018175 2.00E-06 
 (0.030) - 
(Log) Share of non-extractive Tax Sharing 1.017152 0.427357 
 (0.031) (0.008)** 
(Log) Share of Natural Resource Tax Sharing 1.017894 0.271404 
 (0.008)* - 
Observations 2748 174 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -491.644 1.21E-06 
AIC  3.92E+29 
Proportional Hazard Test: Prob> Chi2 0.0474 1.000 
Note: Standard error is robust standard error; significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table F 4. 1993-2005 OLS, Random Effect, and Fixed Effect Estimations: Infant Mortality Rate (Full 
Sample and Proliferated LG Sample) 
 OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
 Full Sample Proliferated LG 
Year 1994 10.424 9.964 9.867 11.652 11.243 11.163 
 (3.025)*** (2.659)*** (2.684)*** (5.126)** (4.671)** (4.786)** 
Year 1995 7.806 7.957 8.010 3.982 4.499 4.708 
 (3.145)** (2.733)*** (2.705)*** (5.345) (4.805) (4.819) 
Year 1996 11.513 10.563 10.319 11.898 11.143 10.924 
 (3.015)*** (2.612)*** (2.618)*** (5.121)** (4.606)** (4.719)** 
Year 1997 12.396 12.437 12.603 9.752 10.597 11.262 
 (3.405)*** (2.966)*** (2.859)*** (6.053)* (5.502)* (5.339)** 
Year 1998 14.819 14.745 14.962 12.946 13.493 14.258 
 (3.094)*** (2.689)*** (2.682)*** (5.458)** (4.893)*** (4.908)*** 
Year 1999 10.678 10.376 10.339 9.475 9.217 9.171 
 (3.366)*** (2.970)*** (2.953)*** (5.888)* (5.323)* (5.291)* 
Year 2000 24.452 24.111 24.161 25.971 25.691 25.916 
 (2.958)*** (2.606)*** (2.610)*** (5.221)*** (4.790)*** (4.842)*** 
Year 2001 13.736 13.218 12.954 22.482 21.892 21.333 
 (2.957)*** (2.591)*** (2.598)*** (4.850)*** (4.417)*** (4.559)*** 
Year 2002 12.920 12.044 11.667 17.228 16.360 15.659 
 (3.036)*** (2.666)*** (2.665)*** (5.072)*** (4.629)*** (4.737)*** 
Year 2003 16.096 15.511 15.426 17.532 16.790 16.596 
 (2.960)*** (2.579)*** (2.588)*** (4.819)*** (4.325)*** (4.420)*** 
Year 2004 24.413 24.617 24.901 30.519 30.726 31.343 
 (2.773)*** (2.446)*** (2.521)*** (4.634)*** (4.223)*** (4.402)*** 
Year 2005 22.866 23.930 24.462 27.869 29.655 30.906 
 (2.949)*** (2.700)*** (2.868)*** (5.024)*** (4.707)*** (5.082)*** 
Dummy of New Local 
Government 
34.435 34.911  21.233 21.480  
 (2.428)*** (3.704)***  (2.702)*** (3.948)***  
Dummy of Origin Local 
Government 
14.117 13.851     
 (1.666)*** (2.690)***     
New LG Proliferation 
Event (Year 0) 
-2.246 -0.084 1.449 -0.353 1.319 2.864 
 (7.244) (6.660) (6.647) (7.714) (7.098) (7.060) 
Origin LG Proliferation 
Event (Year 0) 
-4.249 -4.477 -4.481    
 (4.279) (3.725) (3.829)    
Dummy of Post-Event 
Proliferation New LG (all 
year responses) 
-23.867 -20.287 -18.305 -19.939 -16.195 -13.556 
 (3.488)*** (3.334)*** (3.497)*** (3.838)*** (3.652)*** (3.835)*** 
Dummy of Post-Event 
Proliferation Origin LG (all 
year responses) 
-5.562 -4.350 -3.874    
 (2.544)** (2.251) (2.309)    
Constant -124.950 -123.109 -111.985 -130.723 -131.216 -122.893 
 (25.614)*** (22.554)*** (22.718)*** (42.239)*** (38.580)*** (39.745)*** 
       
Observations 4292 4292 4292 1990 1990 1990 
:umber of Municipalities  433 433  230 230 
R-squared 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.09 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
157 
 
 Table F 5. 1993-2005 OLS, Random Effect, and Fixed Effect Estimations: Dropout Rate (Full Sample and 
Proliferated LG Sample) 
 OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
 Full Sample Proliferated LG 
Year 1994 1.396 1.166 1.147 0.385 0.340 0.339 
 (0.790)* (0.550)** (0.508)** (1.005) (0.824) (0.770) 
Year 1995 1.890 1.644 1.617 0.763 0.570 0.497 
 (0.826)** (0.590)*** (0.551)*** (1.089) (0.919) (0.866) 
Year 1996 3.744 3.481 3.459 2.311 2.256 2.247 
 (0.732)*** (0.504)*** (0.467)*** (0.956)** (0.786)*** (0.733)*** 
Year 1997 4.858 4.802 4.799 3.643 3.780 3.829 
 (0.704)*** (0.475)*** (0.447)*** (0.891)*** (0.728)*** (0.699)*** 
Year 1998 4.197 3.974 3.953 2.784 2.651 2.614 
 (0.730)*** (0.505)*** (0.474)*** (0.944)*** (0.783)*** (0.744)*** 
Year 1999 5.434 5.178 5.149 3.446 3.314 3.258 
 (0.852)*** (0.651)*** (0.632)*** (1.284)*** (1.133)*** (1.102)*** 
Year 2000 6.478 6.617 6.635 4.502 4.897 5.022 
 (0.728)*** (0.516)*** (0.500)*** (0.968)*** (0.841)*** (0.854)*** 
Year 2001 6.856 6.868 6.872 5.186 5.402 5.488 
 (0.675)*** (0.453)*** (0.433)*** (0.791)*** (0.648)*** (0.650)*** 
Year 2002 4.004 4.097 4.107 1.530 1.951 2.089 
 (0.744)*** (0.508)*** (0.478)*** (0.872)* (0.730)*** (0.733)*** 
Year 2003 8.034 7.953 7.944 5.929 6.049 6.079 
 (0.686)*** (0.461)*** (0.450)*** (0.836)*** (0.673)*** (0.655)*** 
Year 2004 9.136 8.992 8.979 7.243 7.295 7.332 
 (0.662)*** (0.467)*** (0.471)*** (0.808)*** (0.669)*** (0.667)*** 
Year 2005 8.746 8.731 8.737 6.544 6.763 6.865 
 (0.668)*** (0.465)*** (0.466)*** (0.817)*** (0.673)*** (0.674)*** 
Dummy of New Local 
Government 
0.704 0.355  1.572 1.264  
 (0.456) (0.949)  (0.462)*** (0.697)*  
Dummy of Origin Local 
Government 
-0.871 -0.837     
 (0.318)*** (0.566)     
New LG Proliferation Event 
(Year 0) 
0.088 -0.030 -0.064 -0.640 -0.713 -0.786 
 (0.808) (0.688) (0.741) (0.924) (0.816) (0.859) 
Origin LG Proliferation Event 
(Year 0) 
1.150 1.070 1.063    
 (0.621)* (0.405)*** (0.417)**    
Dummy of Post-Event 
Proliferation New LG (all year 
responses) 
-1.273 -0.950 -0.915 -2.096 -1.793 -1.684 
 (0.566)** (0.504)* (0.545)* (0.648)*** (0.587)*** (0.623)*** 
Dummy of Post-Event 
Proliferation Origin LG (all 
year responses) 
0.751 0.656 0.649    
 (0.379)** (0.272)** (0.300)**    
Constant -51.558 -50.481 -50.310 -33.194 -34.196 -33.685 
 (6.734)*** (4.653)*** (4.400)*** (8.172)*** (6.698)*** (6.371)*** 
       
Observations 5058 5058 5058 2523 2523 2523 
:umber of Municipalities  434 434  231 231 
R-squared 0.10 0.19 0.19 0.09 0.13 0.13 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table F 6. 2001-2005 OLS, Random Effect, and Fixed Effect Estimations: Test Scores (Full Sample and 
Proliferated LG Sample) 
 
 OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
 Full Sample Proliferated LG 
       
Year 2003 -0.459 -0.447 -0.430 -0.208 -0.230 -0.238 
 (0.103)*** (0.077)*** (0.084)*** (0.158) (0.137) (0.147) 
Year 2004 -0.641 -0.659 -0.649 -0.392 -0.432 -0.448 
 (0.104)*** (0.078)*** (0.084)*** (0.146)*** (0.127)*** (0.140)*** 
Year 2005 -5.002 -5.118 -5.189 -4.411 -4.577 -4.800 
 (0.128)*** (0.099)*** (0.103)*** (0.179)*** (0.158)*** (0.169)*** 
Dummy of New Local 
Government 
-1.074 -0.956  -0.138 -0.011 0.000 
 (0.215)*** (0.233)***  (0.238) (0.249) (0.000) 
Dummy of Origin Local 
Government 
-1.025 -0.915     
 (0.216)*** (0.223)***     
New LG Proliferation 
Event (Year 0) 
0.210 -0.089 -0.188 0.435 0.179 -0.035 
 (0.266) (0.243) (0.292) (0.282) (0.264) (0.319) 
Origin LG Proliferation 
Event (Year 0) 
-0.032 -0.236 -0.315    
 (0.334) (0.295) (0.296)    
Dummy of Post-Event 
Proliferation New LG (all 
year responses) 
-0.187 -0.384 -0.374 0.208 0.022 -0.092 
 (0.231) (0.220)* (0.248) (0.257) (0.245) (0.279) 
Dummy of Post-Event 
Proliferation Origin LG 
(all year responses) 
-0.271 -0.374 -0.406    
 (0.233) (0.210)* (0.221)*    
Constant 22.057 22.138 21.761 19.995 20.163 20.425 
 (0.224)*** (0.184)*** (0.224)*** (0.323)*** (0.289)*** (0.378)*** 
       
Observations 1446 1446 1446 689 689 689 
:umber of Municipalities  432 432  229 229 
R-squared 0.70 0.85 0.85 0.67 0.82 0.82 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table F 7. 2001-2005 OLS, Random Effect, and Fixed Effect Estimations: Graduation Rate (Full Sample 
and Proliferated LG Sample) 
 OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
 Full Sample   Proliferated LG 
Year 2003 30.107 30.167 30.311 36.210 36.708 37.974 
 (1.330)*** (1.169)*** (1.252)*** (2.196)*** (2.006)*** (2.197)*** 
Year 2004 30.469 30.683 30.960 38.351 38.872 40.164 
 (1.394)*** (1.239)*** (1.332)*** (2.268)*** (2.093)*** (2.263)*** 
Year 2005 -9.577 -9.464 -9.345 -9.025 -8.842 -7.987 
 (1.116)*** (1.029)*** (1.309)*** (2.014)*** (1.903)*** (2.249)*** 
Dummy of New Local 
Government 
-6.414 -4.677  -1.242 0.064  
 (2.675)** (2.697)*  (3.086) (3.183)  
Dummy of Origin Local 
Government 
-5.826 -4.414     
 (2.777)** (2.845)     
New LG Proliferation 
Event (Year 0) 
1.752 -2.428 -8.497 6.694 3.292 -2.113 
 (3.533) (3.283) (3.723)** (3.727) (3.514)* (4.077) 
Origin LG Proliferation 
Event (Year 0) 
1.884 -1.016 -5.767    
 (3.466) (3.270) (3.470)*    
Dummy of Post-Event 
Proliferation New LG 
(all year responses) 
-4.240 -6.089 -10.079 0.474 -0.617 -3.433 
 (2.873) (2.644)** (2.872)*** (3.286) (3.106) (3.368) 
Dummy of Post-Event 
Proliferation Origin LG 
(all year responses) 
-4.708 -6.423 -10.289    
 (2.921)* (2.698)** (2.697)***    
Constant 41.791 41.334 40.758 22.081 20.877 20.329 
 (2.581)*** (2.408)*** (3.211)*** (4.398)*** (4.148)*** (5.806)*** 
       
Observations 1450 1450 1450 724 724 724 
:umber of 
Municipalities 
0.59  0.73 0.64  0.79 
R-squared  434 434  231 231 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table F 8. Basic Model Random Effect (RE) Estimations of Test Scores, Graduation Rate, Dropout Rate, 
and Infant Mortality Rate (IMR): Full Sample 
 Dropout Rate IMR Test Scores Graduation Rate 
Dummy of New Local 
Government 
0.408 35.428 -0.994 -4.981 
 (0.957) (3.656)** (0.237)** (2.754)+ 
Dummy of Origin Local 
Government 
-0.751 14.009 -0.988 -4.248 
 (0.569) (2.639)** (0.202)** (2.552)+ 
New LG Proliferation Event 
(Year 0) 
-0.052 0.213 -0.024 -3.597 
 (0.693) (6.740) (0.247) (3.307) 
Origin LG Proliferation Event 
(Year 0) 
0.986 -4.741 -0.152 -2.599 
 (0.406)* (3.691) (0.271) (3.068) 
New LG 1 Year Post-Event -0.983 -3.296 -0.127 -9.458 
 (1.321) (6.047) (0.222) (2.998)** 
New LG 2 Year Post-Event -1.096 -29.643 -0.342 -6.285 
 (0.612)+ (3.467)** (0.251) (2.909)* 
New LG 3 Year Post-Event -1.172 -28.847 -0.826 2.204 
 (0.600)+ (5.689)** (0.306)** (2.871) 
New LG 4 Year Post-Event -1.348 -23.903 -0.117 -5.252 
 (0.571)* (6.180)** (0.326) (3.593) 
New LG 5 Year Post-Event -1.261 -28.871 -0.250 -9.291 
 (0.617)* (5.434)** (0.270) (3.689)* 
New LG 6 Year Post-Event -0.973 0.343 -0.350 1.446 
 (0.676) (17.322) (0.383) (2.959) 
Origin LG 1 Year Post-Event 0.471 -4.459 -0.158 -10.231 
 (0.355) (2.645)+ (0.175) (2.722)** 
Origin LG 2 Year Post-Event 0.336 -5.483 -0.288 -6.081 
 (0.307) (2.961)+ (0.181) (2.404)* 
Origin LG 3 Year Post-Event 0.015 0.467 -0.331 0.112 
 (0.482) (4.556) (0.231) (2.772) 
Origin LG 4 Year Post-Event -0.141 -2.199 -0.460 -7.364 
 (0.445) (4.792) (0.285) (2.639)** 
Origin LG 5 Year Post-Event 0.400 -9.124 -0.262 -7.920 
 (0.556) (5.207)+ (0.208) (3.932)* 
Origin LG 6 Year Post-Event 0.835 -13.684 -0.094 3.347 
 (0.450)+ (4.340)** (0.336) (2.321) 
Constant -50.073 -121.180 22.109 40.467 
 (4.655)** (22.580)** (0.183)** (2.286)** 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
     
Observations 5058 4292 1446 1450 
Number of Municipalities 434 433 432 434 
R-squared  0.12 0.70 0.60 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table F 9. Basic Model Random Effect (RE) Estimations of Test Scores, Graduation Rate, Dropout Rate, 
and Infant Mortality Rate: Proliferated LG Sample 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dropout Rate IMR Test Scores Graduation Rate 
Dummy of New Local Government 1.285 21.598 -0.051 -0.805 
 (0.701)+ (3.924)** (0.251) (3.242) 
New LG Proliferation Event (Year 0) -0.799 0.425 0.260 3.701 
 (0.818) (7.123) (0.269) (3.532) 
New LG 1 Year Post-Event -1.363 1.922 0.097 -0.257 
 (1.393) (6.326) (0.249) (3.436) 
New LG 2 Year Post-Event -1.617 -22.289 0.042 -1.703 
 (0.607)** (3.827)** (0.272) (3.301) 
New LG 3 Year Post-Event -2.136 -23.395 -0.364 4.544 
 (0.609)** (5.908)** (0.340) (3.519) 
New LG 4 Year Post-Event -2.403 -22.329 0.351 1.797 
 (0.596)** (6.468)** (0.346) (3.965) 
New LG 5 Year Post-Event -1.883 -21.034 0.086 0.975 
 (0.668)** (6.040)** (0.283) (4.148) 
New LG 6 Year Post-Event -2.017 7.949 0.340 1.752 
 (0.661)** (17.682) (0.406) (3.425) 
Constant -34.079 -130.497 20.120 18.848 
 (6.697)** (38.593)** (0.293)** (4.042)** 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
     
Observations 2523 1990 689 724 
:umber of Municipalities 231 230 229 231 
R-squared  0.11 0.68 0.64 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%    
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Table F 10. Extended Model FE Panel Estimations: Dropout Rate, Infant Mortality Rate, Total Test Scores, 
and Graduation Rate (Full Sample) 
 Dropout Rate IMR Test Scores Graduation Rate 
     
New LG Proliferation Event (Year 0) -0.672 -11.973 -0.661 -21.424 
 (2.050) (14.644) (0.348) (7.779)** 
Origin LG Proliferation Event (Year 
0) 
0.239 -8.682 -0.137 -8.952 
 (0.509) (5.119) (0.267) (5.623) 
Dummy of Post-Event Proliferation 
New LG (all year responses) 
-3.345 -23.110 0.355 -5.370 
 (1.361)* (11.917) (0.517) (12.190) 
Dummy of Post-Event Proliferation 
Origin LG (all year responses) 
-0.203 -6.918 -0.048 -11.733 
 (0.422) (3.328)* (0.274) (4.653)* 
Number of Schools -0.004  0.000 0.008 
 (0.001)**  (0.000) (0.004)* 
Number of Teachers 0.000  -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of Doctors  0.001   
  (0.004)   
Number of Paramedics  -0.001   
  (0.005)   
Number of Clinics  0.153   
  (0.130)   
Population -0.002 -0.069 0.001 0.005 
 (0.002) (0.022)** (0.001) (0.022) 
Population Square -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000) 
(Log) Income GRP -0.156 -0.954 0.034 -0.295 
 (0.166) (1.500) (0.070) (1.058) 
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation Index 1.596 4.424 0.416 -7.548 
 (1.757) (16.324) (0.766) (15.834) 
Gini Inequality Index -5.449 -19.712 -0.645 -66.008 
 (3.535) (28.190) (1.583) (31.371)* 
(Log) Per Capita of Equalization 
Grants 
-0.129 -0.117 0.168 3.680 
 (0.129) (1.357) (0.319) (6.415) 
(Log) Per Capita Lump-sum DAK 0.667 3.222 0.138 1.840 
 (0.570) (2.826) (0.147) (3.187) 
(Log) Share of non-extractive Tax 
sharing 
-0.161 -2.025 0.203 2.112 
 (0.357) (2.139) (0.183) (3.481) 
(Log) Share of Natural Resource Tax 
Sharing 
-0.096 0.075 -0.071 -0.848 
 (0.067) (0.601) (0.045) (0.794) 
Constant -7.365 51.058 14.373 20.850 
 (3.539)* (37.594) (2.179)** (44.936) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 2450 2184 692 650 
Municipalities 356 352 322 321 
Overall R Square 0.24 0.07 0.20 0.74 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table F 11. Extended Model RE Panel Estimations: Dropout Rate, Infant Mortality Rate, Total Test Scores, and 
Graduation Rate (Full Sample) 
 
 Dropout Rate IMR Test Scores Graduation Rate 
Dummy New Local Government  2.614 25.100 -0.667 -4.713 
 (1.031)* (5.863)** (0.281)* (5.466) 
Dummy OriginLocal Government 1.079 12.169 -0.644 -0.974 
 (0.708) (2.968)** (0.219)** (3.918) 
New LG Proliferation Event (Year 0) -0.998 -8.283 -0.317 -11.223 
 (1.954) (12.689) (0.235) (4.364)* 
Origin LG Proliferation Event (Year 0) 0.166 -6.854 0.048 -3.086 
 (0.493) (5.165) (0.244) (4.933) 
Dummy of Post-Event Proliferation New 
LG (all year responses) 
-3.449 -16.104 -0.213 -6.751 
 (1.066)** (9.101) (0.339) (6.273) 
Dummy of Post-Event Proliferation 
Origin LG (all year responses) 
-0.289 -6.663 0.025 -7.433 
 (0.377) (3.000)* (0.196) (3.533)* 
Number of Schools -0.004  0.000 0.004 
 (0.001)**  (0.000) (0.003) 
Number of Teachers -0.000  0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of Doctors  -0.001   
  (0.004)   
Number of Paramedics  0.001   
  (0.004)   
Number of Clinics  0.139   
  (0.123)   
Population 0.002 -0.012 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.000) (0.005) 
Population Square -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
(Log) Income GRP -0.325 -0.950 0.179 0.899 
 (0.163)* (1.128) (0.079)* (1.114) 
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation Index -3.379 -10.257 -0.465 -6.767 
 (1.058)** (4.833)* (0.261) (4.826) 
Gini Inequality Index -9.569 -68.597 0.749 -18.358 
 (3.431)** (26.309)** (1.119) (19.433) 
(Log) Per Capita Equalization Grants 
(Avg . 1993-1998) 
-1.514 -4.969 -0.387 -5.534 
 (0.581)** (2.482)* (0.131)** (2.378)* 
(Log) Per Capita of Equalization Grants -0.141 0.062 0.430 6.224 
 (0.114) (1.344) (0.166)** (3.074)* 
(Log) Per Capita Lump-sum DAK 0.618 4.596 0.001 1.993 
 (0.548) (2.703) (0.071) (1.438) 
(Log) Share of non-extractive Tax 
sharing 
-0.056 -2.375 0.356 3.786 
 (0.316) (2.018) (0.101)** (1.836)* 
(Log) Share of Natural Resource Tax 
Sharing 
-0.074 0.603 -0.053 -0.150 
 (0.065) (0.510) (0.025)* (0.410) 
Number of Active NGO 0.043 0.137 -0.014 -0.203 
 (0.017)* (0.078) (0.004)** (0.071)** 
Political Competition -0.058 -0.346 0.016 0.093 
 (0.014)** (0.058)** (0.003)** (0.056) 
Constant 4.183 62.924 12.578 0.871 
 (4.984) (31.363)* (1.458)** (25.837) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2450 2184 692 650 
Municipalities 356 352 322 321 
Overall R Square 0.22 0.18 0.48 0.54 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table F 12.  Extended Model FE Panel Estimations: Dropout Rate, Infant Mortality Rate, Total Test 
Scores, and Graduation Rate (Proliferated LG Sample) 
 Dropout Rate IMR Test Scores Graduation Rate 
     
New LG Proliferation Event (Year 0) -0.215 -15.056 0.259 -13.849 
 (2.163) (16.485) (0.796) (15.028) 
Dummy of Post-Event Proliferation 
New LG (all year responses) 
-2.917 -17.092 -0.070 7.576 
 (1.383)* (12.243) (1.195) (27.415) 
Number of Schools -0.001  0.000 0.005 
 (0.001)  (0.000) (0.009) 
Number of Teachers -0.000  -0.000 0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) 
Number of Doctors  0.013   
  (0.016)   
Number of Paramedics  -0.014   
  (0.019)   
Number of Clinics  0.230   
  (0.253)   
Population 0.003 -0.102 0.003 0.028 
 (0.002) (0.031)** (0.002) (0.041) 
Population Square -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000) 
(Log) Income GRP -0.444 -4.032 0.203 4.284 
 (0.484) (3.817) (0.385) (7.397) 
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation 
Index 
2.517 16.424 -2.733 -21.220 
 (2.169) (23.903) (1.738) (34.944) 
Gini Inequality Index -2.738 -55.654 -6.714 -134.922 
 (5.888) (56.048) (4.464) (96.419) 
(Log) Per Capita Equalization Grants 
(Avg. 1993-1998) 
    
     
(Log) Per Capita of Equalization 
Grants 
0.088 1.978 0.620 11.528 
 (0.208) (2.139) (0.656) (13.145) 
(Log) Per Capita Lump-sum DAK 0.619 4.219 0.020 4.846 
 (0.609) (3.018) (0.316) (6.675) 
(Log) Share of non-extractive Tax 
sharing 
-0.300 -4.463 0.270 7.720 
 (0.807) (3.990) (0.377) (8.104) 
(Log) Share of Natural Resource Tax 
Sharing 
-0.158 0.824 -0.020 -2.071 
 (0.129) (1.230) (0.134) (3.027) 
Constant -9.647 45.568 11.950 -62.593 
 (8.203) (76.505) (5.473)* (109.450) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 911 769 217 201 
Municipalities 165 161 128 125 
Overall R Square 0.19 0.12 0.29 0.78 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table F 13.  Extended Model RE Panel Estimations: Dropout Rate, Infant Mortality Rate, Total Test 
Scores, and Graduation Rate (Proliferated LG Sample) 
 Dropout Rate IMR Test Scores Graduation Rate 
Dummy New Local Government 1.081 8.196 0.189 1.502 
 (0.760) (6.093) (0.281) (5.542) 
New LG Proliferation Event (Year 0) -0.663 -9.714 -0.249 -5.956 
 (2.064) (13.444) (0.249) (4.805) 
Dummy of Post-Event Proliferation 
New LG (all year responses) 
-3.333 -10.947 -0.252 -5.187 
 (0.958)** (8.699) (0.383) (6.903) 
Number of Schools -0.000  -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.000) (0.006) 
Number of Teachers -0.000  0.000 0.001 
 (0.000)**  (0.000) (0.001) 
Number of Doctors  -0.003   
  (0.013)   
Number of Paramedics  0.003   
  (0.014)   
Number of Clinics  0.179   
  (0.214)   
Population 0.003 -0.031 0.000 0.003 
 (0.001)* (0.010)** (0.000) (0.008) 
Population Square -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000)* (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000) 
(Log) Income GRP -1.003 -3.421 0.031 -2.675 
 (0.411)* (2.275) (0.107) (2.058) 
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation Index -1.304 -11.193 -0.190 6.562 
 (1.455) (7.389) (0.385) (7.144) 
Gini Inequality Index -4.748 -102.132 -1.195 -21.037 
 (5.643) (53.728) (1.919) (36.289) 
(Log) Per Capita Equalization Grants 
(Avg. 1993-1998) 
-0.540 -11.346 -0.797 -13.610 
 (0.771) (4.215)** (0.229)** (4.029)** 
(Log) Per Capita of Equalization 
Grants 
-0.080 1.297 0.326 5.071 
 (0.171) (2.027) (0.201) (4.210) 
(Log) Per Capita Lump-sum DAK 0.505 4.899 0.011 2.046 
 (0.601) (2.821) (0.071) (1.392) 
(Log) Share of non-extractive Tax 
sharing 
0.100 -6.245 0.289 3.219 
 (0.614) (3.229) (0.149) (2.751) 
(Log) Share of Natural Resource Tax 
Sharing 
-0.075 1.188 -0.049 -0.525 
 (0.114) (0.870) (0.038) (0.592) 
Number of Active NGO 0.006 -0.021 -0.009 -0.080 
 (0.016) (0.089) (0.005) (0.113) 
Political Competition -0.012 -0.233 0.007 -0.005 
 (0.015) (0.082)** (0.004) (0.074) 
Constant 6.781 102.855 15.945 55.425 
 (8.532) (63.124) (1.787)** (35.489) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 911 769 241 228 
Municipalities 165 161 132 133 
Overall R Square 0.22 0.17 0.32 0.54 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table F 14.  Extended Model Pooled Heckman Estimations: Dropout Rate, Infant Mortality Rate, Total 
Test Scores, and Graduation Rate 
 Dropout Rate IMR Test Scores Graduation Rate 
Constant 4.494552 53.05859 14.06087 23.07917 
 (3.617) (25.296)** (0.548)** (8.040)** 
Dummy of New Local Government 3.605697 30.71835 -0.60918 0.308603 
 (0.565)** (3.310) (0.234)** (3.317) 
Dummy of Origin Local Government 1.367977 15.03677 -0.93848 -1.53084 
 (0.414)** (2.299) (0.189)** (2.861) 
New LG Proliferation Event (Year 0) -0.06325 7.637721 -0.06318 -0.0899 
 (1.168) (7.395)** (0.334) (4.457) 
Origin LG Proliferation Event (Year 0) 0.139136 -2.79591 0.246829 1.148439 
 (1.006) (5.277)** (0.286) (4.167) 
Dummy of Post-Event Proliferation 
New LG (all year responses) -3.41187 -13.9154 -0.11768 -12.0216 
 (1.043)** (5.063)** (0.297) (4.148)** 
Dummy of Post-Event Proliferation 
Origin LG (all year responses) -0.99289 -5.91308 0.143909 -5.79103 
 (0.692) (3.439)+ (0.205) (3.031)+ 
Number of Schools -0.00241  -0.0003 -0.00116 
 (0.001)*  (0.000) (0.003) 
Number of Teachers -0.00087  3.93E-05 0.000522 
 (0.000)**  (0.000)+ (0.000)+ 
Number of Doctors  -0.00437   
  (0.005)   
Number of Paramedics  0.003048   
  (0.006)   
Number of Clinics  0.156615   
  (0.080)*   
Time Dummies Yes Yes   
     
Population 0.009783 0.000689 -0.0005 -0.00261 
 (0.001)** (0.004) (0.000)* (0.004) 
Population Square -1.47E-06 -9.01E-07 7.68E-08 1.26E-07 
 (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
(Log) Income GRP -1.28062 -3.73447 0.452011 3.376254 
 (0.195)** (1.058)** (0.066)** (0.966)** 
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation Index -5.1263 -10.9614 -0.88085 -7.02081 
 (0.593) (3.172)** (0.190)** (2.900)* 
Gini Inequality Index -22.3081 -83.0825 1.440924 -8.9566 
 (3.384)** (17.835)** (1.057) (15.105) 
Selection     
(Log) Per Capita Equalization Grants 
(Avg . 1993-1998) 0.624598 0.030621 -0.8149 -0.75195 
 (0.130)** (0.056) (0.065)** (0.063)** 
(Log) Per Capita of Equalization 
Grants 0.105555 0.165545 1.51428 1.415816 
 (0.049)* (0.026)** (0.056)** (0.055)** 
(Log) Per Capita Lump-sum DAK -0.04029 -0.09261 -0.11937 -0.05826 
 (0.055) (0.035)** (0.043)** (0.040) 
(Log) Share of non-extractive Tax 
sharing 0.291039 0.132456 0.231874 0.140855 
 (0.108)** (0.055)* (0.068)** (0.064)* 
(Log) Share of Natural Resource Tax 
Sharing -0.0441 -0.06722 -0.02854 0.028402 
 (0.033) (0.017)** (0.018) (0.017)+ 
Number of Active NGOs (2003) 0.039145 0.01651 0.003678 0.002303 
 (0.006)** (0.002)** (0.002)+ (0.002) 
Political Competition (1999) -0.00267 -0.00861 0.004449 0.003422 
 (0.003) (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)* 
Geographic Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LR Test of Independence 0.017 0.0034 0.0000 0.0000 
Total Observations 2572 2833 3648 3645 
Censored 122 649 2956 2995 
Log Likelihood -8471.96 -12100.3 -1880.82 -3560.2 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table F 15.  Extended Model Random Effect (RE) Estimations of Test Scores, Graduation Rate, Dropout 
Rate, and Infant Mortality Rate (IMR): Full Sample 
 Dropout Rate IMR Test Scores Graduation Rate 
Dummy of New Local 
Government 
2.46205 28.39726 -0.59605 -3.09592 
 (1.04194)* (5.95314)** (0.29088)* (5.39299) 
Dummy of Origin Local 
Government 
1.15616 12.52747 -0.56087 -1.75428 
 (0.71899) (2.92017)** (0.21990)* (3.56472) 
New LG Proliferation Event 
(Year 0) 
-1.47266 -0.77421 -0.62051 -10.39647 
 (2.12883) (12.64625) (0.26859)* (4.48140)* 
Origin LG Proliferation Event 
(Year 0) 
0.07225 -6.95179 -0.00635 -4.56785 
 (0.49930) (5.11789) (0.26576) (4.72491) 
New LG 1 Year Post-Event -6.31493 21.74907   
 (2.61867)* (17.74934)   
New LG 2 Year Post-Event -2.57701 -34.27574 0.09864 -11.11794 
 (1.00017)** (9.05089)** (0.46562) (7.93223) 
New LG 3 Year Post-Event -2.05893 -29.38097 -0.54304 -0.87411 
 (1.65601) (12.35425)* (0.45687) (6.34481) 
New LG 4 Year Post-Event -2.67508 -17.71333 -0.30445 -11.03374 
 (1.15716)* (12.95800) (0.38690) (5.95190)+ 
New LG 5 Year Post-Event -4.84465 -37.45987 -0.12228 -11.03277 
 (1.59924)** (8.35572)** (0.37504) (6.57952)+ 
New LG 6 Year Post-Event  41.82400 -0.25565 1.38940 
  (61.54882) (0.58747) (6.32928) 
Origin LG 1 Year Post-Event -0.49469 -6.18140 0.03986 -8.84082 
 (0.50090) (3.62210)+ (0.21464) (3.40040)** 
Origin LG 2 Year Post-Event -0.86353 -8.62034 -0.16112 -3.79008 
 (0.45863)+ (4.03088)* (0.20307) (3.09632) 
Origin LG 3 Year Post-Event -0.44648 -2.62772 -0.07956 -2.06969 
 (0.69094) (5.42186) (0.28384) (4.18279) 
Origin LG 4 Year Post-Event -0.40844 -3.64738 0.10351 -3.83238 
 (0.93136) (7.27174) (0.30175) (3.67293) 
Origin LG 5 Year Post-Event -0.22680 -11.16972 0.02984 -5.38139 
 (0.63397) (6.04599)+ (0.24394) (4.49679) 
Origin LG 6 Year Post-Event  -14.50172 -0.01161 7.84254 
  (5.62531)** (0.35520) (3.19208)* 
Constant 5.26754 62.17286 17.09895 14.91983 
 (5.03757) (30.81050)* (1.63433)** (21.74689) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Set of Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 2450 2184 885 842 
:umber of Municipalities 356 352 329 328 
Overall R-squared 0.22 0.19 0.81 0.63 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table F 16. Extended Model Random Effect (RE) Estimations of Test Scores, Graduation Rate, Dropout 
Rate, and Infant Mortality Rate (IMR): Proliferated LG Sample 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dropout Rate IMR Test Scores Graduation Rate 
Dummy of New Local 
Government 
0.847 9.767 0.197 1.328 
 (0.756) (6.062) (0.279) (5.546) 
New LG Proliferation Event 
(Year 0) 
-1.223 -4.164 -0.073 -2.712 
 (2.244) (13.615) (0.282) (5.529) 
New LG 1 Year Post-Event -6.861 15.485   
 (2.622)** (16.959)   
New LG 2 Year Post-Event -2.338 -24.612 -0.396 -6.631 
 (0.934)* (9.336)** (0.504) (8.856) 
New LG 3 Year Post-Event -1.961 -23.612 0.537 12.388 
 (1.559) (12.852)+ (0.508) (9.168) 
New LG 4 Year Post-Event -2.242 -19.490 -0.501 -9.364 
 (1.209)+ (13.629) (0.452) (7.826) 
New LG 5 Year Post-Event -3.276 -25.740 -0.243 -6.454 
 (1.216)** (8.319)** (0.441) (7.470) 
New LG 6 Year Post-Event  59.816   
  (62.176)   
Constant 7.843 111.452 15.543 46.027 
 (8.677) (59.463) (1.823)** (36.127) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographic Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Set of Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 911 769 241 228 
:umber of Municipalities 165 161 132 133 
R-squared 0.23 0.20 0.33 0.55 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
169 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Ahmad, Junaid, Shantayanan Devarajan, Stuti Khemani, and Shekhar Shah 2005. 
Decentralization and service delivery. World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper, no. 3603. 
 
Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and Caroline Hoxby. 2004. Political jurisdictions in 
heterogeneous communities. Journal of Political Economy 112, no. 2: 348-96. 
 
Alesina, Alberto and Enrico Spolaore 2003. The size of nations. Cambridge and London: 
MIT Press. 
 
Alm, James, Robert H. Aten, and Roy Bahl. 2001. Can Indonesia decentralise 
successfully? Plans, problems and prospects. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies 37, no.1: 83-102. 
 
Arzaghi, Mohammad, and J. Vernon Henderson 2005. Why countries are fiscally 
decentralizing? Journal of Public Economics 89, no. 7: 1157-89. 
 
Austin, D. Andrew 1999. Politics vs. Economics: Evidence from municipal annexation. 
Journal of Urban Economics 45, no. 3: 501-32. 
 
Austin, D. Andrew 1998. A positive model of special district formation. Regional Science 
and Urban Economics 28, no. 1: 103-22. 
 
Bahl, Roy 1986. The Design of Intergovernmental Transfers in Industrialized Countries. 
Public Budgeting and Finance 6, no. 4: 3-22. 
 
Bahl, Roy, and Johannes Linn 1994. Fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental 
transfers in less developed countries. Publius 24, no. 1: 1-20. 
 
Bahl, Roy, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and Sally Wallace. 2002. State and Local 
Government Choices in Fiscal Redistribution. :ational Tax Journal 55, no. 4: 
723-42. 
 
Bahl, Roy, and Sally Wallace. 2007. Intergovernmental Transfers: The Vertical Sharing 
Dimension. In J. Martinez-Vazquez and Bob Searle (eds). Fiscal Equalization: 
Challenges in the Design of Intergovernmental Transfers. New York: Springer. 
205-50. 
 
Baicker, Katherine and Nora Gordon. 2006. The effect of state education finance reform 
on total local resources. Journal of Public Economics 90, no. 8-9: 1519-35. 
 
Barankay, Iwan, and Ben Lockwood. 2007. Decentralization and the productive 
efficiency of government: Evidence from Swiss cantons. Journal of Public 
170 
 
Economics 91, no. 5-6: 1197-218. 
 
Bardhan, Pranab 2002. Decentralization of governance and development. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 16, no. 4: 185-205. 
 
Bardhan, Pranab, and Dilip Mookherjee. 2006. Decentralisation and accountability in 
infrastructure delivery in developing countries. Economic Journal 116, no. 508: 
101-27.  
 
Besley, Timothy, and Anne Case. 1995. Incumbent behavior: Vote-seeking, tax-setting, 
and yardstick competition. American Economic Review 85, no. 1: 25-45. 
 
Besley, Timothy, and Stephen Coate. 2003. Centralized versus decentralized provision of 
local public goods: A political economy approach. Journal of Public Economics 
87, no. 12: 2611-37. 
 
Besley, Timothy, and L. J. Cord. 2007. Delivering on the Promise of Pro-Poor Growth: 
Insights and Lessons from Country Experiences. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
 
Bird, Richard M., and Enid Slack. 2007. An approach to metropolitan governance and 
finance, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 25, no. 5: 729-55 
 
Bish, Robert L., and Vincent Ostrom. 1973. Understanding Urban Government: 
Metropolitan Reform Reconsidered. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research. 
 
Bjork, C. 2003. Local Responses to Decentralization Policy in Indonesia. Comparative 
Education Review 47, no. 2: 184-216. 
 
Bjorvatn, Kjetil, and Alexander W. Cappelen. 2006. Redistribution and the nature of 
altruism: Should welfare programs be centralized or decentralized? Economics of 
Governance 7, no. 2: 133-42. 
 
Bokhari, Farasat A. S., Yanwei Gai, and Pablo Gottret. 2007. Government health 
expenditures and health outcomes. Health Economics 16, no. 3: 257-73. 
 
Booth, Anne. 2003. Decentralisation and poverty alleviation in Indonesia. Environment 
and Planning C: Government and Policy 21, no. 2: 181-202. 
 
Bourdeaux, Carolyn. 2005. A question of genesis: An analysis of the determinants of 
public authorities. Journal Public Administration Research and Theory 15, no. 3: 
441-62. 
 
Bourdeaux, Carolyn. 2007. Reexamining the claim of public authority efficacy. 
Administration Society 39, no. 1: 77-106. 
 
171 
 
Boyne, George A. 1992. Local Government Structure and Performance: Lessons from 
America? Public Administration 70, no. 3: 333-57. 
 
Brancati, Dawn. 2006. Decentralization: Fueling the fire or dampening the flames of 
ethnic conflict and secessionism? International Organization 60, no. 3: 651-85. 
 
Brasington, David M. 1997. School district consolidation, student performance, and 
housing values. Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy 27, no. 2: 43-54.  
 
Breierova, Lucia, and Esther Duflo. 2004. The Impact of Education on Fertility and Child 
Mortality: Do Fathers Really Matter Less Than Mothers? NBER Working Papers, 
no. 10513. 
 
Brennan, Geoffrey, and James M. Buchanan. 1980. The power to tax: Analytical 
foundations of a fiscal constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Breton, Albert. 1987. Towards a theory of competitive federalism. European Journal of 
Political Economy 31, no. 2: 263-329. 
 
Breusch, T. S., and A. R. Pagan. 1979. A Simple Test for Heteroscedasticity and Random 
Coefficient Variation, The Econometric Society. 47, no. 5: 1287-94. 
 
Brink, Anna. 2004. The break-up of municipalities: voting behavior in local referenda. 
Economics of Governance 5, no. 2: 119-35. 
 
Brodjonegoro, Bambang, and Jorge Martinez Vazquez. 2004. An Analysis of Indonesia’s 
transfer system: recent performance and future prospect. In James Alm, Jorge 
Martinez-Vazquez, and Srimulyani Indrawati (eds). Reforming Intergovernmental 
Fiscal Relations and the Rebuilding of Indonesia. Chentelham: Edwar Elgar. 159-
98 
 
Buchanan, James M., and Roger L. Faith. 1987. Secession and the limits of taxation: 
toward a theory of internal exits secession and the limits of taxation: Toward a 
theory of internal exits. American Economic Review 77, no. 5: 1023-31. 
 
Burns, Nancy. 1994. The formation of American local governments: Private values in 
public institutions. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Byrnes, Joel, and Brian Dollery. 2002. Do Economies of Scale Exist in Australian Local 
Government? A Review of the Research Evidence, Urban Policy and Research. 
20, no. 4: 391-14. 
  
Cameron, A. Colin, and Pravin K. Trivedi. 2005. Microeconometrics: Methods and 
Applications. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Case, Anne C., Harvey S. Rosen, and James R. Hines. 1993. Budget spillovers and fiscal 
172 
 
policy interdependence: Evidence from the States. Journal of Public Economics 
52, no. 3: 285-307. 
 
CBS. 2006. Selected Indicator Socio-Economic Indonesia, available at Central Bureau of 
Statistic website http://www.bps.go.id/leaflet/bookletjuli2006.pdf, accessed 22 
May, 2008. 
 
CBS. 2007. Regency/Municipality Codes 1993-2007, available at website 
http://www.bps.go.id/mstkab/index.shtml, accessed 22 May, 2008. 
 
DSF. 2007. Costs and Benefits of :ew Region Creation in Indonesia. Final Report. 
Jakarta: Decentralization Support Facilities (DSF). 
 
Duncombe, William, Jerry Miner, and John Ruggiero 1995. Potential cost savings from 
school district consolidation: A Case study of New York. Economics of Education 
Review 14, no. 3: 265-84. 
 
Epple, Dennis, and Thomas Romer. 1989. On the Flexibility of Municipal Boundaries. 
Journal of Urban Economics 26, no.3: 307-19. 
 
Esteban, Joan-Maria, and Debraj Ray. 1994. On the measurement of polarization. 
Econometrica 62, no. 4: 819-51. 
 
Fane, George. 2003. Change and continuity in Indonesia's new fiscal decentralisation 
arrangements. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 39, no. 2: 159-76. 
 
Fisher, Ronald C., and Robert W. Wassmer. 1998. Economic influences on the structure 
of local government in U.S. Metropolitan Areas. Journal of Urban Economics 43, 
no. 3: 444-71. 
 
Fitrani, Fitria, Bert Hofman, and Kai Kaiser. 2005. Unity in diversity? The creation of 
new local governments in a decentralising Indonesia. Bulletin of Indonesian 
Economic Studies 41, no. 1: 57-79. 
 
Fox, William F., and Tami Gurley. 2006. Will consolidation improve sub-national 
governments? The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series: 3913. 
 
Garcia, Jorge, and Lana Soelistianingsih. 1998. Why Do Differences in Provincial 
Incomes Persist in Indonesia? Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 34, no. 1: 
95-120. 
 
Geys, Benny. 2006. Looking across borders: A test of spatial policy interdependence 
using local government efficiency ratings. Journal of Urban Economics 60, no. 3: 
443-62. 
 
Gideon, Jasmine. 1998. The politics of social service provision through NGOs: A study 
173 
 
of Latin America. Bulletin of Latin American Research 173: 303-21. 
 
Ginsburgh, Victor. 2005. Languages, genes, and cultures. Journal of Cultural Economics 
29, no. 1: 1-17. 
 
Gordon, Nora, and Brian G. Knight 2006. The causes of political integration: An 
application to school districts. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, 
NBER Working Paper: 12047. 
 
Gordon, Nora, and Emiliana Vegas. 2005. Educational Finance Equalization, Spending, 
Teacher Quality, and Student Outcomes: The Case of Brazil's FUNDEF, in 
Incentives to Improve Teaching: Lessons from Latin America, Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank: 151-86. 
 
Grossman, Philip J. 1994. A political theory of intergovernmental grants. Public Choice 
78, no. 3-4: 295-303. 
 
Hagihara, Kiyoko, and Yoshimi Hagihara. 1991. The role of intergovernmental grants in 
underpopulated regions. Regional Studies 25, no. 2: 163-72. 
 
Haimanko, Ori, Michel Le Breton, and Shlomo Weber. 2005. Transfers in a polarized 
country: Bridging the gap between efficiency and stability. Journal of Public 
Economics 89, no. 7: 1277-303. 
 
Hausman, Jerry A. 1978. Specification Tests in Econometrics. The Econometric Society. 
46, no. 6: 1251-71. 
 
Hofman, Bert, Kadjatmiko, Kai Kaiser, and Bambang S. Suharnoko. 2006. Evaluating 
Fiscal Equalization in Indonesia. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 
no. 3911. 
 
Hoxby, Caroline M. 2000. The effects of class size on student achievement: New 
evidence from population variation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, no. 4: 
1239-85. 
 
Jones, Gavin W., Laila Nagib, Sumono and Tri Handayani. 1998. The Expansion of High 
School Education in Poor Regions: The Case of East Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia. 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 34, no. 3: 59-84. 
 
Jordahl, Henrik and Che-Yuan Liang. 2006. Merged Municipalities, Higher Debt: On 
Free-riding and the Common Pool Problem in Politics, Research Institute of 
Industrial Economics, Working Paper Series, No 679. 
 
Kiefer, Nicholas M. 1988. Economic duration data and hazard functions, Journal of 
Economic Literature 26, no. 2: 646-679. 
 
174 
 
Krause, George A. and Ann O. M. Bowman. 2005. Adverse selection, political parties, 
and policy delegation in the American federal system. Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization 21, no. 2: 359-87. 
 
Lago-Penas, Santiago, and Bruno Ventelou. 2006. The effects of regional sizing on 
growth. Public Choice 127, no. 3-4: 415-35. 
 
Lanjouw, Peter, Menno Pradhan, Fadia Saadah, Hanen Sayeed, and Robert Sparrow. 
2001. Poverty, education and health in Indonesia: Who benefits from public 
spending? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, no. 2739. 
 
Law No. 22/1999. 1999. Undang-Undang tentang Pemerintahan Daerah (Law on Sub-
national Government). 
 
Law No. 25/1999. 1999. Undang-Undang tentang Dana Perimbangan (Law on 
Intergovernmental Transfers). 
 
Law No. 32/2004. 2004. Undang-Undang tentang Pemerintahan Daerah (Amended Law 
on Sub-national Government). 
 
Law No. 33/2004 Undang-Undang tentang Dana Perimbangan (Amended Law on 
Intergovernmental Transfers). 
 
Le Breton, Michel, and Shlomo Weber 2003. The art of making everybody happy: How 
to prevent a secession? International Monetary Fund, IMF Staff Papers vol. 50, 
no. 3: 403-35. 
 
Lowery, David, and William E. Lyons 1989. The impact of jurisdictional boundaries: An 
individual-level test of the Tiebout model. Journal of Politics 51, no. 1: 73-97. 
 
Luoma, Kalevi, Antti Moisio, and Juho Aaltonen. 2007. Secessions of Municipal Health 
Centre Federations: Expenditure and Productivity Effects. VATT Discussion 
Papers. 
 
Luttmer, Erzo F.P. 2001. Group loyalty and the taste for redistribution. Journal of 
Political Economy 109, no. 3: 500-28. 
 
Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge, Mark Rider, and Maribeth Walker 1997. Race and the structure 
of school districts in the United States. Journal of Urban Economics 41, no. 2: 
281-300. 
 
Matsubayashi, Tetsuya. 2007. Population Size, Local Autonomy, and Support for the 
Political System. Social Science Quarterly 88, no. 3: 830-49. 
 
McGuire, Martin C. 1991. Group composition, collective consumption, and collaborative 
production. American Economic Review 81, no. 5: 1391-1407. 
175 
 
 
McMahon, Walter W., and Boediono. 1992. Universal basic education: An overall 
strategy of investment priorities for economic growth. Economics of Education 
Review 11, no. 2: 137-51. 
 
Meligrana, John F. 2000. Toward a Process Model of Local Government Restructuring: 
Evidence from Canada. Canadian Journal of Regional Science 23, no. 3: 509-30. 
 
Mikesell, John L. 2007. Developing Options for the Administration of Local Taxes: An 
International Review. Public Budgeting and Finance. 27, no. 1: 41-68.  
 
MOF. 2007. Municipalities’ Budget Realizations 1994-2005, available at Indonesian 
Ministry of Finance website at http://www.sikd.djapk.go.id/, accessed 22 May, 
2008. 
 
MOHA. 2008. Law and Regulation Archive: 2003-2008, available at Ministry of Home 
Affairs website at http://www.depdagri.go.id/konten.php?nama=ProdukHukum, 
accessed 22 May, 2008.   
 
MoNE. 2007. EBTANAS/UNAS 1998-2006, available at Ministry of National Education 
website at http://puspendik.com/ebtanas, accessed 15 March, 2006. 
 
Ministry of State Secretary. 2005. Law Archive: 1998-2005, available at website 
http://www.setneg.go.id/index.php?option=com_perundangan&catid=1&Itemid=
42&catname=UU&tahun=1999, accessed 20 June 2007. 
 
Musgrave, Richard A. 1959. The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy. 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Musgrave, Richard A. 1997. Devolution, grants, and fiscal competition. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 11, no. 4: 65-72. 
 
Nelson, Michael A. 1992. Municipal amalgamation and the growth of the local public 
sector in Sweden. Journal of Regional Science 32, no. 1: 39-53. 
 
Oates, Wallaces E. 1972. Fiscal Federalism. New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
 
Oates, Wallaces E. 1999. An essay on fiscal federalism. Journal of Economic Literature 
37, no. 3: 1120-49. 
 
Panizza, Ugo. 1999. On the determinants of fiscal centralization: Theory and evidence. 
Journal of Public Economics 74, no. 1: 97-139. 
 
PODES. 2003. Community Village Survey (PODES) 2003. Jakarta: Central Bureau of 
Statistic. 
 
176 
 
PP No. 129/2000, Tata Cara Pembentukan, Penghapusan, dan Penggabungan Daerah, 
Presidential Decree. 
 
PP No. 78/2007, Tata Cara Pembentukan, Penghapusan, dan Penggabungan Daerah, 
Presidential Decree. 
 
Pradhan, Menno. 1998. Enrolment and Delayed Enrolment of Secondary School Age 
Children in Indonesia. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 60, no. 4: 413-
30. 
 
Rogers, Diane Lim, and John H. Rogers 2000. Political Competition and State 
Government Size: Do Tighter Elections Produce Looser Budgets? Public Choice 
105, no. 1:1-21 
 
Rowland, Allison M. 2001. Population as a determinant of local outcomes under 
decentralization: Illustrations from small municipalities in Bolivia and Mexico. 
World Development 29, no. 8: 1373-389. 
 
Sakai, Minako. 2003. Resisting the Mainland: The Formation of the Province of the 
Bangka Belitung, in Damien K. and H. Aveling (eds), Autonomy and 
Disintegration in Indonesia, London, U.K: Routledge Curzon, Ch 12: 189-201. 
 
Seabright, Paul. 1996. Accountability and decentralisation in government: An incomplete 
contracts model. European Economic Review 40, no. 1: 61-89. 
 
Shah, Anwar. 1998. Balance, accountability, and responsiveness: Lessons about 
decentralization. Washington, D.C: World Bank 
 
Sidik, Machfud. 2007. A :ew Perspective of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations: 
Lessons from Indonesia’s Experience, Jakarta: Ripelge. 
 
Slack, Enid. 2007. Managing the Coordination of Service Delivery in Metropolitan 
Cities: The Role of Metropolitan Governance. World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper, no. 4317. 
 
Smoke, Paul, and Blane D. Lewis. 1996. Fiscal decentralization in Indonesia: A new 
approach to an old idea. World Development 24, no. 8: 1281-99. 
 
Sole-Olle, Albert, and Nuria Bosch. 2005. On the Relationship between Authority Size 
and the Costs of Providing Local Services: Lessons for the Design of 
Intergovernmental Transfers in Spain. Public Finance Review 33, no. 3: 343-84. 
 
Taylor, Charles L., and Michael C. Hudson. 1972. World Handbook of Political and 
Social Indicators. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
177 
 
Tiebout, Charles M. 1956. A pure theory of local expenditures. The Journal of Political 
Economy 64, no. 5: 416-24. 
 
Tovmo, Per, and Torberg Falch. 2002. The Flypaper Effect and Political Strength. 
Economics of Governance 3, no. 2: 153-70. 
 
Tyrefors, Bjorn. 2006. Do Politicians Free-ride? An empirical test of the common pool 
model. Stockholm School of Economics Working Paper Series in Economics and 
Finance, no. 626. 
 
UNDP. 2004. National Development Report 2004, The economics of democracy: 
Financing human development in Indonesia. Indonesia: BPS, Bappenas and 
UNDP. 
 
Villarreal, Andres. 2002. Political competition and violence in Mexico: Hierarchical 
social control in local patronage structures. American Sociological Review 67, no. 
4: 477-498. 
 
Warren, Carol. 2005. Mapping common futures: Customary communities, NGOs and the 
state in Indonesia's reform era. Development and Change 36, no. 1: 49-73. 
 
Wheelock, David C., and Paul W. Wilson. 2000. Why Do Banks Disappear? The 
Determinants of U.S. Bank Failures and Acquisitions. The Review of Economics 
and Statistics. 82, no. 1: 127-138. 
 
Wildasin, David E. 1984. The welfare effects of intergovernmental grants in an economy 
with distortionary local taxes. Journal of Public Economics 25, no. 1-2: 103-25. 
 
Winkelmann, Rainer. 2003. Econometric Analysis of Count Data. Berlin, New York: 
Springer. 
 
World Bank. 2005. East Asia Decentralizes: Making Local Government Work. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank 
 
Yoonjoung, Choi, , Fadia Saadah, Geoff Marks, Peter F. Heywood, and Jed Friedman. 
2006. Health sector decentralization and Indonesia's nutrition programs: 
Opportunities and challenges. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
Series, no. 39690. 
178 
 
VITA 
 
Riatu Mariatul Qibthiyyah was born in Jakarta, Indonesia. She received a Bachelors 
degree in Economics from Faculty of Economics University of Indonesia (UI) in 1999. 
She earned a Masters Degree from Georgia State University in 2002, which was funded 
by USAID (United States Aid for International Development). She continued in the Ph.D. 
in Economics program at Georgia State University and earned her doctoral degree in 
August, 2008.  
